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I N S I D E

The Belt Road Initiative and the Future of Globalisation: Perspectives from South Asia

Madhu Raman Acharya

Development of Daesh's Ideology

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Professor Helen Ware

The Evolution of Suicide Terrorism

Radhika Halder



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Editors Note

There is no permanent friend or enemy in the arena of International politics. The events in International arena are changing very fast. Countries are coming together for their common interest. In the era of constructivism states are following the path that leads to achieve their national economic interests in globalised market. The rise of terrorism and the changes in the tactics of terrorist activities are important issues. As a multi dimensional security review, this issue also highlights the aspects of military extremism, their development and Ideologies by which terrorists are influenced and the tactics they have been using.

The first article titled: The Belt Road Initiative and the Future of Globalization: Perspectives from South Asia by Madhu Raman Acharya demonstrates the BRI as a concept that encapsulates the Chinese thrust on “economic globalization”, which is supposed to be “inclusive, mutually-beneficial and equitable”, offers transformative opportunity in promoting global connectivity and regional economic integration. Together with China’s massive engagement abroad in terms of trade, investment, contracts and in political relations, the BRI constitutes a geopolitical grand strategy that creates both challenges as well as opportunities for South Asia. China already has strong economic relations with each of the countries in South Asia, with a huge trade surplus and massive investment and robust involvement in construction of big projects. The Chinese focus on “economic” globalization emanates from their worldview in which the neoliberal globalization is laden with political and cultural elements and which has created uneven results, inequality and divides in the world. To correct those mistakes of neoliberal globalization China visions a globalization, that is “for everyone, nor just a few”.

The Second article titled: Development of Daesh’s Ideology by Shafi Md Mostofa and Professor Helen Ware, illustrates how the ideology developed and results the formation of ISIS (Islamic States of Iraq and Syria). This ideology was not formulated overnight. Rather it has taken years to develop. In the process of formulation, many ideologues have played a significant role

through their writings. As an ideology it developed with the blend of Wahabi-salafi puritism and Islamist exclusivism. Islamic political ideologies developed by the scholars like Hasan Al Banna and Sayyid Abul Ala Mawdudi touched every aspect of human life and encourage to establish Sharia law through peaceful means. Influenced by Sayyid Qutb, father of salafi jihadism and salam faraj, Bin laden established Al Qaeda where the activists hold the view that the act of killing Jews and Americans are justified. With the evolving nature of the ideology the complete shape to Daesh's ideology came into existence with the understanding of Takfir by Zarqawi which permits killing anybody who becomes an apostate.

The Third article titled "The Evolution of Suicide Terrorism" by Ms. Radhika Halder beautifully focuses on the history and evolution of suicide attacks that has been continuously launches by various groups as a sort of tactics. The use of suicide attack a weapon in conflict is not an entirely new concept owing to the psychological leverage that the act of self sacrifice has. This very leverage is mostly sought by the weaker opponent in a conflict so as to make up for the asymmetry. As terrorism largely involves asymmetric warfare, the act of self sacrifice has been taken as an advantage in different ways by terror outfits in several phases or waves. Each phase or wave is a result of terror organizations learning from one another and mastering the art of employing suicide terrorism. It is then worthwhile to trace the evolution of suicide terrorism so as to understand the dangerous shape it has taken today.

In this interdependent globalised world countries are following the path that leads their own national economic interests. As a result they are going for economic pacts, projects and organisations to accelerate the economic growth. The security aspects have given priority as always, with the growing tendencies of using suicide terrorism by different terrorist groups. This volume thus illustrates on the future globalised world with mega project like BRI and the evolution of terrorism with its different ideologies and tactics.

Major General ANM Muniruzzaman, ndc, psc (Retd.)
Editor

The Belt Road Initiative and the Future of Globalisation: Perspectives from South Asia

*Madhu Raman Acharya*¹

Abstract

China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), commonly known as One Belt One Road (OBOR), offers transformative opportunity in promoting global connectivity and regional economic integration. Together with China's massive engagement abroad in terms of trade, investment, contracts and in political relations, the BRI constitutes a geopolitical grand strategy that creates both challenges as well as opportunities for South Asia. China already has strong economic relations with each of the countries in South Asia, with a huge trade surplus and massive investment and robust involvement in construction of big projects in each country. For South Asia, economic incentives available from the BRI outweigh its geopolitical or strategic dimensions, though they may undermine its economic benefits. However, the BRI's success will depend upon how the perceived or real strategic and geopolitical objectives and apprehension of the increasing Chinese footprint in each of these countries are addressed in a transparent and accommodative manner. Together with emerging issues in global governance, the environment of uncertainty, including the disarray in multilateralism, superpower rivalry, backlash against globalisation, return of geopolitics and emergence of protectionism and trade war can also affect the success of the BRI.

This paper seeks to examine some questions and issues around the BRI. Does BRI complement "*globalisation*" or seeks to counter it? Can the BRI become an alternate model for "*benign*" and inclusive globalisation? How should the countries in South Asia respond to rise of Chin and its alternative model for globalisation, global governance, economic integration, connectivity, trade

1 Paper presented at the *Asian Regional Conference on Belt and Road Initiative: Prospects and Challenge*, organized by the Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS) held in Dhaka on 12-13 September 2018

and investment that BRI wants to introduce? What are the factors that may hinder or add to the success of BRI? How do we avoid geopolitical and strategic implications and risks and challenges associated with the BRI in South Asia? What China and the participating countries need to do to make it work?

BRI and Globalisation

By all counts, BRI is a global project. It encompasses 78 countries covering nearly a third (30%) of the world GDP and two-thirds (70%) of the world's population. It covers most of Asia and the continental Europe as well as Africa. In a summit meeting of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) held in Beijing in September 2018, China has proposed to extend the BRI projects investing over \$ 60 billion in Africa. As such the mission of the BRI is for advancing "global development" through economic integration, connectivity and investment in infrastructure projects. Also described as the "Chinese answer" to globalisation, BRI is often labelled as "globalisation with the Chinese Characteristics".

The BRI encapsulates the Chinese thrust on "economic globalisation", which is supposed to be "inclusive, mutually-beneficial and equitable". The Chinese focus on "economic" globalisation emanates from their worldview in which the neoliberal globalisation is laden with political and cultural elements and which has created uneven results, inequality and divides in the world. To correct those mistakes of neoliberal globalisation China visions a globalisation that is "for everyone, nor just a few". "BRI is a golden age for globalisation", China's President Xi Jinping said in a speech at the BRI summit held in Beijing in May 2014. Xi Jinping has also said that "BRI is a pathway for global development, global governance and economic globalisation".

In that sense, the BRI has been referred to as "globalisation 2.0", with an alternative vision for globalisation in which there is supposed to be China's benign role in sharing the fruits of its economic development and surplus capability with the BRI countries. All the five pillars of the BRI (policy coordination; connectivity; trade; financial integration; and people-to-people contacts) seek to promote globalisation. Through the BRI, China is China projecting itself as the savior of globalisation. This was demonstrated in President Xi Jinping's strong defending of economic globalisation in January 2017 speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos.

Even without the BRI, China is already a major driver of globalisation. Since China's entry in into the WTO in 2001, the globalisation of the Chinese

manufacturing and trading companies has made China a truly global player in the world. China has been a major gainer from globalisation. According to the famous Elephant Chart produced by two World Bank economists, China, especially its middle class, was among those who gained from globalisation most^[1]. That is among the reasons why China is a big defender of globalisation.

In 2017, China's trade with BRI countries reached a huge \$ 1.44 trillion, in which its import is \$ 666 billion and export \$ 774 billion. So far, China has invested over \$ 60 billion in the BRI countries as Foreign Direct Investment. China ranks 7th position in the Global Interconnectedness Index. All of that speaks for a huge role of China in globalisation. The BRI is supposed to further accentuate and complement the process of globalisation, albeit in a different fashion.

Though it is risky to predict the future, it is likely that globalisation world stay. The factors like market integration, advancement of technology and dynamism of demography speak for an irreversible process of globalisation. Globalisation and nationalism may return in cycles and in varying degrees, just as period of economic boom and recession occur cyclically. Globalisation is also likely to stay because the cost of de-globalisation, protectionism and the "trade war" will be too high. One of the central challenges that undermine globalisation is the rising inequality among and within the nations. An Oxfam report showed that almost 82% of the world wealth generated in 2017 went to the wealthy 1% of the global population^[2]. Since 2015, a mere 1% of the global rich people owns more than half of the global wealth, according to the same report. If the trend continues, the global inequality will further exacerbate the pervasive social, economic and political challenges existing in the world. The thrust of globalisation may shift from neoliberal approach to a more social and environmental approach. Globalisation may find new champions for its defense. This is where role of China and its BRI project will become important. China is likely to become the key driver to globalisation in the time to come. The BRI can become an alternative model for globalisation, in which there is room for more inclusion and sharing of benefits to everyone, as China likes to pledge. BRI can also serve as a check on backlash against globalisation. It can also help correct some mistakes of the neo-liberal globalisation, which has resulted into winners and losers and into haves and have-nots.

Global factors affecting the success of the BRI

Since BRI is a project of global dimension, the overall global environment will largely affect its implementation and success. The increasing environment of uncertainty in the cooperative international environment at the global level, including the increasing disarray in multilateralism, undermining of the WTO trade rules and rising tide of protectionism and even escalating tension towards the evolution of a full scale “trade war” may greatly undermine the success of the BRI. Besides, the rise of populism and nationalism in many countries in the West as well as in the East may also undermine the environment of cooperation required for a project of this nature, which is sometimes described as China’s Marshall Plan or the “project of the century”. Besides, the fissures in global governance, especially the existing malfunctioning system and the alternative global governance mechanism emerging under China’s leadership may bring about new tensions that can hamper the implementation of the BRI and its sustainability.

The BRI may also be affected by the rising backlash against globalisation, also referred to as the process of “de-globalisation”, as there are supposed to be losers and gainers from the process, though China has insisted that BRI is a win-win enterprise. There may be fierce competition between the supporters of globalisation that China is hoping to lead and those opposed to it, especially the United States which has seen some retreat from its earlier posture for promoting globalisation.

The success of the BRI may hit the roadblock if the superpower rivalry between China and the United States becomes a full scale confrontation, especially after the continued rise of China as a global power. The world may enter into what has been called as the *Thucydides Trap*, in which conflict becomes inevitable as a new power challenges the existing big power and eventually seeks to replace that power’s supremacy^[3]. For starters, an ancient Greek historian Thucydides had explained such trap in his *The History of the Peloponnesian War* saying, “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.” There are already tensions between China and the USA on issues of trade, geopolitical issues in the South China Sea and the emerging US-led Indo-Pacific Alliance that is supposed to check China’s rise.

BRI’s inherent challenges

The BRI is an unprecedented and huge enterprise, perhaps with the exception of the US Marshall Plan or China’s own Great Wall. It is so ambitious a mega

project that it has its inherent challenges and constraints. First of all the so-called “BRI Bubble” may lose its momentum after some time as the continued and sustained interest and enthusiasm both in China and the participating countries may not be there forever. This also brings the question of the sustainability of projects of this big nature. There are inherent contradictions between China’s economic nationalism, which seeks the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”, and its espousing of economic globalisation to the benefit of everybody.

The explicit and implicit strategic and geopolitical objectives-real as well as perceived- may also undermine the transformative opportunity that BRI brings for economic integration, connectivity, trade and investment and infrastructure development in the participating countries. It is obvious that China has strategic objectives in these projects, as it would not be pumping in billions of dollars into this just for a good cause. But there are immense economic benefits from this exercise for the participating countries as well. If the notion of strategic objectives obscures that of economic benefits, the BRI cannot generate a big momentum in the time to come.

In the participating countries, the BRI may encounter problems of political backlash, as the successive governments may cancel “prestige projects” started by the previous governments. Besides the usual problem associated with what has been described as the “buyer’s remorse” that arises after signing huge projects with huge debt and other implementation responsibilities, the BRI projects may face cancellation due to changing economic and political condition in the participating countries. For example in 2018, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad cancelled two big BRI projects involving \$ 23 billion signed by the previous government of Malaysia. The cancellation was made on political as well as economic grounds.

The political and economic situation in the participating countries may also affect the success of implementation of the BRI projects. The BRI extends to countries with unstable security situation and political tension among the participating countries. This element is much more significant in South Asia, where two main corridors, namely the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Bangladesh China India Myanmar (BCIM) corridor included in the grand connectivity proposal pass through security-sensitive regions with politically divisive issues.

There is already a concern over the increasing Chinese footprint in the form of control of assets that China has taken to offset the inability to pay

the debt associated with the BRI projects. The famous case of Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka has been cited as the classic case of “debt trap”. China and the participating countries in the BRI must ensure that the hype of the “debt trap” and “predatory investment” is not exaggerated while the genuine issues of debt sustainability must be addressed. It is especially true in the case of countries which are already in debt risks. Many of the BRI countries are so listed.

The BRI suffers from what is called as the scale of size and scope. As a mega project, there are organizational issues and issues related to transparency and accountability in the execution of the projects. The Chinese contractors and construction companies have to change their reputation for quality and fair practices in execution of such big projects.

Though denied by China, the BRI is often viewed as the “China Club”. For example, Nepal’s signing of a MoU with China on the BRI and signing of a transit treaty and possible extension of the Chinese railway to Nepal has been interpreted in India as Nepal’s shifting closer to China. Such geopolitical tensions cannot speak for a good environment for execution of the BRI projects. Nepal has already seen awarding of big hydropower project (Budhi Gandaki) to a Chinese company (Gezhouba) and cancellation of the same by the successive governments.

The BRI projects also suffer from a governance deficit, especially in the sense that there is no multilateral mechanism to oversee the projects. The deal is done as a two-way street between the China and the individual countries. The issues of transparency and accountability may continue to haunt the BRI project if this deficit is not addressed. There are regulatory risks as well as risks associated with implementation delays and project execution difficulties.

Opportunities available under the BRI

According to the IMF (cite), BRI will “help meet infrastructure gaps, connect countries supply and value chain, increase in trade and employment and boosting economic growth”. The BRI is supposed to make available funds for infrastructure projects in the participating countries through multitude of banks and financing institutions, including the Silk Road Fund (\$ 40 billion), the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (\$ 100 billion), the BRICS’s New Development Bank (\$ 100 billion) and China Exim Bank (\$ 900 billion). The BRI will also help integrate and open up markets in the participating countries through better connectivity, increased trade and foreign direct investment

and economic integration. It will also foster cultural links through people-to-people contacts which will also bring immense benefits related to tourism and connectivity of ideas among the people in the BRI countries.

The BRI is a unique proposal in many counts. China claims that there are no strings attached in the BRI projects. China does not seek any conditionality for economic reforms or other measures as is usually demanded in the multilateral and bilateral funding available for infrastructure projects in the developing countries. The BRI is focussed on big investment in infrastructure, connectivity, trade and investment. It is supposed to be a big thrust in South-South Cooperation in the sense that most of participating countries come from the Global South. The BRI offers an alternative model for financing development, though there are concerns associated with the debt conditions in the participating countries.

Elements for the success of the BRI

There are a number of issues that are important for the successful execution of the BRI projects. China should help address the remaining vagueness and absence of clarity in the BRI concept so that everybody is on the same page. There is the element of “lost in translation” of the BRI in the sense that the “Belt” refers to road and “Road” refers to maritime belt. The official maps and corridors that are circulated do not include all the participant countries comprehensively. For example, Nepal considers itself an important connecting link during the ancient entrepot trade routes between India and China. But official maps and corridors do not touch Nepal. How Nepal can become a connecting link between China and South Asia could be shown explicitly in the project documents and maps. Though the Chinese officials keep reiterating that the concept is flexible and evolving, citing the change of name from OBOR to BRI and inclusion of new corridors along the way, the BRI needs better articulation, especially after it has completed five years of its inception in 2013. The BRI should be focussed on connecting the dots and missing links in global, regional and sub-regional connectivity and in removing the bottlenecks in infrastructure and trans-border gaps between and among the participating countries.

For the success of the BRI, China and the participating countries must remain continuously engaged. China invited the representatives of the participating countries in a seminar in Beijing May 2014. That process should be continued. It would be worthwhile for China to consider making the BRI as a multilateral exercise such as in the case of the AIIB. For correcting the mistakes from the

lessons learned in the last five years, China should continuously engage the think-tanks and opinion-makers and the civil society in the participating countries.

Both China and the participating countries should be careful in selecting the projects, especially avoiding the investment in “vanity projects” or “prestige projects” to appease the political leaders in the respective countries. Projects should be selected after proper scrutiny on economic, environmental and social grounds. Economic viability rather than political preferences should be guiding factor in selecting the projects. Both sides must ensure that projects are not cancelled after they are started. China should do everything to avoid the apprehension of “debt trap” in the participating countries. That issue cannot be discounted as solely raised by the non-participating countries in a “grapes are sour” manner. China should distinguish the criticisms, “Sinophobia” and anti-BRI “propaganda” from the genuine concerns in the enterprise and seek to address them one by one.

China should ensure that projects are executed after ensuring the project readiness, not hastily without proper scrutiny. It should ensure fair rules and international standards in deals and contracts, especially in making sure the environmental and equity concerns in the BRI projects. China can help improve the contract awarding procedure and make it open to non-Chinese companies. To avoid the trade deficit and gaps between China and the participating countries, China should also help the participating countries providing better trade concessions to them to bring down trade deficit due to surge in imports for big construction under the BRI projects. There should be better dispute settlement mechanism in the BRI projects.

The participating countries should make objective assessment of the risks and opportunities available under the BRI projects and ensure transparency in the deals with China. They must remain careful not to enter into geopolitical tension and strategic competition with their neighbours. They should streamline project implementation and reduce unnecessary delays. The participating countries should also start planning operationalizing the projects and plan for debt repayment in a realistic manner. In the over all, BRI countries should avoid being too much attracted with China’s rise as a benign power alone. They should not fear the rise of China. Rather they should stand ready to gain from the Chinese diplomatic overtures in a manner that suits their interests. They should focus on how they can reap the benefits available from the transformative opportunity that BRI offers to them in areas of trade, investment, connectivity, tourism, energy and infrastructure development to suit their needs.

The BRI and South Asia

China's has substantive trade with each of the South Asian countries. China has a surplus in trade with each. China is a major source of foreign direct investment in each of these countries. China is extensively involved in construction of infrastructure projects in most of the South Asian countries. These countries stand to gain a lot from the China's BRI. They should continuously remain engaged with China, bilaterally or through regional cooperation blocs, so that China's overtures can be available to their benefit. Especially, they can benefit from the availability of China's economic surplus funds for investment, technical know-how and capability to imitate bigger projects which these countries cannot take themselves. If the South Asian countries do not start engaging China collectively, China will continue to deal with each of them bilaterally. They should consider bringing China as a Strategic Partner in the SAARC and possibly as Dialogue Partner in the BIMSTEC so that they can deal with China collectively in an open and transparent environment. In any case, the BRI seeks to complement the regional integration process through these blocs, not counter or replace them.

In South Asia, the environment of strategic competition between China and India may influence the success of the BRI projects. For the BRI to succeed there must be strategic trust and confidence between important powers in the region, as the BRI projects cannot be executed well in an environment of geopolitical tension and strategic competition. The Wuhan informal summit between China President Xi Jinping and India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi in April 2018 is a good beginning in this regard. The two leaders have supposedly discussed the possible ways of maintaining cooperative relations for the sake of the interest of Asia and developing countries and that of Asia and are believed to have underplayed the element of strategic competition. A cooperative rather than confrontational mode of relations, such as visible during the 2017 Doklam incident involving India and China in Bhutan-China border, would be of great help to the success of the BRI projects.

Though they are competitors for power and strategic consideration, India and China already have cooperative relations on number of counts. Both are developing countries with similar positions on issues of economic development, significance of globalisation, climate change and other global multilateral issues. Their bilateral trade has exceeded \$70 billion. The two countries are already working together in a number of undertakings such as in the BRICS and the AIIB and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). If India and China are already working on such big issues, there is no reason as

to why they cannot cooperate on the issues of BRI. In any case, the BRI under the Chinese leadership and other connectivity and “Look East” policy adopted by India have a lot of complementarities in the sense that they both seek to enhance connectivity, economic integration and boost trade and investment in the region. Similar complementarities exist between the BRI and regional and sub-regional cooperation efforts under the SAARC, BIMSTEC and the BBIN, a four-nation cooperation initiative between Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal. Therefore, it will be in the interest of the both China, India and the countries of the region that they work together in the BRI sorting out their differences there off. For example India’s northeastern states can stand to gain from the potential benefits of connectivity with China, Bangladesh and Myanmar through the BRI connectivity projects under BCIM corridor, a factor India seems to be already contemplating seriously. The South Asian countries should not aim to counter India using the BRI, something that complicates the already tense strategic competition in the region between the two big countries. If China and India can work together in the BRICS and AIIB, there is no reason as to why India’s concerns on the BRI cannot be addressed. Both China and India are aware that this project cannot succeed without an effective cooperation between them. For China, the BRI project cannot be considered successful if that is not accepted by one of the largest and immediate neighbours. For India, there is the risk of being isolated as all other countries in the region are co-opting with China in this enterprise. The two countries should find a way to come out of this situation.

For Nepal, for example, the issue of rail and road connectivity and development of north-south corridors with China through its participation in the BRI will constitute an important milestone in reviving Nepal’s traditional entrepot significance and connecting South Asia with China. India has also proposed to extend its railways to Kathmandu. However, the divided political opinion, geopolitical imperatives and the modality of financing for the Chinese rail and other BRI projects including that of the debt issue is something that needs to be addressed beforehand. The BRI can help identify the missing links in connectivity and help improve infrastructure along the north-south corridors from Nepal linking the Chinese border passes. The real fruits of the BRI can come when the Chinese ports and routes for Nepal’s trade and transit can be used in an economically competitive scale so that Nepal can diversify its trade, transit and economic relations. They can also be effective connecting link between China and South Asia. But all of this cannot become successful in an environment of geopolitical tension between India and China. That must be resolved in earnest through a cooperative framework of relations. Nepal is even prepared to work trilaterally with India and China, should the

two countries consider the merit of doing so in establishing connectivity and implementing projects for mutual benefit to all the three countries.

Conclusion

To conclude, China's BRI initiative, when fully implemented, can shape the future pattern of trade, investment, infrastructure development and international financing of big projects. It can also help further integrate the markets of Asia, Africa and Europe. Though several challenges and confusion lie ahead it, the BRI can potentially become a new driver for inclusive globalisation and may correct some of the mistakes of neo-liberal globalisation. China and the participating countries must work together to make it work. Participating countries should strive to make use of the Chinese overture and funds for their economic development. China can help introduce more transparency, clarity and engagement to the BRI in a multilateral setting.

The success of the BRI will depend upon an environment of strategic trust between China and participating countries. Venture of this big nature cannot succeed as a one-way street. Rather it should have continuous engagement between China and all the participating countries. The issue of transparency in deals and that of debt issues should be handled through a multilateral exercise, rather than between China and the individual participating countries. The hype of debt trap should also be addressed pragmatically. Projects should be selected on the basis of economic viability than on political preferences of the individual leaders and governments in the participating countries and strategic objectives of the investing country. It should focus on connecting the dots establishing the missing links between China and South Asia as well as that between South Asia and other regions, through connections in road network, sea connectivity, trans-regional pipelines and transmission lines.

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Development of Daesh's Ideology

*Shafi Md Mostofa*¹

*Professor Helen Ware*²

Abstract

Daesh or *Daish* is the Arab acronym for *Al-Dawlah Al-Islamiyah fi Al-Iraq wa Al-Sham* which is usually translated as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or Al-Sham (ISIS or ISIL). *Daesh* has emerged as an international militant organization which has affected almost every part of the world. It claims to have succeeded in recruiting from all classes of society and from almost all nations across the globe due to its strong ideological appeal. Evidently, its ideology was not formulated overnight. Rather it has taken years to develop. In this process of formulation, many ideologues have played a significant role through their writings. This paper examines how the ideology of *Daesh* has been developed and who has contributed to it. It uses secondary qualitative data, including books, journal articles and working papers, to understand the dynamics of *Daesh's* ideology.

Introduction

Jordanian Abu Musab Al Zarqawi's ideological severity is considered to be the foundation for present day *Daesh* ideology. Al Zarqawi was born in 1966

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- 1 Shafi Md. Mostofa has been an outstanding student at Dhaka University, Bangladesh's leading university. He stood first class first both in Honours and Masters Examinations. He received some prestigious awards for his outstanding academic result and he especially received the Khaleda Monzoor-e-Khuda Memorial Gold Medal for the highest marks awarded to a MA student in 2012. That potential was recognized by the University of Dhaka when it promptly appointed him a lecturer in world religions in the same year. He currently holds an Assistant Professorship in the same department and pursues his PhD from the University of New England with prestigious IPRA scholarship. To date he has published 6 refereed articles and has another refereed article forthcoming.
 - 2 Professor Ware has been an historian, a sociologist (working on prostitution), a demographer, a human rights advocate, a femocrat, an aid bureaucrat, a diplomat (Australian High Commissioner to Zambia and Malawi, Ambassador to Angola) and now is that rare creature: a Professor of Peace Studies at the University of New England, Australia.

and joined the Afghan war in the 1980s where he met Abu Muhammad Al Maqdisi. Later, they were sent to jail in Jordan for 6 years in 1994. During this time, Zarqawi was deeply influenced by Maqdisi's Salafi-Jihadism and became a charismatic leader. Upon his release from prison in 1999, Zarqawi went back to Afghanistan where he set up a training camp. He did not give *bay'a* (oath of fealty) to Osama Bin Laden due to his stricter ideological standpoint, which in some areas contradicts Al Qaeda's ideology. After the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2002, he hurriedly moved to Iraq where he founded a group named '*Jamaat Al TawhidWal Jihad*'. Finally in consideration of US occupation of Afghanistan, he gave *bay'a* to Bin Laden and formed Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in 2004³⁴⁵. In January 2006, AQI formed the *MujahideenShura Council* to open the door for other Sunni rebellious factions and Sunni tribal leaders to join the Council. Soon after the sudden demise of Zarqawi, Egyptian Abu Ayyub Al Masritook charge of the AQI leadership on 12 June 2006⁶. The *Mujahedin Shura* Council then announced the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) spearheaded by an Iraqi, Abu Omar Al Baghdadi on 12 October 2006. ISI faced a serious setback when both Masri and Baghdadi were killed in 2010⁷. But Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi declared himself the Caliph of ISI after these deaths, claiming *Quraishi* lineage like Omar Baghdadi⁸. ISI claimed to have a solid foundation in Iraq due to the US military withdrawal from Iraq in 2009; disillusionment with the Shia-led government and massive propaganda in favour of Islamic state based on Islamic apocalyptic ideology⁹¹⁰. By 2011, the

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 - 5 Radio Liberty, Iraq: A Timeline Of Abu Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi, Radio Free Europe, June 9, 2006, Washington, available at <https://www.rferl.org/a/1069045.html>
 - 6 Mapping Militant Organizations (The Islamic State). from Stanford University, available at <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/1>
 - 7 ICEIS. (2016). ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria): Origins, Ideology, and Responses by Mainstream Muslim Scholars from National Centre of Excellence for Islamic Studies, University of Melbourne, p. 2, available at http://arts.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/2297733/ISIS_Origins,-Ideology,-and-Responses-by-Mainstream-Muslim-Scholars.pdf
 - 8 Khattak, M. U. R., Khan, M. A., & Amin, H. (2015). The Emergence of Islamic State: Implications For Pakistan And Afghanistan. Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, 33(4), p. 4.
 - 9 Lister, C. (2014). Profiling the Islamic State. Doha: Bookings Doha Center, p. 10
 - 10 Young, W., Stebbins, D., Frederick, B. A., & Al-Shahery, O. (2014). Spillover from the conflict in Syria: an assessment of the factors that aid and impede the spread of violence: Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, p. 43

Syrian civil war apparently allowed ISI to expand its network in Raqqa. By mid-2011, ISI leaders in Syria formed *Jabhat Al Nusra* in order to bring back all local Jihadi groups onto one platform, which raised its public profile in early 2012. Capitalizing on this initial access to Syria, Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi changed the name from ISI to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in order to bring Syria under his authority, claiming *Al Nusra* as a branch of ISIS although the *Al Nusra* leadership rejected his claim and maintained their own networks and independence. By January 2014, ISIS took absolute control over Raqqa and Mosul, although strong resistance was also felt from the Al Qaeda leadership, under Aiman Al Zawahir who tried to prevent them from expanding beyond Iraq¹¹¹²¹³. On 29 June 2014, Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi resumed his original plan, establishing the Global Caliphate under his own leadership through an audio recorded message and asked every Muslim to come under the shade of the Caliph¹⁴¹⁵. He then changed the name from ISIS to the Islamic State (IS), to give it a global look. IS also declared that the Caliphate that had been dissolved by Turkish President Kamal Ataturk was now reborn and claimed that 1.5 billion Muslims from across the entire world had shown their allegiance to the new Caliph¹⁶. By late 2017, some news reports suggest that *Daesh* had lost its sway over both Mosul and Raqqa¹⁷, although a controversy over the reported demise of the Caliph, Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi still continues¹⁸. Now question arises as to how loses of territory by *Daesh* will affect global security, and how the ideology and current indoctrinated followers will move in future. Yochi Dreazen has commented that *Daesh* may turn into more of an ideology as it loses more territory¹⁹. That ideology may continue to inspire *Daesh's* followers across the world.

11 Bunzel, Op. cit., pp. 16-32

12 ICEIS, Op. cit., pp. 2-3

13 Lister, Op. cit., pp. 12-13

14 IS. (2014). *Khilafah Declared*. Dabiq(1), p. 6.

15 Special Report: The Islamic State. (2015), pp. 8-11, Retrieved from available at <http://clarionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/islamic-state-isis-isil-factsheet-1.pdf>

16 Manne, R. (2016). *The Mind of the Islamic State*. Australia: RedbackQuarterly, p. 3

17 BBC World, Islamic State and the crisis in Iraq and Syria in maps. (2018). BBC. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034>

18 BBC World, IS chief Baghdadi probably still alive - US commander. (2017). BBC. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-41121043>

19 Ward, A. (2017). ISIS just lost its last town in Iraq: It's still a dangerous group. Retrieved 2 March 2018, from Vox <https://www.vox.com/world/2017/11/17/16669650/iraq-isis-syria-rawa>

Development of *Daesh's* Ideology

Daesh Ideology has taken years to reach its present form which allows the indiscriminate killing of innocent people including fellow Muslims and children. Different ideologues played their part in developing it a blend of Wahhabi-Salafi puritanism and Islamist exclusivism. Wahhabism was founded by the renowned Arabian Islamic scholar, Muhammad Ibn Abd al Wahhab in the 18th century. The Wahhabis place utmost emphasis on *Tawhid* (Oneness of God) and reject everything which is not in line with teachings of the Holy Qur'an and the Hadiths or *Sunnah*²⁰. On the other hand, Salafism spearheaded by Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), Jamal Al Din al-Afghani (1839-1897) and Rashid Rida (1865-1935), originated in the 19th Century as an intellectual movement at the Al Azhar University in Egypt. The term Salafism comes from the Arabic root *Salaf* which means forefathers or predecessors. Salafists believe that the Islam practised by their forefathers was the pure Islam. So, their main aim is to go back to the practices of early Islam and to stick to the literal interpretation of the Holy Qur'an and the Hadiths. Both Wahhabism and Salafism fall within the *Hanbali* school of Islam²¹, which deems visiting tombs and shrines; and adopting foreign dress as un-Islamic practices. This School is also particularly hostile towards the Shia²². Although Salafism and Wahhabism began as two distinct movements, Faisal's embrace of Salafi pan-Islamism resulted in cross-pollination between Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teachings on *tawhid* (oneness of God), *shirk* (the sin of associating partners with God) and *bida'at* (innovations) and Salafi interpretations of the hadith (the sayings of Muhammad). In the third quarter of 20th century, some *Salafis* nominated Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as one of the *Salaf* which retrospectively brought Wahhabism back into the fold of Salafism^{23,24}. Both Wahhabism and Salafism owe an intellectual debt to Taqi Al Din Ibn Taimiyah (1263 -1328) who emphasized on the singleness of the creator Allah; the prophetic *Sunnah* of the Prophet Muhammad; and the traditions of *Salf-al Salihin*, the first three

20 Robinson, F. (2002). Islam and the west: clash of civilisations? *Asian Affairs*, 33(3), p. 304

21 There are four schools of Islamic law. Hanbali School is one of them.

22 Byman, D. (2015). *Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the global jihadist movement: what everyone needs to know*: Oxford University Press, USA, p. 69

23 Lauzière, H. (2010). The construction of Salafiyya: Reconsidering Salafism from the perspective of conceptual history. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 42(3), pp. 369-375.

24 Stanley, T. (2005). Understanding the Origins of Wahhabism and Salafism. *Terrorism Monitor*, 3(14), available at <https://jamestown.org/program/understanding-the-origins-of-wahhabism-and-salafism/>

generations of Islam, as the be-all and end-all of Islam²⁵. However, among the other noted works of Wahhab, a small book titled *The Ten Voiders [or Nullifiers] of Islam* has been mostly cited by radicals. This work summarizes ten conditions²⁶ that inevitably dismiss someone from the fold of Islam. Of these ten conditions, three are of particular importance for the jihadists. First of all, a Muslim becomes a disbeliever when he associates with someone or something in worshipping God. In line with this condition, Wahhab labelled Sufism as a deviant form of polytheism or in other words 'grave worship'. Given the jihadists' utmost emphasis on Ibn Taimiyah's argument about the unity of worship, this "voider" is also used to condemn any ruler who uses non-Islamic law. Secondly, any Muslim who judges by 'other than what God revealed and believes that this is superior to divine law' is an apostate or a disbeliever. For nonviolent *Salafis*, the two parts of this "voider" are critical: to be an apostate a ruler must not only implement non-Islamic law but also believe he is using legal means that are better than Islam. Unless the leader flagrantly admits that he has rejected Islam or believes in the supremacy of human-made law (extremely unlikely), he remains a Muslim. *Jihadists*, on the other hand, argue that actions alone are grounds for apostasy. For radicals, there are certain things about Islam that are "known by necessity," such as the ten *voiders* (some radicals use a much longer list). As a result, if a leader violates one of these, it is evidence of apostasy because he willingly disobeys God's order. Third, supporting or helping nonbelievers against Muslims is an act of apostasy. This one, above all others, seems to have become the central "evidence" used by Al Qaeda to charge regimes in the Muslim world with an act of apostasy²⁷.

25 Ahmed, R. (1983). *Islam in Bangladesh: society, culture and politics*. Dhaka: Bangladesh ItihasSamiti, p. 100

26 See (<https://ashabulhadeeth.com/2013/10/21/nawaaqid-al-islam-nullifiers-of-islam-by-the-noble-shaykh-muhammad-ibn-abdulwahhaab/>)

- 1) Polytheism (associating others with God in worship)
- 2) Using mediators for God (for example, praying to saints)
- 3) Doubting that non-Muslims are disbelievers
- 4) Judging by non-Islamic laws and believing these are superior to divine law
- 5) Hating anything the Prophet Mohammed practiced
- 6) Mocking Islam or the Prophet Mohammed
- 7) Using or supporting magic
- 8) Supporting or helping non-believers against Muslims
- 9) Believing that someone has the right to stop practicing Islam
- 10) Turning away from Islam by not studying or practicing it

27 Wiktorowicz, Q. (2005). A genealogy of radical Islam. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 28(2), pp. 81-83.

While Wahhabi-Salafism constantly works to look at what is right and what is wrong and tries to bifurcate society based on leaders' own interpretations of the texts, Islamism encompasses all sectors of human life making Islam wholly a political ideology. Islamism is a political ideology based on Sharia Law (Qur'anic principles) formulated in the first half of the 20th century to replace Socialism, Communism and Marxism. Islamism provides guidance in every sphere of life, i.e. social interaction, politics, private/family matters, economic activity, national and international life, moral and legal issues, and even cultural affairs; it offers what it calls 'the complete code of life'²⁸. In face of the fall of Caliphate in 1924, accompanied by the rise of Western imperialism and the waning of Islamic values in public life, the Muslim Brotherhood, spearheaded by Hasan Al Banna, emerged in Egypt in 1928. Al Banna tried to Islamize the society from below in order to gain state power. His aim was to restore the Caliphate: "Islam requires that the Muslim community unite around one leader or one head, the head of the Islamic State, and it forbids the Muslim community from being divided among states..." Elsewhere Banna stated: "The Muslim Brotherhood puts the idea of the caliphate and work to restore it at the forefront of its plans"²⁹. The same development is also seen in the Indian subcontinent with formation of Jamaat-e-Islami by Sayyid Abul Ala Mawdudi. Both Banna and Mawdudi's promoted Ibn Taimiyah's concept of '*Tawhid*' (oneness of God). According to Wiktorowicz, Mawdudi gave a modernist cast to Sayed Ahmad Rai Barelvi's approach³⁰. Olivier Roy pointed out that Barelvi (1786-1831) was "the first person to realize the necessity of a movement which was at the same time religious, military and political"³¹.

While Wahhabi-Salafi puritanism provided the sectarian inclusive identity, Islamism contributed with the idea of establishing an 'Islamic state', which encompasses every sector of life. Although Islamists like Al Banna and Mawlana Mawdudi have accepted the concept of 'nation state', 'democracy' and 'pluralism' they helped to form another school of thought, i.e., Jihadism. Wiktorowicz contends that one of three factions of Salafism³², the Jihadi faction

28 Heywood, A. (2017). Political ideologies: An introduction. London: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 299

29 Bunzel, Op.cit., pp. 7-8

30 Wiktorowicz, Op.cit., p. 78

31 Roy, O. (2001). Islam and resistance in Afghanistan (2 ed. Vol. 8). USA: Cambridge University Press, p. 56

32 Wiktorowicz divided Salafists into three types on the basis of their ideal types. The purists are those who avoid politics altogether, the politicians are those who influence politics from sidelines and Jihadists are those who want revolutionary transformation through violent struggle (Wiktorowicz, 2005, p. 77).

allows violence in order to establish an Islamic state. Wiktorowicz discussing the development of the Jihadi ideology argued that individual theologians like Taqi Al Din Ibn Taimiyah (1263–1328), Muhammad Bin Abdul Wahhab (1703–1792), MawlanaAbulA'laMawdudi (1903–1979), and SayyidQutb (1906–1966) offered new interpretations of the Qur'an and the Sunnah that challenged prevailing understandings, but subsequent thinkers, for the most part, merely adapted these understandings to new issues, often stretching them to their logical conclusion in a way that increased the scope of permissible violence³³. Both Wiktorowicz (2005) and Manne (2016) argue that Jihadism developed out of Egyptian and Saudi intellectual streams but Wiktorowicz also includes that it has additional roots in British controlled India. MawlanaMawdudi was greatly influenced by the writings of the Salafi scholar Ibn Taimiyah. Ibn Taimiyah offered his opinion on *Tawhid* to be understood as both the unity of lordship and the unity of worship. The unity of lordship means the God is the creator and sole sovereign of the universe, whereas the unity of worship affirms that God is the only entity for worship, which in turn requires adherents to follow God's laws. Thus following modern laws goes against the notion of *Tawhid*. Based on this view, Mawdudi developed the party of God and the party of Satan. In doing so, he came up with concept of 'the modern *Jahiliyya*'³⁴ (age of ignorance). It is incumbent upon every Muslim to follow the Prophet's Pathways with regard to what he did during *AyameJahiliyya* (pre-Islamic ignorance). Modern *Jahiliyya* also requires a similar struggle and resistance following the actions of Prophet Muhammad during his life time. Based on Mawdudi's concept of Modern *Jahiliyya* and Taimiyah's concept of *Tawhid*, Qutb argued that the whole world falls into the *AyameJahiliyya* (pre Islamic polytheism) and those who do not follow divine laws are not Muslims. Through his important works, *The Shade of the Qur'an* and *The Milestone*, he summoned Muslims to form a small group of true believers to restore Islam to the world^{35,36}. Whereas Mawdudi tried to stay within the democratic system and formed a political party to establish an Islamic State, [which Gilles Kepel terms Islamo-democracy and Islamo-nationalism to serve instead of

33 Wiktorowicz, Op. cit., p. 77

34 For Mawdudi, true Muslims must struggle against this ignorance, just as the Prophet and his companions struggled against the paganism of the dominant Quraysh tribe in Mecca. In 1941, he formed the Jamaat-e-Islami as the spearhead of this struggle, a vanguard viewed as necessary to promote God's sovereignty on earth (Wiktorowicz, 2005, p. 78).

35 Manne, Op. cit., pp. 10-11

36 Wiktorowicz, Op. cit., pp.77-81

Internationalism and Islamic society^{37]} Qutb advocated jihad to establish an Islamic state³⁸. So, a new school of thought, that is, Jihadism emerged through Qutb's works which was later developed further through the works of other theologians.

Like Qutb, Muhammad Abd Al Salam Faraj (1954-1982) and Abdullah Azzam (1941-1989) took the path of Jihad or violent struggle as a means to restore an Islamic State or to defend *Ummah* through their renowned works such as the *Neglected Duty*, and the *Defense of the Muslim Lands* and *Join the Caravan*. Osama bin Laden, being influenced by both Qutb's vision and Azzam's triumphalism and ambition, founded Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in 1988 with a view to destroy the superpower, the United States because it supports the Jewish State at the heart of the *Ummah*³⁹ and *taghut* (satanic) regimes throughout the Muslim world. Therefore, he issued a fatwa that the act of killing Jews and Americans are justified⁴⁰. Whereas Faraj was concentrating on the near enemy⁴¹, Azzam, Bin Laden and Zawahiri chose to fight the far enemy⁴², the crusaders. Aiman Al Zawahiri was one of the co-signatories of Bin Laden's fatwa. Both Bin Laden and Zawahiri allowed suicide bombings, calling them 'martyrdom operations'. Zawahiri systemized the Islamic political ideology based on Qutb's vision of Jihadism⁴³⁴⁴. The present day ideology of *Daesh* was further shaped by the hand of Abu Musab Al Zarqawi. He added several new elements to the Al Qaeda's ideology, such as sectarian hatred of Shia, public beheadings of hostages, killing of innocent people; even including politically unfriendly Sunnis, based on his explanation of *Takfir* (declaring someone to be an apostate). According to Zarqawi, anybody who does not follow his

37 Zemni, S. (2007). 9/11: THE END OF ISLAMISM? Middle East and North Africa MENARG Research Group, p. 11

38 Wiktorowicz, Op. cit., p. 79

39 The whole community of Muslims bound together by ties of religion.

40 Conditions for killing civilians according to Al Qaeda (only one condition is necessary)

i) The enemy has purposefully killed Muslim civilians. ii) Civilians have assisted the enemy in "deed, word, or mind". iii) Islamic fighters cannot distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. iv) There is a need to burn enemy strongholds or fields where there are civilians. v) Heavy weaponry needs to be used. vi) The enemy uses civilians as human shields. vii) The enemy violates a treaty with the Muslims and civilians must be killed as a lesson. (Wiktorowicz, 2005, p. 89)

41 By the term 'near enemy' Islamists usually refer to the secular elites or secular government in their own country.

42 By the term 'far enemy' Islamists usually refer to the Christians and US and its allies.

43 Manne, Op. cit., pp. 11-13

44 Wiktorowicz, Op. cit., pp. 78-83

definition of God's law becomes an apostate and is thus a subject to be killed by the *Mujaheedins*⁴⁵. This has made all Islamist political parties to be traitors against Islam as they have accepted democracy as way to establish an Islamic State⁴⁶. In developing his explanation, Zarqawi was inspired by Abu Bakr Naji, the author of *The Management of Savagery*, and Abu Abdullah Al Muhajir, the author of *The Jurisprudence of Blood*. Zarqawi was unique in his methodology and unlike others, he restored the Caliphate, based on the apocalyptic and eschatological undercurrents of Sunni Islam. Both Zarqawi (who died in 2006), and Baghdadi (who died in 2010) left the scene before the establishment of the Global Caliphate but Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi established the Global Caliphate in June 2014; which had its own land and claimed that more than one and half billion Muslims from the entire world now owned allegiance⁴⁷.

Conclusion

From the discussion above it is quite evident that *Daesh's* ideology owes its intellectual roots to Ibn Taimiyah. His student Abdul Wahhab extended its puritanical ideology, which sees Shias and Sufis as deviants and 'grave worshippers'. This fuels extreme sectarian hatreds. Then, based on Taimyah's concept of '*Tawhid*' and Wahhab's concept of '*voiders*', Islamists like Hasan Al Banna and Sayyid Abul Ala Mawdudi developed an Islamic political ideology, which comprises every aspect of human life. Mawdudi promoted the new idea of *Jahiliya* (age of ignorance). While Al Banna and Mawdudi favour peaceful means to establish sharia law, Qutb choose jihad as only way to establish an Islamic state. Motivated by the works of Qutb and inspired by Salam Faraj and Abdullah Azzam Bin Laden established Al Qaeda and issued a fatwa following the conditions set by Abd Al Wahhab that the acts of killing Jews and Americans are justified. Then, finally Zarqawi's understanding of *Takfir* gave the complete shape to *Daesh's* ideology which permits killing anybody who becomes an apostate. Thus, the ideology of *Daesh* is called Salafi-Jihadism due to its Salafi doctrinal orientation together with placing utmost emphasis on Jihad or violent struggle in the service of God. Yemeni journalist Abdulelah Haider Shaye remarked on the genealogy of *Daesh's* ideology: "The Islamic State was drafted by Sayyid Qutb, taught by Abdullah Azzam, globalized by Osama Bin Laden, transferred to reality by Abu Musab al Zarqawi, and implemented by al Baghdadi: Abu Omar and Abu Bakr"⁴⁸.

45 He who fights for the cause of Allah.

46 ICEIS, Op. cit., p. 9

47 Manne, Op. cit., pp. 3-15

48 Quoted in Manne, Op. cit., p. 15

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The Evolution of Suicide Terrorism

Radhika Halder¹

Abstract

Suicide terrorism, as we know it, has evolved over the years to become one of the most challenging threats for global security today. The use of suicide as a weapon in conflict is not an entirely new concept owing to the psychological leverage that the act of self sacrifice has. This very leverage is mostly sought by the weaker opponent in a conflict so as to make up for the asymmetry. As terrorism largely involves asymmetric warfare, the act of self sacrifice has been taken advantage of in different ways by terror outfits in several phases or waves. Each phase or wave is a result of terror organizations learning from one another and mastering the art of employing suicide terrorism. It is then worthwhile to trace the evolution of suicide terrorism so as to understand the dangerous shape it has taken today.

The use of suicide as a weapon in conflict is not a new phenomenon. Suicide has a profound psychological impact, and it has been used effectively and strategically in conflicts. According to Jeffrey William Lewis, suicide or “martyrdom” as perceived by those committing the act, must be seen as a kind of technology that has been invented, reinvented, diffused, and transformed

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at the hands of its users. Further, he says -

“The spread of technologies is never uniform or homogenous; instead, societies embrace or reject specific technologies depending on how a technology allows them to solve problems consistent with their values and norms”.²

It is worthwhile then to take a look at the way in which the use of suicide has originated and evolved both in conflict and eventually, in terrorism in order to understand its diverse use.

Imperial Russia

Suicide terrorism or suicide bombing was a tactic first deployed by the revolutionary group, Narodnaya Volya or People’s Will in Imperial Russia. On March 1, 1881, Alexander II, the Tsar of Russia was assassinated after the rebels had condemned him to death on August 25, 1879. The conspirators planned to target the Tsar during the course of his movement to the Palace. The Tsar traditionally took a particular route to return to his palace in St. Petersburg but on the day he was to be targeted he took an alternative route. In order not to take any chances, the People’s Will planted bombs along all routes he could possibly take but were in a dilemma when the Tsar decided to make a detour and visit his cousin on the way. However, the group members seemed determined to carry out the assassination that very day and hurriedly revised their plans in order to replant the bomb. This attempt also failed as the explosive damaged the carriage and injured a young boy besides a Cossack guard deputed with the Tsar.³

The inability to strike the target inspite of all their efforts not only made the conspirators feel dejected but a sense of desperation and anxiety prevailed among them. Alexander II was meanwhile keen on inspecting the scene where the carriage was bombed, which is when People’s Will member Ignaty Grinevitsky took advantage of the situation. He moved closer to Alexander and threw the bomb at his feet, severely injuring him and causing him to succumb to his injuries. Grinevitsky’s death was a consequence of his decision to control the blast of the bomb by keeping himself and the weapon as close as possible until its detonation. Thus the perceived need and the possibility of the tactic, drove Ginevitsky’s mental innovation to commit the act. He had not

2 Jeffrey William Lewis, *The Business of Martyrdom: A History of Suicide Bombing* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2012), p. 7.

3 Jeffrey William Lewis, *The Business of Martyrdom: A History of Suicide Bombing* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2012), pp. 29-57.

planned on sacrificing his life for such a cause, but given his options, it only seemed the most viable one. Having said that, the culture within the People's Will was one of absolute faith and devotion. Their cause was mainly to oppose the Tsar, due to which they knew their actions would inevitably lead to death. In the late eighteenth and nineteenth century, a revolutionary impulse swept Europe and these revolutionary stirrings lasted a century.⁴

It is important to note that People's Will was the first terrorist organization to have embraced the anarchist cult of dynamite for symbolic purposes as simpler weapons such as pistols would not have made a powerful enough impact. Michael Frolenko, a People's Will member involved in the March 1, 1881 plot, went on to say that a pistol "would not have created such an impression. It would have been seen as an ordinary murder, and thus would not have expressed a new stage in the revolutionary movement."⁵

Numerous elaborate plots were planned and embarked upon by the group utilizing dynamite to kill the Tsar. However, all efforts failed up until Grinevitsky's suicidal attack. This reflected on the fundamental challenge that terrorist groups such as People's Will face even today – no matter how good your bomb makers are, how well you plan out your plots, there will always be far more ways for such plans to fail. This was mainly because of the lack of control the groups could exercise in order to improve the accuracy of the attack and reduce uncertainty. As an organization, People's Will never enforced suicide attacks and it was a decision made by the bomber at his own discretion. However, those terrorists who got close enough to risk their own lives were the most successful.⁶

Thus, suicide bombing, as a tactic, was created owing to the limitations of implanted bombs leading to the invention of portable bombs. This, in turn, urged for a more accurate guidance and control system, which, given the technological capabilities of the time, was best achieved by exploiting the desire for martyrdom already prevalent among some individuals. The heroic essence and social connotation attached with martyrs has been aggressively exaggerated for suicide bombing and the cult of martyrdom first began to emerge in Russia in the 1860s. This was a time when any form of political protest, including peaceful expressions were considered criminal offence, rendering

4 Jeffrey William Lewis, *The Business of Martyrdom: A History of Suicide Bombing* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2012), pp. 29-57.

5 James Billington, *Fire in the Minds of Men: Origins of the Revolutionary Faith*, Page 388

6 Bruce Hoffman, "Aviation, Security and Terrorism: An Analysis of the Potential Threat to Air Cargo Integrators", *Terrorism and Political Violence* 10, no. 3 (1998), p. 66.

the educated youth and the intelligentsia of Russia extremely helpless and frustrated. Opposing the state thus involved the risk of being caught and further executed, thereby leading to a polarizing “kill or be killed” mindset to take root. There was widespread fascination for suicide in educated Russian society which coincided with the dedication towards violent social revolution, with an impression that suicide was on the rise in Russia in the 1870s – 1880s. This attraction towards suicide by Russian thinkers and writers made the tactic an important aspect of the revolutionary tradition of Imperial Russia. One of the critics of the revolutionary subculture in Russia was Dostoevsky, who went on to say that suicide was the expression of the revolutionaries’ nihilistic obsession with individual freedom and empowerment.⁷

During Alexander II’s assassination, suicide bombing was not employed as a tactic and there was no organizational apparatus dedicated to promoting attacks of similar nature. However, the idea persisted until the end of Alexander III’s reign and a broader wave of terrorist violence gripped Russia, during which the use of suicide bombers became a recurring element of escalating violence between revolutionaries and the state.⁸

The Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (PSR) was a political party in early twentieth century Russia and one of the key players in the Russian Revolution. PSR was responsible for majority of the instances of dynamite attacks in Russia between 1902 and 1906. The party members saw themselves as ideological heirs to the People’s Will and within the PSR, the Terrorist Brigade, also called the Combat Organization, became an independent unit. The brigade included self-selected adherents of a culture of martyrdom which differed from the ideology of the group as a whole. These aspiring “martyrs” began to take pride in their self-proclaimed willingness to die for the cause, sometimes even viewing their comrades with disdain, as they were not as fanatical and perhaps even prone to compromise.⁹

The plot to assassinate the Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich, governor general of Moscow was planned by the Terrorist Brigade in early 1905. The designated lead bomber in the plot, Kaliayev was one who had previously discussed self-sacrifice in a tactical manner with other members and finally on February 4, 1905 got the opportunity to carry out the act in the form of

7 Jeffrey William Lewis, *The Business of Martyrdom: A History of Suicide Bombing* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2012), pp. 29-57.

8 Norman M. Naimark, *Terrorists and Social Democrats: The Russian Revolutionary Movement under Alexander III* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1983).

9 Anna Geifman, *Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1904-1917* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 45-83.

an improvised attack. His readiness to martyr himself gave him the ability to improvise in such a manner and he managed to kill the grand duke by throwing his bomb from approximately four paces away while running full speed towards the duke's carriage. Astonishingly, Kaliyev managed to survive the attack and demonstrated through his actions the practical utility of a bomber who is willing to sacrifice his life for the cause or mission. He was aware of both the strategic and tactical usefulness of suicide for the Terrorist Brigade. Having achieved strategic success through this attack, he then went on to use his incarceration and trial to complete his martyrdom in order to legitimize his group and the struggle.¹⁰

Kaliyev's attack was thus a major landmark in the history of tactical use of martyrdom by a terrorist organization. It demonstrates that the purpose of integrating the bomb and the bomber not only guarantees maximum damage but further, allows for more control ensuring that the actual outcome corresponds with the desired result of the attack. Subsequently, many assassinations were carried out by the Terrorist Brigade in the following years, as well as other revolutionary groups in Russia such as the Maximalists, who had attempted to kill the Prime Minister Peter Stolypin in his villa in August 1906. They detonated sixteen-pound bombs while yelling slogans of freedom and anarchy, killing themselves and twenty-seven other people. In this manner, the use of human bombs remained unique to the Russian context for years after the decline of the Socialist Revolutionaries in the area.¹¹

Imperial Japan

During the Second World War, it was Imperial Japan that made the most thorough and systematic use of suicide attackers, deploying thousands of human bombs in the last year of the war. These attackers were known as Kamikaze, or Tokkotai, short for Tokubetsu Kogekitai, meaning special units. Attacks such as the Kamikaze were extremely rare in the world from its inception up until the 1980s. Even till date, Imperial Japan is known to have used suicide bombing most extensively, measured in sheer numbers.¹²

The Kamikaze were primarily aircraft laden with explosives piloted by humans on one-way missions to inflict as much damage as possible to U.S. naval vessels. An estimated three thousand pilots are known to have killed

10 *ibid*

11 Jeffrey William Lewis, *The Business of Martyrdom: A History of Suicide Bombing* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2012), pp. 29-57.

12 Malcolm Higgins, "Japan's Deadly WW2 Kamikaze Pilots", *War History Online*,

themselves in suicide missions during the war thus creating a powerful psychological impact on the U.S. forces projecting an image of fanaticism and militarism. It is known however, that the Kamikaze were not as successful as their inventors had envisioned them to be. This was mainly because of the disparity in forces on both sides fighting the war. The Japanese empire was in full retreat and the civilian population under a state of siege by mid-1944. Thus, Japanese leadership hoped that relatively small numbers of Kamikaze would be able to combat the U.S. forces effectively.¹³

As the number of such attacks increased, cheaper aircraft that were of little military value and easily disposable were also used. Further, the training period for pilots was shortened as cost was a major factor. Besides, a variety of social and cultural factors were smartly exploited by Japanese leaders in order to encourage increasing number of young men to join the army for suicide missions. They often linked the suicide attacks to the tradition of ritual suicide and elements of Buddhism and Shinto as a means to secure honour in the Japanese military. This did not always work as most young men in Japan at the time came from free thinking institutions and universities with a liberal mindset, not easily convinced with such fanaticism or militarism. The government also began retorting with shame and coercion in order to gain control over these men and to direct their actions in the desired manner. Therefore, the irony is that Tokkotai are remembered even today as brave soldiers or protectors of the nation but were essentially fatalistic young men who saw no other better alternative to their deaths and hoped that their sacrifice would ensure the safety of their loved ones.¹⁴

Despite the Japanese government's portrayal of the Kamikaze as a noble cause, the entire phenomenon was nowhere near successful as the attacks were not large enough to make any significant impact. However, their use of suicide attackers was much different than that of the Russian revolutionaries. Where death was anticipated and probable for the Russians, it was anticipated and necessary for the Japanese Tokkotai. The latter would use individuals as a last-ditch effort to salvage a cause and thereby, for perhaps the first time in the world, exhibited the mechanization of human beings in this manner.¹⁵

September 11, 2017. Available at: <https://www.warhistoryonline.com/world-war-ii/5-facts-japans-deadly-kamikaze-pilots-mm.html> Last accessed on May 5, 2018.

13 Jeffrey William Lewis, *The Business of Martyrdom: A History of Suicide Bombing* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2012), pp. 57-85.

14 *ibid*

15 Ohnuki-Tierney, "Kamikaze Diaries", page 84

Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA)

The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) was an organisation that stood for the reunification of Ireland and the end of British rule in Northern Ireland. The Provisional IRA is an offshoot of the IRA which fought an insurgency from 1916-1921 with the British. As a result of the insurgency, an Irish Free State was created which was independent and also marked the success of the insurgency. However, six of Ireland's northern counties were to remain under British rule, to be known as Northern Ireland. While most members of the IRA were not in favour of this partition, the Irish forces that were supportive of this arrangement ultimately won the civil war launched by IRA. Although the relations between the Irish Free State and Britain were not always the best, it was in 1960s that they started deteriorating with discrimination against Catholics in the Free State. Within the IRA, there was a split between the "officials" and the "provisionals", wherein the former believed in using peaceful means to attain a united socialist Ireland, while the latter saw violence as a catalyst for unification.¹⁶

The Provisional IRA gained momentum in the late 1960s when British troops were deployed in Northern Ireland to restore order thereby further alienating the Catholic population. This gave the Provisional IRA an environment conducive to steady recruitment and support among the Catholics.¹⁷ The organisation devised a strategy in order to achieve its goals, as stated in the Green Book, the training manual of the organisation entailing a five-part guerrilla strategy. The first part of the strategy spoke of a war of attrition against the British military and the Northern Irish forces, in order to cause as many casualties and deaths as possible. This was aimed at creating a demand from the affected people for their withdrawal. The second part stated that a bombing campaign must be launched to financially hamper the United Kingdom, by ensuring unprofitability in the six Irish counties under its rule. The third part stated that the counties under British rule must be "ungovernable except by colonial military rule". The fourth aspect of the strategy talked of sustaining the war through propaganda and publicity campaigns enabling widespread support

16 Kathryn Gregory, "Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) (aka, PIRA, "the provos," Óglaigh na hÉireann) (UK separatists), *Council on Foreign Relations*, March 16, 2010. Available at: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/provisional-irish-republican-army-ira-aka-pira-provos-oglaigh-na-heireann-uk> Last accessed on April 20, 2018 and BBC History, "The Troubles", *BBC*. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/troubles> Last accessed on April 21, 2018

17 Jeffrey William Lewis, *The Business of Martyrdom: A History of Suicide Bombing* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2012), pp. 115-141.

on national and international platforms. The last point of the strategy aims at punishing “criminals, collaborators or informers” that come in the way of the war of liberation.¹⁸

Explosives or bombs were an essential part of the IRA’s campaign in accordance with the first three parts of its strategy. Bomb explosions were carried out by the IRA in 1972, however the organisation would not claim responsibility for these attacks. On March 4, a bomb explosion at a restaurant in Belfast killed 2 women and injured 136 other people. Several similar attacks took place at restaurants and crowded places killing and injuring many civilians, with the IRA still refusing to claim responsibility for the attacks. These attacks gained widespread condemnation from the Irish community, especially the Catholics.¹⁹

While bombing incidents are known to have taken a lot of lives of IRA volunteers, it is worth noting that their resolve to cause maximum deaths with ruthlessness was strong and undeterred. There was an inherent willingness to kill as it was the primary strategy they adopted, however, the willingness to die required a lot more. The members of IRA believed that they were fighting for a sacred cause and it was secular nationalism with a vaguely socialist bend that replaced Catholicism, making it an ethnic nationalist conflict. The need for self-sacrifice and of volunteers willing to fight was understood necessary for the movement, however, the IRA never employed suicide terrorism on a large scale. Suicide, however, still played a significant role in the IRA movement.

In order for an organisation to employ suicide terrorism, a lot of factors need to be considered. To begin with, the need for such a tactic must be appropriately contemplated by the terror organisation and its effectiveness must be weighed. In the case of Ireland, while bombing failures surely called for alternative methods of targeting, that did not seem to be enough. According to Jeffrey William Lewis, “the conditions in Northern Ireland during the Troubles were not conducive to the production of willing suicide attackers”.²⁰ Essentially, a culture of martyrdom was absent, making it hard to win support among the community for suicide terrorism, simultaneously failing to legitimise the act of self-sacrifice.

18 Green Book contents- http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/ira/ira_green_book.htm

19 Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 135-136.

20 Jeffrey William Lewis, *The Business of Martyrdom: A History of Suicide Bombing* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2012), pp. 126-127.

This did not mean that the IRA never witnessed acts of self-sacrifice. Hunger strikes were carried out by republican prisoners in 1981 as a result of confrontation between the prisoners and authorities. In 1976, the British began to de-escalate and criminalise the conflict, rendering republican prisoners that were usually kept under house arrest with far worse circumstances now. The first spark of retaliation began with a prisoner who refused to wear the uniform and wore a blanket instead. A lot of prisoners followed suit refused to do everything that was required of them in prison, but by 1979, nothing seemed to be working and the prisoners grew desperate. They had placed five demands to the British but could not lead them to agree. This is when the first hunger strike by seven prisoners began in October 1980. Of the seven prisoners, there was one each representing the counties of Northern Ireland and one representing Belfast. While the strikes did have a psychological impact, no concession was made on the part of the British, despite one of the prisoners having slipped into a coma due to acute hunger. The second hunger strike was led by Bobby Sands on March 1, 1981 who died sixty six days after he started the protest. A few more prisoners died soon after in a series of hunger strikes that followed. The IRA was not supportive of this form of protest as it feared losing support for its cause.²¹

The hunger strikes were a failure on technical grounds as they did not make Britain adhere to any of the republican concessions. However, it had a tremendous psychological impact and stunned people all over the world. The hunger strikes had been equated to “tactical martyrdom” due to the manner in which people were responding to it. While the strikes did make use of the dedication of individuals towards the cause, it was not successful in achieving what it set out to. Sympathy was garnered from the national and international audiences, however, family members and volunteers of the IRA did not support the strikes or the act of self-sacrifice at all. The deaths of strikers seemed counterproductive within the community, diminishing the power of self-sacrifice entirely. The desperation of most campaigns of suicide terror comes from a sense of overwhelming force imposed on them, which was absent in the case of the IRA. A war never really commenced between the British government and its Catholic population and thus self-sacrifice was not accepted and couldn't receive legitimacy.²²

21 *ibid*

22 Jerold M. Post, *The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to Al-Qaeda* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 39-54.

Worker's Party of Kurdistan (PKK)

The people of the Kurdish ethnic group are spread across Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq approximately numbering over 16 million. Numerous organisations in this region have claimed to represent the Kurds, one of them being the PKK in Turkey. In each of these countries, the Kurds comprise a minority which has made them vulnerable to abuse, as illustrated in the late 1980s by the attempted genocide by Iraq under Saddam Hussein. This led to the belief among many Kurds that the creation of an independent Kurdish state would put an end to all the atrocities faced by the ethnic group. The PKK was established on November 27, 1978 and started out as a radical left-wing organisation. It was in 1984 that the PKK got involved in violent action against Turkey, with assistance from Syrian authorities. Abdullah Ocalan was the leader of PKK which and its central objective was an integration of Marxist revolution and the Kurdish struggle for independence. It was the spirit of nationalism and the will for self-determination on ethnic grounds that drove the ideology of the PKK rather than religious fundamentalism in Turkey.²³

Ocalan had managed to establish a "political cult"²⁴ that ensured that PKK members remain in the organisation for their entire life pledging allegiance to him, and by extension to the PKK and the idea of a Kurdish state.²⁵ The group was involved in sporadic acts of terrorism while the biggest problem it faced was gaining acceptance among the Kurdish population. PKK struggled to convince the Kurds of the sincerity of the organisation. Ocalan thus organised the group into guerrilla units in order to form a people's army and portray the PKK's cause as genuine and focused. The PKK ended up killing large number of Kurds in its effort to demonstrate its power to the community it is supposed to be representing. While the PKK also aimed at deterring the Kurds from collaborating with Turkish authorities, it struggled with gaining acceptance among its own people and in fact even alienated them.²⁶

Suicide terrorism was taken up by Ocalan when PKK was at a weak point. The first campaign was launched in 1996, withdrawn soon after that, and the second

23 Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 102.

24 Dogu Ergil, "Suicide Terrorism in Turkey: The Workers' Party of Kurdistan" in *Countering Suicide Terrorism: An International Conference 20-23, 2000 Herzliya, Israel* (Herzliya: International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, 2001), p. 107.

25 Jeffrey William Lewis, *The Business of Martyrdom: A History of Suicide Bombing* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2012), p. 136.

26 Ami Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), pp. 86-96.

campaign began in 1998 and stopped in 1999. Each time the PKK resorted to suicide terrorism was during its moments of weakness, in an attempt to also convince its own population and boost the morale of the rank and file within the organisation. While Ocalan had his own reasons on the need for use of suicide bombing, his poor use of it did not let the tactic sustain the organisation. The most probable reason for this could be the use of female bombers on suicide missions which were known to not necessarily volunteer for the task.²⁷ Moreover, the PKK was not known to commemorate its “martyrs” as it lacked group identity and the promise of religious or secular immortality.²⁸ Thus, PKK struggled constantly between trying to be a representative organisation for the Kurdish population, and using force against its own people to project its capability, thereby losing support and legitimacy.

The PKK was unsuccessful in making the Turkish government concede to its demands and grew extremely weak in the mid to late 1990s. With inadequate public support and smoother government policies in the 1980s, Kurds saw the chance to peacefully express their grievances. The decline of the PKK began with Ocalan’s arrest in 1999, which led to violent clashes and suicide attacks by PKK supporters, in an attempt to prevent Turkish authorities from executing Ocalan and gather support. It is also known that while in trial, Ocalan denied responsibility for the suicide attacks and in August 1999 announced a “peace initiative” which included the denouncement of violence as well as a request for dialogue with Turkish authorities. However, Ocalan and the PKK were not just a terrorist organisation but symbolic of the ideal that still resonates among the Kurds to a great extent.²⁹

West Asia

In the 1980s, there were a lot of developments in the Middle East, especially revolutionary Iran and war torn Lebanon. The Iran-Iraq war had transpired into an existential struggle for the Islamic Republic of Iran, a country which was taken aback by Iraqi invasion and hence performed poorly in the initial stages of the war. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran’s supreme leader resorted to use of an instrument which would help him assert control and consolidation over the region. This instrument was the use of religion in order to articulate

27 Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 101-119.

28 Jeffrey William Lewis, *The Business of Martyrdom: A History of Suicide Bombing* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2012), p. 138

29 Jerold M. Post, *The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to Al-Qaeda* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 67-82.

and interpret the crisis in religious terms, thereby mobilizing Iranian citizenry in the name of God. The Shiite branch of Islam is known to be found by Hussein, grandson of Prophet Mohammad who opposed transfer of the office of the caliph from the Prophet's immediate family and thus challenged the authority of the Umayyad caliph Yazid. As a result, Hussein supported by his followers was an adherent of self-sacrifice unto death, rather than submission to tyranny and his martyrdom is celebrated as a holy day each year. Hussein's martyrdom at Karbala is known to be one of the most powerful and symbolic sources of ritual in the Shiite tradition, which was used by Khomeini to glorify martyrdom and make it an inspiring tale for Shias.³⁰

The propensity of self-sacrificial violence was first demonstrated by members of People's Mujahideen Organization of Iran (Sazeman-e Mujahideen-e Khalq-e Iran) in the 1970s with a Marxist agenda, willingly going for their deaths in order to oppose the Shah. They believed and openly professed that "examples of heroism, self-sacrifice, and martyrdom" were necessary for the liberation of the Iranian population. The group went on to carry out at least five assassinations in 1981 – 1982, killing themselves along with their victims, using hand grenades. It was eventually suppressed brutally but the self-sacrificial mindset was an individual phenomenon which existed within the group, rather than an organizational one.³¹

The Iraqi invasion of Iran was immediately declared as a jihad or holy war by Khomeini and other Iranian religious leaders, referring to Saddam Hussein, the leader of Iraq, a tyrant whose threat to Iran and further to Islam was a crucial one looming large for the Shiite community. In this holy war, there was a special place for martyrs and Khomeini gave them a distinct status from the rest. These were known as protectors of the religion who were willing to shed their own blood in order to defend Islam. He further called upon the Iranian population to emulate Hussein, encouraging them to follow in his footsteps. The population was incentivized by being made to believe that self-sacrifice was the noblest form of Islamic observance possible and would guarantee prospective martyrs a place in paradise. The Iranian state struggled to organize a competent military force like the Revolutionary Guards on one hand and on the other, older men and fairly young boys took matters in their own hands and accompanied Iranian regular forces in a defensive battle, where they were

30 Jeffrey William Lewis, *The Business of Martyrdom: A History of Suicide Bombing* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2012), pp. 63-64.

31 Ervand Abrahamian, *The Iranian Mojehedin* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989) pp. 35-222.

massacred by the Iraqi military. This group of men were known as the “Basij” or the “mobilised”.³²

This passion and fervour which drove these irregulars was exploited by Khomeini to institutionalise the Basij as auxiliaries to the Iranian army. He professed that the kind of martyrdom demonstrated by Hussein had now become an obligation of the Iranian people and thus, even those who did not believe in the same ideology were made to believe that self-sacrifice was their non-negotiable duty towards the religion and the Shiite community. As a result, many young boys were recruited for service, although they seldom had any real sense of martyrdom and what it meant.³³

The Basij were sent in vast numbers to the front to be slaughtered by the Iraqis, wearing headbands and keys around their necks, displaying their purity and allegiance to Khomeini. The exact number of casualties is not known but an Iraqi source has testified that at least 23,000 men were sent as part of Basij and killed in a single “human wave attack” in 1983. The Basij did not necessarily kill themselves but death was an anticipated event that they were well prepared for. Further, their deployment by Khomeini was a landmark event in the field of suicide terrorism as it was a clear case of a leadership group using religious symbolism deliberately to prepare its followers for self-sacrifice. This tactic was unique and not seen anywhere else in the world up till then.³⁴

Martyrdom was further glorified and made a much more deadly tool when leaders began to use it as a narrative, especially with the martyrdom of the young boy Mohammad Hosein Fahmideh. He was one of the Basij volunteers who grabbed a hand grenade and threw himself under an Iraqi tank, detonating the explosive and thereby destroying the tank as well as taking his own life. This act of Fahmideh’s was used by Khomeini to set as an example for the rest and glorify the 12 year old boy who was willing to so selflessly give up his own life in the name of the cause.³⁵ His death was not only a cause for celebration among Khomeini and his supporters; it further caused fear in the minds of the enemy, making them withdraw their tanks into their own

32 Jeffrey William Lewis, *The Business of Martyrdom: A History of Suicide Bombing* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2012), pp. 57-85.

33 Ian Brown, *Khomeini’s Forgotten Sons: The Story of Iran’s Boy Soldiers* (London: Grey Seal, 1990), pp. 88-89.

34 Jeffrey William Lewis, *The Business of Martyrdom: A History of Suicide Bombing* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2012), pp. 57-85.

35 Davis M. Joyce, *Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance and Despair in the Middle East* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), p. 49.

territory. Thus the spontaneous act of Fahmideh's created an aura of heroism and its effectiveness suggested that this accidental act could serve as the template for a much more systematic form of violence.

Lebanon

Lebanon is a country with multiple faiths and religions, subject to French colonization after which the political system in the country marginalized one of the larger confessional groups of the country, the Shiite Muslims. The beneficiaries of the Constitution were the Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims and continued to be so even in the 1970s when the Shiite Muslims became the largest single confessional group in the country due to differential population growth over the years. The Constitution was never amended and the marginalization of the Shiite Muslims continued politically and economically despite their numbers. This was also the time that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) became a prominent actor in Lebanese politics, following a state-within-a-state approach and using Lebanon to secure its own interests with Israel. The PLO stood for the representation of the Palestinian people and has not officially been affiliated to any religious cause or purpose. It started carrying out military operations against Israel from the southern part of Lebanon, and by 1975 many other key actors began advancing their own agenda in Lebanon causing its government to collapse and a multi-front civil war to emerge.³⁶

During the political mobilization of the Shiite Muslims in Lebanon in the 1970s, a cleric named Musa al-Sadr recognised that Lebanon's Shiites had been encouraged by their leadership to adopt an attitude of political submissiveness. He tried to change this attitude by taking up various elements of Shiite history and tradition in order to mobilize the people and in the process reinterpreted many concepts. One such concept was the martyrdom of Hussein which he hoped to convey as one of political choice, rather than fanaticism and recklessness. Thus, he stripped Hussein's martyrdom of sorrow and reinterpreted it as a tale of courage and bravery for his followers. He worked at the grassroots level and helped create a political identity for Lebanese Shiites, initiating a small network of schools and clinics to provide them with services that the state failed to provide. As much as he tried to refrain from using violent methods, he realised in 1975, the need for a militia, which came to be known as Amal, meaning "hope" and also an acronym for

36 Robert A. Pape and James K. Feldman, *Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010), pp. 194-215.

Battalions of the Lebanese Resistance.³⁷

Musa al-Sadr, however mysteriously disappeared on a visit to Libya, then under the leadership of Muammar al-Qaddafi. Till date his disappearance remains a mystery while there have been speculations that he was killed by the Libyan government. His disappearance came at a time when the civil war and the Iranian Revolution was also building, rendering the Shiites of Lebanon trapped in between these complex developments. This not only revealed deep fissures within the Lebanese Shiite society but also brought to the fore a number of clerics with long-standing personal and ideological connections to revolutionary Iran. Further, there was ambivalence in the relations between Iran and Amal as the latter was reluctant to any form of rule under Khomeini, and instead turned to Syria. Syria was seen by al-Sadr as a last-ditch ally and as part of compatibility it suited both sides as Syria was seeking to keep the PLO in check in Lebanon and thus found the relationship with Amal useful. Finally, as Amal-Syrian relations strengthened, Amal-Palestinian relations worsened to the point of bitter hostilities.³⁸

In the summer of 1982, Israel launched a full-scale attack in the southern part of Lebanon in order to wipe the PLO out. Initially, Israel successfully destroyed the conventional weapons of the PLO, routed the Syrian air force and even reached the outskirts of Beirut. This resulted in the siege of Beirut, though at a great human cost. Thousands of Lebanese non-combatants were also killed in the siege and by the end of summer, southern Lebanon and East Beirut were under Israeli military occupation. This invasion further invoked the Iranian role in Lebanon, even though Iran had so far been cautiously away from the region. The Khomeini government now began to assert itself aggressively in the region, encouraging radical Shiite militias to coalesce as an anti-Israel force. This aggregation of groups eventually led to the formation of numerous entities a few years down the line, such as Hezbollah which developed a national leadership structure and formally announced its existence in an open letter in 1985. The group served as an integrating force among local groups and leaders, proving to be an alternative for Shiites who were discontent with Amal. The organization was based on twofold goals: first, to create a new authentic entity for Shiite identity within the context of Khomeini's Islamic revolution; and second, to combat the Israeli occupation. Suicide bombing

37 Eitan Azani, *Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God – From Revolution to Institutionalisation* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), pp. 47-74.

38 *ibid*

proved to be effective for promoting both agendas.³⁹

There were six major suicide attacks between 1981 and 1983 by Shiite groups in Lebanon. The first attack in 1981 was most likely to be carried out by the remnants of Iraqi al-Dawa, an Islamic alternative to the secular Baath Party formed in 1958. Within the al-Dawa, there were growing connections between the Iraqi, Lebanese and Iranian Shiite, united in opposition to Saddam Hussein's government. The group became more aggressive when Iraqi forces attacked pilgrims on their way to Karbala and the Iranian Revolution further inspired its militancy. Musa al-Sadr's relative Mohammad Bakr al-Sadr was at the time the most respected representing the Shiite community, who also joined the opposition to Hussein's government, eventually proceeding to guide and direct the anti Hussein narrative . The Iraqi al-Dawa was outlawed in March 1980 by the Iraqi government following which it planned to assassinate Tariq Aziz (a close aide to Hussein) the following month in response to the retaliation. Saddam Hussein's government retaliated by executing al-Sadr and his sister after which much of the organisation's leadership fled to Tehran and Lebanon, with the remaining deciding to stay behind in Iraq and carry out several attempts on Hussein's life in the 1980s. The remnants of al-Dawa that fled to Lebanon were subsumed into Hezbollah and it is likely that Iran had some role in the first Lebanese suicide attack as well as the integration of al-Dawa members into Hezbollah, suggested by the continuity seen in the next few attacks.⁴⁰

Thus, the revival of Hussein's martyrdom by Musa al-Sadr and the militarization of the concept by Ayatollah Khomeini created a certain culture of death and self-sacrifice rather similar to the trend that existed in Revolutionary Russia and the Japanese military. The creation of Hezbollah brought about this culture of martyrdom and its members set themselves apart from other religious denominations as well as other parts of the Shiite community. Jihad and martyrdom became an integral part of these individuals' identity and further testified to the authenticity of their identity and faith. While the encouragement and establishment of such a culture of martyrdom was brought about by Iran, the Israeli invasion accelerated and helped provide a common enemy for the Shiite community to unite against and feel strong enough to resort to self-sacrifice . Furthermore, the disparity in power between the Iranians and Israelis coupled with Israeli indifference towards mass civilian

39 Rogan Eugene, *The Arabs: A History* 2nd ed., Page 415

40 Jeffrey William Lewis, *The Business of Martyrdom: A History of Suicide Bombing* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2012), pp. 70-71.

casualties only made suicide bombing all the more practical.⁴¹

The major suicide attacks during 1981-1983 owe their credibility to Hezbollah, the organization which encouraged enforcement of such a brutal tactic. There were many other suicide bombings that took place hereafter, however, they all successfully devastated the forces of three states, claimed significant human casualties and defied all efforts at prevention of such actions and retaliation that followed. This wave of attacks held a powerful symbolic value and contributed towards the withdrawal of Hezbollah's adversaries in Lebanon in the next two years. In this manner, Hezbollah established itself as a major player in the Lebanese conflict and managed to seek a distinct identity for itself different from other forces such as Amal.⁴²

In the years following these major attacks, suicide bombings became a very common tactic and gained a lot of attention throughout the world. While most of the world was reeling under the brutality of the act and condemning it, terrorist organizations were gaining inspiration from the success story of Hezbollah and other groups in the Middle East.

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

This was organized into an army-like structure in order to protect and defend their 'homeland' for over three decades from 1976 till 2009. Religion was never really a part of their mandate and Tamilian nationalism was the sole driving force of the organisation. The LTTE was unique in its tactful deployment of suicide terrorism as it functioned like a thorough military institution comprising specialized units with a range of operational capabilities. One of these units was the "suicide" unit, which also happened to be the most prestigious of all. It was comprised of dedicated individuals trained and willing to sacrifice their lives towards the cause of their homeland. The LTTE had mastered the effective use of suicide terrorism during the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. It carried out major political assassinations involving people of high ranks and having security protection through its suicide attacks, thereby furthering its agenda in the conflict. Prabhakaran, the leader of LTTE was responsible for this and there are strong pieces of evidence suggesting that he was directly influenced by Hezbollah's use of suicide bombing. In its ultimate attempt the LTTE even replicated the Kamikaze form of suicide when two of its pilots

41 Eitan Azani, *Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God – From Revolution to Institutionalisation* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), pp. 47-74

42 Table from - Jeffrey William Lewis, *The Business of Martyrdom: A History of Suicide Bombing* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2012), p. 67

crashed two separate single engine aircraft on Sri Lankan government targets with the aim of causing maximum damage. LTTE earned name globally for its successful and orchestrated employment of suicide terrorism to further its mandate.

Palestinian Suicide Bombing First intifada (1987-1993)

In the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, the state of Israel was created and further the Gaza Strip was administered under Egypt while the West Bank under Jordan. However, during what came to be known as the "Six Day War" in 1967, Israel took over "the remaining Palestinian territories of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza Strip, as well as the Syrian Golan Heights, and the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula, in a matter of six days".⁴³ The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) was a representative body for all Palestinians who lived in the territory prior to the creation of the state of Israel. It acted as an umbrella organisation upon formation in 1964 to bring together all Palestinian resistance groups under one umbrella, though it gained prominence only after the war in 1967.⁴⁴

In 1982, when Israel invaded Lebanon, it was successful in ousting the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) from southern Lebanon which also led to the rise of Hezbollah. Most of the upper ranks of the PLO settled in Tunisia, and the rest of the Palestinians were left to live under occupation. With heightened frustration among the youth and disappointment in the PLO for its inability to put an end to the occupation, tensions broke out in the form of a civil disobedience campaign with strikes and demonstrations within the occupied territories in December 1987. This marked the beginning of the first *intifada* or uprising which was triggered by the killing of four young Palestinians by Israeli soldiers and the shooting of a teenage boy during an unarmed protest.⁴⁵ The *intifada* came as an opportunity for Palestinian leadership to take revenge

43 Zena Tahhan, "1967 war: How Israel occupied the whole of Palestine", *Al Jazeera*, June 6, 2017. Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/06/50-years-israeli-occupation-longest-modern-history-170604111317533.html> Last accessed on April 22, 2018

44 The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Palestine Liberation Organisation", *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. Available at: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Palestine-Liberation-Organization> Last accessed on April 25, 2018

45 Bethan McKernan, "Intifada: What is it and what would a third Palestinian uprising mean for Israel and the Middle East?", *Independent*, December 7, 2017, Beirut. Available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/intifada-what-is-palestinian->

of the humiliation and oppression faced by them at the hands of the Israelis, and further demanded the creation of Palestinian statehood. A National Unified Command was formed by the local leaders of the factions of the PLO who instructed Palestinians on how to oppose occupation, coordinate strikes and protests etc. Further, there were various Palestinian resistance groups that had come up in the occupied territories, united in their dissatisfaction towards the PLO. A vague organizational framework was formed by these resistance groups who were never in a position to openly defy the PLO. With the *intifada*, most of the world paid attention to the Palestinian cause including the US, Israel and of course, the PLO leadership in Tunisia that was taken by surprise and realized the need to take charge of the situation for any actual political gains to be made.⁴⁶

In the meantime during the 1980s, two prominent Palestinian organizations were formed – Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Hamas was made up of the Gaza branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and wished to present itself independent of the National Unified Command during the *intifada*, posing as “an Islamic alternative for leadership towards Palestinian statehood”. Hamas started out to be a non-violent group that recognized PLO as a “father, brother, relative, and a friend”⁴⁷, however differentiated itself from it owing to the secular nature of the PLO. The PIJ, on the other hand was even more ideological than Hamas and far less prone to pragmatic accommodation of any sort. It also comprised of the Gaza branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and was inspired by the 1979 Iranian Revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini. While Hamas fought for the creation of the Islamic state of Palestine, PIJ was interested in creating a revolutionary movement across the Arab world.⁴⁸

In 1990, skirmishes between the Palestinians and Israelis became common. In October 1990, the Jewish group Temple Mount Faithful planned to lay the foundation stone for the Third Jewish Temple on the Mount, symbolizing recapture of the site for the Jewish community. This seemed as a threat to leaders of Hamas who resorted to stone pelting at Israeli security personnel as well as the worshipping Jews at the site. The police retaliated by opening fire

uprising-israel-jerusalem-trump-hamas-capital-west-bank-palestine-a8097331.html Last accessed on April 26, 2018

46 Jeffrey William Lewis, *The Business of Martyrdom: A History of Suicide Bombing* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2012), pp. 142-162.

47 Jeffrey William Lewis, *The Business of Martyrdom: A History of Suicide Bombing* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2012), p. 147

48 Robert A. Pape and James K. Feldman, *Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010), pp. 216-250.

which wounded nearly a hundred and killed twenty-one Palestinians. This is when Hamas announced its own *jihad* against the Israelis and its military wing was formed, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, who indulged in several knife attacks on Israelis. In 1992, Hamas members, on two separate occasions, killed six Israeli soldiers and kidnapped a seventh, who was eventually murdered when negotiations between the government of Israel and Hamas broke down.

The 1992 attacks were a significant escalation from the level of traditional Palestinian violence that was prevalent before that. In the meantime, the Unified Command was advocating civil disobedience and non-violent methods during the *intifada*. Another development that took place by now was the struggle within the Palestinian community wherein militant groups began competing with each other post the withdrawal of Israeli security forces from many parts of the occupied territories. However, Hamas did not formally participate in the leadership of the *intifada*, in an effort to distinguish and legitimize itself in the eyes of the Palestinian community. In an effort to do so, Hamas took a hard stance towards its own community before doing the same towards Israel.

A few years into the *intifada*, the chairman of the PLO, Yasser Arafat, arrived in Palestine from exile in Tunisia and initiated a formal dialogue with Israel. The first of these was the Madrid Conference in 1991, followed by the Declaration of Principles in 1993 which formally accepted the secret negotiations between Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin, prime minister of Israel. According to the Declaration, parts of the Gaza Strip and West Bank would be administered by the Palestinian Authority (PA) ensuring self-governance in those territories. Arafat served as the president of the PA and continued to assume the role of chairman and leader of Fatah. This agreement came to be known as the Oslo-Cairo process, but it did not address the issue of an independent Palestinian state.⁴⁹

The Declaration of Principles was not welcomed by Hamas and PIJ, who escalated their pitch of violence. On the eve of signing of the Declaration, Hamas guerillas ambushed and killed three Israelis. In 1994, Dr. Baruch Goldstein, a Jew, in the West Bank shot twenty-nine worshippers at a mosque, after which the crowd beat him to death. This further strengthened Hamas' narrative, which orchestrated the first Palestinian suicide attack entailing an explosive laden vehicle driving into a bus stop, thereby killing eight Israelis and injuring forty-four. This was followed by another suicide attack a few days later killing five Israelis and injuring thirty. Both attacks were claimed

49 *ibid*

by Hamas in retaliation for the Goldstein massacre. These attacks were extremely important in determining Hamas' role as a prominent actor in the Palestinian struggle and at the same time put Arafat in an awkward situation. He publicly expressed regret for the loss of Israeli lives in the attacks, which to his own people was a signaling of Israeli appeasement, making him appear less empathetic towards them. The escalation of violence and use of suicide attacks put Arafat under pressure as his authority was being challenged. Several attempts by him to control the Palestinian violence were received with greater protest and violence, including suicide attacks.⁵⁰

The Palestinian suicide attacks were not fully supported by the people, especially those who had faith in the peace process. Further, the intensification of violence on the part of Hamas placed the Palestinians at a disadvantage with increased Israeli security. There was momentary peace during the period of truce between Hamas and the PA from August 1995 to February 1996, however there was resurgence in suicide attacks post 1996 due to the assassination of significant PIJ and Hamas members by Israel. The trajectory of suicide attacks continued in 1997 (five attacks) and 1998 (three attacks), after which suicide attacks of the first *intifada* or first wave ended in Palestine.

Thus, the first *intifada* saw the beginning of the employment of suicide attacks by Hamas and PIJ to showcase their own credibility among Palestinians as well as to challenge the authority of the PA besides targeting the Israelis. While the attacks hampered the peace process between Israel and Palestine, in 1999 the peace process resumed with the election of Ehud Barak as prime minister of Israel, which was supported by a majority of Palestinians at the time.⁵¹ This declining support was accompanied by the PA and Israeli government's decimation of Hamas' al-Qassam Brigades as well as a reduction of their funds, thereby restricting their operations and charitable work. This is how the first wave of suicide attacks came to an end due to lack of support from the community, resulting in no suicide attacks in the year 1999 and 2000, until the second *intifada*.

Second *Intifada*

There was optimism regarding the peace process in 1999 but by 2000 it became clear that the peace process was a distant reality and harder to achieve.

50 *ibid*

51 70% Palestinians had faith in the peace process, while fewer than 20% were in favour of suicide attacks. – Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 19-44.

Ehud Barak was willing to arrive to a final solution along with Arafat, the construction of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip continued, and an increase in the number of Israeli settlers in these territories ensued. This was not welcomed by the Palestinians of course and what further added to their woes was the functioning of the PA under Arafat marred by rampant corruption and autocracy taking precedence. Palestinians started losing faith in the peace process. Further, when the United States under President Clinton wished to hold talks between Arafat and Barak in 2000, it seemed clear that a final solution for peace was nowhere in sight as both parties did not have enough political capital to make a compromise. On one hand, Arafat was losing the support of his own people and on the other hand, Barak was also equally isolated. The US tried to mediate once again and advocate a framework for peace however, it was rejected by Arafat leading to the acrimonious Israeli-Palestinian relationship once again, characterized by violence and a larger spate of suicide attacks.⁵²

The violence resorted to in 2000 was a lot more lethal, as most Palestinians were losing out on patience and Arafat began to support the use of deadly violence as well. Further, at the time Hezbollah was gaining prominence in the region and the withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon was attributed to the organisation's guerilla warfare strategy along with its employment of suicide terrorism. This gave groups like Hamas and PIJ along with several other Palestinian resistance groups the incentive to employ violence in a similar manner to take charge of the situation. Thus, violence became decentralized and made it hard for the Palestinian leadership to control or contain it effectively.

The first suicide bombing in the second *intifada* was orchestrated by PIJ when an IDF post in Gaza was targeted injuring one Israeli soldier and killing the perpetrator as well. In a few months' time, it was widely felt that suicide terrorism was the most effective means of striking Israeli targets, mainly soldiers and by the end of 2001, there were over thirty suicide attacks conducted by Hamas and PIJ. By 2002, resistance groups that had not previously indulged in suicide attacks also started employing the tactic as it had widely become the last resort for resistance groups to target the Israeli armed forces or society. The number of such attacks exceeded the total number of suicide attacks employed during the first *intifada*, which was above fifty.⁵³ While suicide terrorism was at its

52 Jeffrey William Lewis, *The Business of Martyrdom: A History of Suicide Bombing* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2012), pp. 163-190.

53 Mohammad M Hafez, *Manufacturing Human Bombs*

peak in 2002 in Palestinian territories, the number of attacks started declining soon after that, ending in 2005 altogether. This was because of the ceasefire agreement between Israeli and Palestinian forces after Arafat's death in 2004.⁵⁴

Conclusion

Suicide is seen to have been a tactic resorted to by both state and non-state actors in conflicts that were asymmetric, with mostly the weaker power using the tactic to gain leverage in the conflict. Through its evolution over the years, both successful and unsuccessful campaigns of the use of suicide indicate pertinent factors required for suicide to be used in an effective and strategic manner.

Narodnaya Volya in Imperial Russia was successful in understanding the practicality of keeping the bomb as close to the human as possible in order to gain control of the detonation and assured success of the mission. On the other hand, Imperial Japan used suicide more systematically in order to make up for the asymmetry in warfare. Both these users of suicide as a weapon understood the basic effectiveness of the "tool". However, in case of both the IRA and PKK, there was realization that suicide to be used as a revolutionary act must certainly have the support of the masses or the community for which the "suicide user" is committing the act. In the absence of such support, an air of uncertainty and vacuum gets associated with the act and it no longer found to be as effective. Moreover, mass support for an extreme act such as suicide is only gained when there is harsh brutality faced by the masses. Both Britain and Turkey did not exert such brutal forms of repression, and thus provided scope for a peaceful alternative to people's grievances. Thus, the required community support for acts of suicide to achieve their ends was not generated among the masses in both these cases.

The events in West Asia around 1979 completely changed things, especially in the realm of suicide terrorism. Prior to this, suicide was used more as an act of revolution for self-determination and "freedom". However, with the Iranian revolution and the use of religion by Khomeini to mobilize the Shiite masses, the very act of suicide became glorified much more than it was prior to this. Suicide terrorism was glorified not just as martyrdom but as an "ultimate death" associated with religious enlightenment. With the creation of Hezbollah and the use of narratives and propaganda in order to instill among

54 Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 19-44

the masses an aspiration to become a “martyr”, terror outfits all over the world gained inspiration. Not only did these events demonstrate to the Islamic world the usefulness of suicide, it managed to impress Prabhakaran, the leader of the LTTE, too. While taking a cue from Hezbollah’s use of vehicular borne suicide attacks, the LTTE demonstrated the strategic use of suicide terrorism in order to strike high-risk targets that would be difficult to hit at in any other kind of terrorist mission.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan saw the creation of a base for *mujahideen* fighters from across the Arab world, eventually forming the foundation of Al Qaeda. Religion was now used liberally in order to carry out suicide terrorism with the global *jihād* that was waged by Osama bin Laden through Al Qaeda. Once again, the use of narratives for propaganda and misinterpretation of both religion and world events led to the foundation of an ideology that resonated among a wide cross section of people. At the same time, Hamas and PIJ were instrumental in conducting the Palestinian suicide bombings, once again portraying the limited role of such attacks in the presence of a peaceful alternative to the issue, despite the support for suicide among the masses.

It is pertinent to understand the use of suicide in conflict in order to understand how terror outfits use the tactic to their advantage today. The Iranian Revolution and establishment of organizations such as Hezbollah, LTTE, Hamas and PIJ is said to have changed the way in which terror outfits operated in the modern world, especially in terms of suicide terrorism. However, there seems to have been a further change after the establishment of Al Qaeda and the attacks of 9/11 that completely ‘revolutionised’ suicide terrorism as a tactic. This is precisely why Al Qaeda is known to be the “trendsetter” of suicide terrorism today along with one of its factions that went on to become the Islamic State (IS) which has shown far more widespread and brutal use of suicide terrorism as part of its functioning.

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