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Editor's Note

Not Quite an Age of Aquarius

Significant moves and shifts are taking place in the strategic landscape with the beginning of the Obama era. One of the areas of hectic strategic manoeuvring is certainly in the Asia Pacific region, and closer to home, in the South Asian region. The editorial team of *Peace and Security Review* (PSR) is closely monitoring and analysing these important moves in the wider region and trying to understand what implications and footprints they have for the strategic and security architecture in the coming days.

US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton's decision to break with tradition and embark on her first foreign trip in this official capacity heading out to Asian capitals in February 2009 suggested the Obama Administration had decided to focus on trans-Pacific, as opposed to trans-Atlantic, relations as its first strategic priority. The simultaneity of Clinton's arrival in Japan, on the first stop before going on to Indonesia, South Korea and Japan, and the visit to Kabul, Islamabad and Delhi by Richard Holbrook, Obama's special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, stressed the importance Washington now attaches to the wider Asia-Pacific region. So, after eight years of alleged neglect, is Asia being restored to a position of pre-eminence in the US-led global security order?

Well, yes, and no. For one thing, President Obama has more pressing challenges closer to home in the form of the economic and financial crises to worry about. His forthcoming trip to London where British Prime Minister Gordon Brown will host a G-20 summit in April will underscore that focus. For another, there are worries about a resurgent Russia facing uncertain economic times while its Balkan, Baltic and European neighbours fret over the direction of Moscow's strategic trajectory. Longer-term difficulties abound: Israeli-Palestinian volatility in and around Gaza, complex dynamics in the Iraq-Iran-Syria-Lebanon quadrangle, worries about NATO's prospects in Afghanistan, India-Pakistani tensions over militancy in Kashmir and elsewhere, and Pyongyang's ballistic and nuclear histrionics. In the backdrop looms

hydra-headed Islamist militancy of Al-Qaeda's ideological progeny, feeding off from some of the former conflicts and grievances.

So, traditional strategic considerations are probably just part of the palimpsest of issues facing the Administration. Still, events have a way of neutering vision and the period surrounding Barack Obama's inauguration demonstrated patterns of behaviour familiar to students of security. Around the time when the new President was taking his oath of office, India was test-firing the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile using the US GPS satellite network to guide it to its target. The test failed as the missile was diverted some 2km from its objective because of an alleged problem with the GPS feed. Indian defence scientists reconfigured BrahMos to use the Russian Glonass Global Navigational Satellite System instead. More worryingly, perhaps, a month after Obama won the election, Beijing announced plans to start building two aircraft carriers in 2009 for launch in 2015. Both would be built in Shanghai, displace 50-60,000 tons and carry Su-33 fighters. 50 of these had been ordered from Russia, and 50 pilots had begun a four-year training programme in Dalian. While Beijing has been hinting at this for some time, the imminent reality of Chinese power-projection capability challenging rivals in the western Pacific waters raised interesting questions for proximate maritime powers.

Before the carriers could be commissioned, China reportedly planned to deploy short- and medium range ballistic missiles with manoeuvrable warheads to attack naval targets such as enemy carriers. Even with improving BMD capabilities coming on stream with US Pacific forces, no assured defences were available against these weapons. Beneath the waves, China's Shang and Han-class attack submarines had increased oceanic patrols. 12 such patrols were detected in 2008, compared to seven in 2007, two in 2006 and none in 2005. More substantially, the Chinese Navy is building a flotilla of five Jin-class SLBM subs, each expected to carry around 12 JL-2 ballistic missiles. Once these are commissioned, China's nuclear deterrent — though relatively small — would become invulnerable to a decapitating first strike. In short, China would be able to assert its claims within the 'First Island Chain' with little fear of effective counterattacks. The window for neutering China would close.

Perhaps pragmatic recognition of the increasingly multipolar reality will win, after all. The USA announced in the New Year that restrictions on high-tech exports to China, in force since mid-1989, would be 'eased' and licenses issued on a 'case by case basis.' If US firms begin exporting high-technology items to China, the case for the European Union maintaining an embargo would be diluted, and the lucrative duopoly enjoyed by Israel and Russia would face considerable competition for the first time. Beijing could then

perhaps operate as a buyer's market and shape procurement terms and prices. If another sign was needed of an acknowledgement of the tectonic shifts reshaping strategic Asia-pacific, it came just before Clinton embarked on her Asian voyage. The USA and China announced resumption of 'defence policy dialogue' in Beijing at the end of February 2009. China broke off the series in November 2008 when the outgoing Bush Administration announced plans to sell military kit worth \$6.5bn to Taiwan. Since cross-Strait relations had shown marked improvement in recent months and conflict appeared unlikely, resumption of military talks looked propitious.

What of the 'neo-containment' policy led by the former Bush Administration, then? Where does the 'alliance of democracies' stand? Is the Quadrilateral Initiative linking the USA with Japan, India, and Australia, and second-tier countries such as Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia defunct? No straightforward answer to these questions present themselves yet, but signs of US efforts to incorporate China as a partner within the regional and global security architecture suggest adversarial tendencies have moved to the background, at least for now. India and Japan, of course, would pursue their own security interests and goals as they see fit, and can count on US support and assistance to their emergence as autonomous actors with expanding space. But India is quite a distance behind China in the power curve and Japan's position is not radically different. The substance of China's 'comprehensive national power' is on a broadly rising trajectory and will be for some time to come. Although the global economic downturn will reduce the resources available to these — and indeed other — powers to advance their strategic interests over the next couple of years, the broad patterns of tectonic shifts are likely to persist.

Under these circumstances, especially given the delicate nature of America's economic health and Sino-US symbiotic economic relations, Washington's conciliatory approach to Beijing suggests a move towards a pragmatic acceptance of the emerging regional and global strategic reality. Partners can achieve so much more than adversaries can, after all; and the USA and China have had two decades of covert collaboration and strategic success in the 1970s and 1980s to attest to that. So, while we may not be seeing the dawning of an age of Aquarius, Mars may not be on the ascendant for a while.

Against this backdrop, how does South Asia generally, and Bangladesh in particular, stand? Well — in practical terms states, societies and governments get what their leaders deserve. US intelligence analysts have described South Asia as 'one of the world's least integrated regions' and given the substantial — some would say potentially existential — challenges facing the billion-plus largely penurious people who call the region home, this can only make

concerted efforts to address these threats even more difficult than they already are. But the first step must be to acknowledge that severe economic, environmental, demographic and meta-security threats do confront the region and its populace—threats which no single actor by itself can meet with any realistic hope of success. Leadership is often about explaining the complex nature of reality to voters, to build up the constituency for taking unpleasant but necessary steps. Mr Obama might have begun that process in the USA, but will South Asian leaders demonstrate that level of statesmanship? Coming months will answer that question.

Major General ANM Muniruzzaman, ndc, psc (Retd.)
Editor

Mumbai Investigation: The Operatives, Masterminds, and Enduring Threat

*Rohan Gunaratna**

I. INTRODUCTION

The most devastating terrorist attack in 2008 was the coordinated, near simultaneous, no-surrender attack on India's entertainment and financial capital from November 26-29.¹ After reaching Mumbai by sea on the eve of November 26, ten attackers in pairs engaged in a serial killing spree for 60 hours shocking the entire world.² Sequentially and consecutively, they attacked Mumbai's soft and symbolic targets—the Victoria Terminus,³ Leopold Café, Jewish Centre at the Nariman House, and two iconic hotels,

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¹ As opposed to suicide attacks, where the perpetrator fully intends to die, in fedayeen or "no surrender" attacks are high risk missions. The perpetrator intends to fight until he is either killed or captured by his adversary. There is a very small chance that he is able to complete his mission and escape.

² The attack killed 182, maimed and injured about 300 and caused an economic damage and loss of 30-40 billion dollars.

³ VTS, renamed Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (CST), is one of the busiest railway stations in the world.

frequented by Westerners. To gain global attention, the terrorists took hostages in the Narim House, the Taj Mahal hotel, and the Oberoi hotel. The strike bore resemblance to the eight-member PLO attack on the Savoy hotel in Israel on the night of March 4, 1975 where they landed by boat on the Tel Aviv beach. They fired and threw grenades and held 13 hostages. The Israeli commandos Sayeret Matkal stormed the hotel, killed seven and captured one terrorist. Three soldiers, including the Sayeret Matkal commander Uzi Yairi were killed. Although the attacks in Mumbai were reminiscent of the Savoy siege, the Indian response was not.

India is nearly a decade behind the West in counter-terrorism. India had failed to develop a multi-agency threat alert capability that would fuse all source intelligence, assess, and share information with multiple operational agencies with the responsibility to prevent and protect. With no national threat integration capacity, both the central and the state governments failed to anticipate and develop an action-response plan for a catastrophic attack. Mumbai has suffered repeatedly from terrorism since 1993. In the face of sustained threat to and vulnerability of Mumbai, India's elite counter terrorism units capable of quick-reaction to such events had no contingent stationed in Mumbai. The police was ill-equipped with vintage weapons and the Indian marine commandos were not trained in hostage rescue.

Despite intelligence by foreign and national security agencies, India was gravely under-prepared for the attack. The US government's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and its Indian counterpart, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), had warned of the impending threat of an attack in Mumbai.⁴ Though intelligence reporting did not specify the date and time of the attack, the identity of the operatives, and the attack's method of operation, it specified the Taj Mahal Hotel as a target.⁵

The security of the Taj was enhanced in late September but a stand-down was ordered a week before the attack.⁶ In addition, from the interrogations of LeT operatives, the Indian police knew of terrorist's sustained interest in the Taj, Oberoi Trident, Stock Exchange, Mumbai Vidhan Sabha, Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus, Mumbai police commissionerate and ATS-Mumbai.⁷ "I took

⁴ Praveen Swami, Pointed intelligence warnings preceded attacks, *The Hindu*, November 30, 2008. The first report was based on a phone call made by 'Muzammil' alias 'Abu Hurrera', a LeT leader responsible for mounting operations in India.

⁵ Intelligence reports foreshadowed attack, *Seattle Times*, December 2, 2008 and Praveen Swami, Pointed intelligence warnings preceded attacks, *The Hindu*, November 30, 2008.

⁶ Interview, Alan Orlob, Vice President for Security, Marriott, December 15, 2008

⁷ Prashant Dayal, Ahmedabad, Mumbai, one mastermind? *Times of India*, Dec.22, 2008.

photo and video. I drew a diagram of roads/buildings,” stated Mumbai resident Fahim Arshad Ansari alias Abu Zarar, a LeT operative arrested in India in February 2008.⁸ Another eight-member cell disrupted in Mumbai in March 2007 revealed that LeT planned to hit a dozen targets including the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre and the Mumbai Stock Exchange.⁹

II. THE CONTEXT

As Mumbai attacks demonstrated, India is in the category of nations worldwide that face a tier-one terrorist threat.¹⁰ The other countries in that class are Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq. India will face an enduring threat from three sources in the foreseeable future. First, radicalized segments of India’s Muslim community, second, radicalized segments of neighboring Muslim communities, third, deterioration of relations between Pakistan and India.

The best organized terrorist group in mainland Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Taiba [LeT: Army of the Pure], staged this attack in Mumbai.¹¹ Furthermore, the international target selection demonstrates the evolving role of LeT from a national and a regional into a global threat group. The Mumbai attack is over but the threat to the region endures. The group’s vast conceptual, support and operational infrastructure overseas and in neighboring Pakistan is still intact: its ideologues, masterminds, operatives and supporters remain active, planning and preparing for the next attack. Although ideologically and operationally opposed to Al Qaeda and to its principal host Tareek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), for the first time LeT adopted as its enemy, the “Jews and crusaders.” As opposed to a suicide attack, a classic Al Qaeda tactic that does not require high-level training, the LeT attackers received higher quality training to stage a no-surrender attack.

The State of Pakistan is not implicated in the attack.¹² On the other hand all the attackers came from Pakistan. After the U.S.-led coalition intervention

⁸ Sagnik Chowdhury “Kasab’s version matches that of Fahim, say cops” *Indian Express*, December 7, 2008.

⁹ Praveen Swamy, “Pakistan Restraining LeT But Doing Little to Dismantle Capability,” *The Hindu*, May 14, 2007

¹⁰ The terrorist attack in Mumbai terror was the 13th strike in India in 2008. What’s next?, *The Telegraph*, Calcutta, December 7, 2008.

¹¹ To disassociate Hafeez Mohamed Saeed, the LeT leader, from the Mumbai attack, Muhammad Yahya Mujahid, his spokesman stated that LeT is a separate entity from Jamaat-ul Dawa. Jane Perlez and Somini Sengupta, Mumbai Attack is Test for Pakistan on Curbing Militants, *New York Times*, December 3, 2008

¹² Jonathan Adams, “In unconfirmed raid, Pakistan seizes Mumbai attack ringleader” *Christian Science Monitor*, December 8, 2008.

in Afghanistan, the threat from Afghanistan has shifted to Pakistan. Instead of blaming Pakistan, which is the easiest thing to do, the international community should work with Pakistan to build its counter terrorism law enforcement (especially police), intelligence and military capacities. Otherwise, the current and emerging threat both from mainland and tribal Pakistan is unlikely to diminish and will most likely grow and continue to threaten the international security.

III. BACKGROUND

The terrorists who attacked Mumbai operated in a milieu where Indians and Pakistanis hate each other. While India's foreign intelligence agency — the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) — destabilized Pakistan, Pakistan's Inter-Services-Intelligence (ISI) destabilized India. Despite attempts to hide the issue under the carpet, resolving the dispute over Kashmir is at the heart of normalizing relations between these two nuclear neighbors. The perpetuity of the animosity, tension and fighting has hampered the economic growth of the subcontinent at a time when the epicenter of economic power is steadily moving from the West to the heart of Asia. Like North America and Europe dominated the global economy for two hundred years, India and China have the potential to dominate the global economy in the coming decades. Political and military might will naturally follow economic power. However, both India and China face many challenges: The dominant national security threat facing both India and China is from terrorism. Without internal security and regional stability, these two emerging powers are unlikely to achieve and sustain superpower status.

With a dozen other Pakistani groups, LeT fights the Indian military in Kashmir and its clandestine cells mostly attack the government targets throughout India. Operating against 500,000 troops in Kashmir, the largest concentration of troops anywhere in the world, LeT attempted to indigenize the insurgency in Kashmir but failed. However, in the Indian mainland, LeT was successful in infiltrating, recruiting and training Indian Muslims in Pakistan and creating an "Indian LeT." Known as the Indian Mujahidin, in the lead up to the Mumbai carnage, this group was responsible for a majority of terrorist attacks in India in 2008. As attacks in Kashmir evoked little response, LeT and its affiliate Indian Mujahidin increasingly shifted their operations to the major cities. For their focal attack on Mumbai, the Indian Mujahidin studied the Mumbai targets, but LeT employed Pakistani attackers. As security was paramount, LeT trusted Pakistani operatives over Indians.¹³

¹³ An interesting parallel was Al Qaeda employing only non-American Muslims to plan, prepare and execute the 9-11 attack.

LeT leadership believed that Indian operatives may “chicken out” at the last moment, especially because the attack was indiscriminate and led to many Muslim deaths.¹⁴

IV. THE SURVIVING ATTACKER

One of the attackers, Mohammed Ajmal Amir Qasab, was captured after he got injured in an encounter with the Indian police. Qasab’s interrogation, the international investigation, and pre- and post-attack intelligence shed unique insights into the terrorist planning, preparation, execution and the continuity of threat.

As the only surviving attacker, Mohammed Ajmal Amir Qasab, like the other nine attackers, came from a poor family in Pakistan. The son of Wasib Ajmal Amir, Qasab studied only up to fourth standard from a Government Primary School in Faridkot, Punjab, Pakistan.¹⁵ Almost all the LeT attackers came from poor families and had low paying jobs. They were driven by money and incited by incendiary speeches at mosques highlighting Indian atrocities against Muslims and congregations receiving irresistible offers, “the prospect of economic security for the family” and “a meaning for an otherwise miserable life” and afterlife.¹⁶ After leaving school in 2000, Qasab joined his brother Afzal in Lahore and found employment in the capital of Punjab until 2005. After a quarrel with Wasib, his father, Qasab ran away from home and stayed in a boy’s home in Ali Hajveri Darbar at Lahore. Shafiq, a caterer from Zhelam, invited Qasab to work for him on daily wages. Paid Rs. 120 to 200 per day, Qasab worked with him till 2007. Intending to engage in a robbery, Qasim joined Muzaffar Lal Khan, aged 22 years, and they relocated to Rawalpindi. After hiring a flat at Bangash Colony, they surveyed and drew maps of likely targets and intended to procure weapons. While searching for firearms, they saw LeT stalls at Raja bazaar, on the day of Bakri-Eid, a religious day. “We thought that, even if we procured fire-arms, we could not operate them. Therefore, we decided to join LeT for weapons training.”¹⁷

¹⁴ In the Victoria Terminus, nearly half of the victims were Muslims. Of 58 victims, 22 were Muslims. Interview, Arabinda Acharya and Sujoyin Mandel, Field Team, Mumbai, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Singapore, January 10, 2009.

¹⁵ Statement of accused Mohd Ajmal Amir Qasab; Age 21 yrs. Occupation: Labour, Resident of Faridkot, Tehsil-Dipalpur, Å Dist -Ukada, State -Suba Punjab, Pakistan, provided by the Mumbai Police to the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Singapore, December 2008.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

V. JOINING LeT

After approaching LeT office, their names and addresses were noted and they were asked to return the following day. They were given Rs. 200 and asked to visit Marqas Taiyyaaba, Muridke for training. After arriving by bus at LeT's main training camp, a reference note given from the office was presented at the entry gate. After filling two recruitment forms, they enlisted in the 21 days Daura-Sufa training, the following day.

Daura-Sufa Training Schedule

04.15	Wake up call and namaz
08.00	Breakfast
08.30-10.00	Hadis and Quran by Mufti Hafeez Mohomed Sayyed, Leader, LeT
10.00-12.00	Rest
12.00-13.00	Lunch Break
13.00-14.00	Namaz
14.00-16.00	Rest
16.00-18.00	PT and Game Instructor Fadulla
18.00-20.00	Namaz and other work
20.00-21.00	Dinner

After the basic training, Qasab was selected to follow Daura-Ama, an intermediate training course. After traveling to Mansera, Buttal Village by vehicle, Qasab participated in the 21 day course at another LeT camp.

Daura-Ama Training Schedule

04.15 - 05.00	Wake up call and namaz
05.00-6.00	PT Instructor Abu Anas
08.00	Breakfast
08.30-11.30	Weapons training. Trainer Abdul Rehman, Weapons AK-47, Green-O, SKS, Uzi gun, pistol, revolver
11.30-12.00	Rest
12.00-13.00	Lunch break
13.00-14.00	Namaz
14.00-16.00	Rest
16.00-18.00	PT

18.00-20.00 Namaz and other work
 20.00-21.00 Dinner

Afterwards, Qasab served at the camp for two months. Qasab was permitted to visit his parents for one month. Thereafter, Qasab traveled to Shaiwainala, Muzaffarabad, the capital of Azad Kashmir, for further advanced training called Duara-khas. At the LeT camp, Qasab was photographed and asked to fill application forms. The course at Chelabandi pahadi lasted three months.

Duara-Khas Training Schedule

04.15-05.00 Wake up call and namaz
 05.00-06.00 PT Instructor Abu Mawiya
 08.00 Breakfast
 08.30-11.30 Weapons training, handling of all weapons and firing practice, from hand grenade, rocket launchers and mortars, Green-O, SKS, Uzi gun, pistol, revolver, rocket launchers. Trainer Abu Mawiya
 11.30-12.00 Rest
 12.00-13.00 Lunch Break
 13.00-14.00 Namaz
 14.00-16.00 Weapon training and firing practice. Lecture on Indian security agencies
 16.00-18.00 Physical Training
 18.00-20.00 Namaz and other work
 20.00-21.00 Dinner

Qasab's initial motive for joining LeT was criminal. However, during the indoctrination and training, Qasab became fully convinced of LeT's vision and mission. Before becoming a fully fledged international terrorist, Qasab underwent four terrorist training courses — basic, intermediate, advanced and specialized — in four different locations. The entire training lasting one and a half years and had two elements — the ideological, to indoctrinate the mind; and the physical, to prepare the body for the mission.

Upon completion of training, the trainees visited their family members for seven days and returned to the LeT camp at Muzaffarabad. Out of 32 trainees, 16 were selected for a secret operation in India by Zaki-ur-Rehman alias Chacha, the military commander of LeT and Kafa. Three trainees ran away from the camp. The remaining 13 were assigned for two successive training

courses at two locations; Muridke and Karachi. They were taught courses that were designed and developed for a specific mission.

Zaki-ur-Rehman instructed Kafa to take the trainees to the camp at Muridke. In Muridke, the 13 trainees were taught swimming, boat operations, and how to operate in a maritime environment for a month. Except the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), no other terrorist group offers specialized training in maritime operations. During the training course, the trainees were instructed on India; the operation of Indian security agencies, including RAW, and how to mount operations, evade and escape. They were strictly instructed not to make phone calls to Pakistan after reaching India. To motivate the trainees, they were also shown video clippings highlighting the atrocities committed on Muslims in India. Continuous ideological indoctrination and physical training enabled motivation to sustain and constant improvement of skill set needed for operational success.

VI. TRANSFORMATION

After completion of model training, Zaki-ur-Rehman selected 10 members and formed five teams, each having two persons. On September 15, 2008, each team was assigned specific targets. The team comprised of Mohd Azmal alias Abu Muzahid, Ismail alias Abu Umar, Abu Ali, Abu Aksha, Abu Umer, Abu Shoeb, Abdul Rehman alias Bada, Abdul Rehman alias Chhota, Afadulla and Abu Umar.

Each target had a code name and the attacking team was known by that code. The code name for Qasab and Ismail that attacked the railway station was VTS team. The attackers were shown their targets on 'Google Earth' on Internet. Qasab said: "On the same site, we were shown the information about Azad Maidan, [the independence ground where rallies are held], [the city of] Mumbai, how and where to get down at Mumbai. We were shown the film on VT railway station and the film showing the commuters moving around at rush hours at VT railway station." In preparation for the attacks, LeT is likely to have dispatched surveillance teams to India to case the targets. It is also very likely that LeT agents in India, including its sympathizers, supporters as well as members of the Indian Mujahidin, provided sound and timely intelligence on the targets.

Qasab said: "We were instructed to carry out the firing at rush hours in the morning between 7 to 11 hours and between 7 to 11 hours in the evening. Then kidnap some persons, take them to the roof of some nearby building. After reaching at the roof top, we were to contact Chacha. After that, Chacha would give the telephone or mobile no of electronic media. We were then to

contact the media persons on the same phone. And as per the instructions received from Chacha, we would make demands for releasing the hostages. This was the general strategy decided by our trainers.”¹⁸

The date fixed for the operation was September 27, 2008. The arrest of Fahim Arshad Ansari and three of his associates in India delayed the operation.¹⁹ Qasab was not aware of the arrests. They remained in Karachi learning Hindi and undergoing a maritime course. The LeT attackers trained in the use of speed boats on the sea. Ten attackers were organized as five teams. The overall leader of the attack was Ismail Khan, 25 years of age from Dera Ismail Khan in North West Frontier Province, Pakistan.

- **1st Team**
 1. Ismail
 2. Qasab
- **2nd Team**
 1. Abu Aksha
 2. Abu Umar
- **3rd Team**
 1. Bada Abdul Rehman
 2. Abu Ali
- **4th Team**
 1. Chhota Abdul Rehman
 2. Afadulla
- **5th Team**
 1. Shoeb
 2. Abu Umer

On November 23, 2008, the attack teams led by Zaki-ur-Rehman alias Chacha and Kafa left from Azizabad, Karachi to the sea shore at 4.15 a.m. After boarding a trawler and traveling for 22 to 25 nautical miles, the attack team boarded a bigger trawler. After journeying for one hour, the team boarded Al-Huseini, a LeT ship, in the deep sea.²⁰ While boarding the said ship, each attacker was given a backpack containing eight grenades, one AK-47 rifle, 200 cartridges, two magazines and one cell phone for communication. Afterwards, the Al-Huseini navigated to the Indian waters, where the crew members hijacked Kuber, an Indian fishing trawler. Except the captain, the Indian seamen shifted to Al-Huseini ship were murdered. Thereafter, the LeT attack team boarded the hijacked Indian trawler. The captain, held at gunpoint, navigated the trawler to Mumbai, a three day journey. The operational commander

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Four LeT men's arrest delayed 26/11 attacks: Police, MSN, December 24, 2008.

²⁰ Like the LTTE, the LeT is one of the few terrorist groups in the world with a maritime capability. After it became difficult to move men and materiel across the land border, LeT built its maritime capability. The LeT fleet from ships to trawlers and small boats play a key role in moving personnel, arms, explosives and other equipment to transit and target countries.

Ismail and another team member Afadulla took the captain below the deck and killed him. After reaching Mumbai in the trawler, the attack team boarded a floatable dinghi and reached Budwar Park Jetty. As the LeT did not wish to leave behind any traces to Pakistan, the LeT pre-instructed the attackers to throw the satellite phone to the sea, and to sink the boat after killing the seaman. When a LeT caller from Pakistan checked: "What did you do to the dead body?," the attacker said: "Left it behind."²¹ When the caller asked: "Did you not open the locks for the water below?," the attacker responded: "No, they did not open the locks. We left it like that because of being in hurry. We made a big mistake."²² When questioned "What big mistake?," the attackers admitted their operational mistake to their handlers, "When we were getting into that boat, the waves were quite high. Another boat came. Everyone raised an alarm that the Navy had come. Everyone jumped quickly. In this confusion, the satellite phone of Ismail got left behind."²³ Later the Indian authorities recovered the body and the boat, and most importantly, the phone uncovering the links to Pakistan.

After reaching Budwar Park, Qasab went along with Ismail to VT railway station by taxi. To quote Qasab: "After reaching the hall of VT railway station we went to the common toilet, took out the weapons from our sacks, loaded them, came out of toilet and started firing indiscriminately towards the passengers. Suddenly one police officer in uniform came towards us and opened fire. In retaliation, we threw hand grenades towards him and also opened fire towards him. Then we went inside the railway station threatening the commuters and randomly firing at them. Then we came out of the railway station and started searching for a building with roof top. But we did not find a suitable building. Therefore, we entered a lane. Then we entered a building and went upstairs. On 3rd or 4th floor we searched for hostages but we found that the said building was a hospital and not a residential building. Therefore we started coming down."²⁴

The police in Mumbai believed that the gun fire was a result of a fight between two gangs. As such, the response was not sufficiently robust. Qasab narrated government response: "At that time policemen started firing at us. We responded by throwing some grenades towards them. When we were

²¹ Translation of some selected intercepted conversations, Mumbai Terrorist Attacks, November 26-29, 2008, Government of India, Annexure-VII, p. 52. Hotel Taj Mahal, November 27, 2008, 1.26 am.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*

coming out of the hospital premises, we suddenly saw one police vehicle passing in front of us. Therefore, we took shelter behind a bush. Another vehicle passed in front of us and stopped at some distance. One police officer got down from the said vehicle and started firing at us. One bullet hit my hand and my AK-47 dropped down. I bent to pick it up when second bullet hit me on the same hand. I got injured. Ismail opened fire at the officers who were in said vehicle. They got injured and firing from their side stopped.”²⁵

Unknown to the terrorists, their firing killed Mumbai’s Anti-terrorism Squad (ATS) chief Hemant Karkare, Additional Commissioner Ashok Kamte and encounter specialist Vijay Salaskar who were in that vehicle. To quote Qasab: “We waited for some time and then went towards the vehicle. When we found three bodies lying there. Ismail removed the three bodies and drove the vehicle. I sat next to him. While we were moving in the said vehicle, some police men tried to stop us. Ismail opened fire towards them while we were on the move; our vehicle got punctured near a big ground by the side of road. Ismail got down from the driver seat, stopped a car at the gun point and removed the three lady occupants from the said car. Then Ismail carried me to the car and sat me inside as I was injured. Then he drove the car.

While we were moving in the car, we were stopped on the road near the sea shore by the police. Ismail fired at them. Some policemen got injured. The police also opened fire towards us. Due to the police firing Ismail got injured. Then police moved us to some hospital. In the hospital I came to know that Ismail succumbed to the injuries he had sustained.”²⁶

VII. THE ATTACK

Only one of the five attack teams was neutralized. The four teams reached the two hotels and Nariman House, a hostel, an educational center, and a synagogue and laid siege. The two hotels were the most prestigious hotels in Mumbai. A few days before the attack, Henry Kissinger was staying at the Taj Mahal and on the day of the attack, Israel’s deputy foreign minister was about to visit the Oberoi Trident for a meeting. The attackers resumed communication with their handlers for operational direction and inspiration. The attackers had significant tactical independence.

LeT leadership in Pakistan communicated to the attackers who were holding Israeli and Jewish hostages in the Nariman House at 7.45 p.m. on November 27, 2008: “the Major General [a code for the LeT operational leader] directed us

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*

to do what we like. We should not worry.”²⁷ The LeT high command controlled the overall operation. They wanted to conclude the siege in the morning of November 28th. “The operation has to be concluded tomorrow morning. Pray to God. Keep two magazines and three grenades aside, and expend the rest of your ammunition.”²⁸ At 10.26 p.m. the LeT Pakistan called again to inform the attackers at the Nariman House, “Brother, you have to fight for the victory of Islam. Be strong.”²⁹

The LeT handlers wanted to set fire to the hotels by initiating fires in the rooms. At 1.26 a.m. on November 27, 2008, when a LeT caller phoned and asked the attacker at the Taj Mahal hotel: “Are you setting the fire or not?,” he responded: “Not yet. I am getting a mattress ready for burning.”³⁰ Again at 1.37 a.m. when the caller said: “Try to set the place on fire”, the attacker said: “We have set fire in four rooms.”³¹ They asked the attackers to look for a government minister. “The “Vazir” [Minister] should not escape.”³² At 3.10 a.m., the LeT caller phoned and informed an attacker at the Taj Mahal hotel: “Greetings! There are three Ministers and one Secretary of the Cabinet in your hotel. We don’t know in which room.” When the attacker responded: “Oh! That is good news! It is the icing on the cake,” the caller said: “Find those 3-4 persons and then get whatever you want from India.” Based on TV coverage of the event, these experienced handlers controlled the attackers. The same caller added: “Do one thing. Throw one or two grenades on the Navy and police teams, which are outside.”³³

The LeT handlers motivated and guided their attackers throughout the episode. “Brother Abdul. The media is comparing your action to 9/11” said a LeT caller from Pakistan to an attacker at Hotel Oberoi at 3.53 a.m. on November 27, 2008.³⁴ Speaking from Azizabad, Karachi, Kafa, the deputy operational leader of the LeT said: “Everything is being recorded by the media. Inflict maximum damage. Keep fighting. Don’t be taken alive.”³⁵ On the same phone, another caller instructed, “Kill all the hostages, except the

²⁷ *Ibid*, p. 51.

²⁸ *Ibid*, p. 51.

²⁹ *Ibid* p. 52.

³⁰ *Ibid* p. 52.

³¹ *Ibid*. p. 53.

³² *Ibid*. p. 53.

³³ *Ibid*, p. 51.

³⁴ *Ibid*, p. 52.

³⁵ *Ibid*, P. 53.

two Muslims. Keep your phone switched on so that we can hear the gunfire.” When the attacker Fahadullah said, “We have three foreigners including women from Singapore and China, the caller responded: “kill them.”³⁶ In the background were the voice of Fahadullah and Abdul Rehman directing the hostages to stand in a line and telling the two Muslims to stand aside. Momentarily after the gunfire in Mumbai, there were cheering voices in Karachi.

VIII. WAS THE ISI IN THE KNOW?

The perpetrating group LeT is the most structured guerrilla and terrorist movement in the subcontinent. Created immediately after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan to fight Indian presence in Kashmir, LeT grew under the watchful eyes of Pakistan’s Inter-Services-Intelligence (ISI). Contrary to press reporting, ISI had no role in establishing it but was instrumental in guiding its direction. In the subcontinent, the intelligence services use existing groups to advance their short-term national interests but after a while threat groups develop their own momentum. The LTTE, the group responsible for the largest number of suicide attacks was financed, trained, armed, and directed by RAW from 1983-1987. Subsequently, LTTE declared war on the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka and dispatched an Indian trained female suicide bomber Tenmuli Rajaratnam alias Dhanu, to kill Rajiv Gandhi, a former Indian Prime Minister.

Reporting by the international intelligence community suggest that ISI attempted but failed to contain LeT operations in India’s mainland. As Pakistan curtailed LeT activities, LeT started to operate clandestinely to conceal “the scale and size of its military activities” even as far as ISI was concerned.³⁷ Referring to Umm al-Qura, a LeT camp near Bait-ul Mujahideen, LeT HQ in Muzaffarabad, Praveen Swamy, India’s respected writer on LeT commented: “Firing practice was sharply restricted for fear of drawing attention of nearby Pakistan army positions. When Inter Services Intelligence personnel visited Umm al-Qura, the recruits were ordered to hide.”³⁸ Even the initial land journey of eight LeT operatives trained was compartmentalized, suggesting that “Lashkar now wished to conceal major operations from ISI itself.”³⁹

³⁶ *Ibid*, p. 56.

³⁷ Praveen Swamy, “Pakistan Restraining LeT But Doing Little to Dismantle Capability,” *The Hindu*, May 14, 2007.

³⁸ *Op.cit*.

³⁹ “They had strict instructions to travel in groups of two, using separate compartments on the Rawalpindi-Karachi train and avoiding conversation with other passengers. After a long wait in a window-less room on the Karachi coast, the group was finally told that the time had

India's Response

Since the attack, India has explored a range of measures. The LeT attack is a setback to normalizing ties between India and Pakistan. The Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mehmud Qureshi was in New Delhi when Mumbai was hit by terrorist attacks. Since the attacks, the Indian focus has been to punish Pakistan. The attack also strengthened the hand of the Hindu extremists and empowered the voice of the right-wing Hindu Politicians. On February 18, 2007, the Hindu terrorist group, Abhinav Bharat, attacked Samjhota train between India and Pakistan killing 68, most of them Pakistanis. A serving Lieutenant Colonel of Indian Army, Prashad Srikant Purohit, former Major of Indian Army Ramesh Upadhyay and 10 others including a Hindu priest and priestess were linked to the attack.⁴⁰ As a result of India's limited options vis-à-vis Pakistan, it is very likely that Hindu extremism will rise in India.

In addition to punishing Pakistan, India is determined to restructure its national security apparatus and capabilities. The state government of Maharashtra in India has set up a two-member high level committee to investigate the 26/11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai.⁴¹ The rationale for setting up the committee is to probe security lapses from every aspect and fix responsibilities on the culprits. The government has empowered the committee to summon officers of any rank for hearings. The committee will propose recommendations to guard against such attacks in future and will submit its report within two months.⁴²

The formation of the committee underscores a positive step taken by the Indian government towards addressing the scourge of terrorism. The investigation is deemed to reveal systemic inefficiencies and bureaucratic impediments to enhancing security in India. It will thus provide the policymakers with an assessment that would serve as a basis for making systemic changes. The approach is similar to the one taken by the United States which had set up the 9/11 commission to prepare a thorough account of the 9/11 attacks; circumstances, preparedness and the responses. The committee has already sought details of the movement from senior officials of the state government,

come from them to be launch forward into Jammu and Kashmir — but that their route would first involve a journey by sea." Praveen Swamy, "Pakistan Restraining LeT But Doing Little to Dismantle Capability," *The Hindu*, May 14, 2007

⁴⁰ Iftikhar Gilani, Pakistan to grill India over Samjhota train blast probe, *Daily Times*, November 22, 2008

⁴¹ Maharashtra announces probe into Mumbai terror attack: Rediff India online, December 30, 2008

⁴² *Ibid.*

including Chief Secretary Johny Joseph, Additional Chief Secretary (home) Chitkala Zutsi, DGP AN Roy, Police Commissioner Hassan Gafoor and Crime Branch Chief Rakesh Maria.⁴³ The two-member committee is headed by former Union Home Secretary and former Nagaland Governor, R.D. Pradhan, who has the status of a Cabinet Minister for this investigation. The second member of the committee is the former IPS officer and a Special Secretary of RAW in the Union government, V Balachandran, who enjoys the rank of Minister of State during the investigations. Balachandran worked for RAW for 19 years in various countries including the United States and France.⁴⁴ Balachandran has often highlighted the lack of intelligence integration in India's anti-terrorist methodology.⁴⁵ He has pushed for a system of accountability and better inter-agency coordination among the Indian intelligence agencies.

Unless and until India normalizes its relations with Pakistan, over its bilateral disputes, Pakistani soil will be used to wage terrorism against India. Despite the international pressure on the state of Pakistan, the government is unlikely to dismantle either the LeT or its educational, welfare and humanitarian front Jamaat-ul Dawa. There is no easy solution rather than to resolve these long standing conflicts that cause seething anger and violent action across the divide. The easiest way is a tit-for-tat response or to accuse and blame each other. The most intelligent response is for the leaders of India and Pakistan to sit down, discuss how best to address each other's concerns. Both the Indians and the Pakistanis live in pain. A year before the Mumbai attacks, the President of Pakistan had suffered the loss of his wife the late Benazir Bhutto to terrorism. The Prime Minister of India is under mounting pressure to act against Pakistan. With LeT emerging under the guise of another front, the rhetoric over a possible India-Pakistan conflict is likely to escalate in the coming months. The limited role played by the Bush Administration by sending Secretary Rice has not helped except to temporarily calm both sides. The new US Administration under President Obama can play a strategic and a long term role to mediate and negotiate a resolution. Failure to do so will mean an increase in threat, not only to India and Pakistan, but also to the world at large.

With an increase in threat by India to Pakistan, Islamabad is likely to move its troops from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and in FATA to its border with India. This means, greater freedom for Al Qaeda, Pakistani Taliban,

⁴³ 26/11 probe: Where were top brass?: The Times of India online, January 22, 2009.

⁴⁴ Police Intelligence in Mumbai is very poor: The Rediff Interview, September 1, 2003.

⁴⁵ India's lack of preparedness 'pathetic': Aziz Haniffa, Rediff News online, December 10, 2008.

Afghan Taliban and their associated groups operating against US and coalition targets in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the world. As tribal Pakistan is the epicentre of global terror, withdrawal of Pakistani troops from FATA will have major implications for global security and for the incoming Obama Administration.

The Rise of China and its Growing Footprint in the Region: Strategic Implications for South Asia

*S. Mahmud Ali**

I. STRATEGIC THEME

The rise of China and its growing footprint in the region have major strategic implications. Will it bring competition or cooperation, particularly with another major power in the making — India? What is the perspective analysis from national and regional stand-point?

II. PROLOGUE

China's renaissance as a function of its dramatic economic development over the past three decades, occasional hiccups like the current slow-down notwithstanding, is now an accepted element of the strategic landscape. For several years, conferences like the present one have focused on the nature of China's re-emergence, its likely impact on the post-Cold War international security architecture, and ways of encouraging peaceful evolution of interests and policies by China and other major powers as what has been described as tectonic shifts reshape the security system. Alongside the resurgence of China's stature and influence, the revival of India's capacity to shape its own strategic destiny, and consequences of the near simultaneity of these two

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developments, especially given the mixed history of Sino-Indian relations over the past six decades, have concentrated minds around the globe.¹ Because of the systemic nature of, the shifts the revival of these two Asian giants portends, the theme of the present paper is topical.

There is some consensus that these phenomena will change, and indeed, are changing, aspects of the international security architecture in fundamental ways whose formative contours are still somewhat unclear. Given India's physical, economic, geopolitical and strategic centrality in 'South Asia' and China's proximate prominence in the region, the near-simultaneous ascendance of these actors will presumably impact on this region more directly and profoundly than any other. However, this does not mitigate the complex intellectual challenges posed by the formulations 'strategic implications' and the more basic 'South Asia.' It may prove harder than is assumed to develop substantive consensus on the meaning and import of these phrases, and the definition and significance of linkages between the two. This presentation seeks to address that *problematique*.

III. AIM

This paper aims at examining the theoretical underpinning behind the concept of South Asia, and establishing the practical implications of such a formulation in shaping strategic perceptions and policies. The paper will then recount how key South Asian actors have actually dealt with China over recent decades, thereby establishing the context in which present and future policy-formulation processes might take shape. If in the process it stimulates discussion by challenging assumptions and prejudices, it will add to the dialectics of discourse on a significant theme and, hopefully, contribute to a rational approach to a major issue and render itself a meaningful intervention.

IV. SOUTH ASIA — IN SEARCH OF A PARADIGM

The complex linkages among South Asian actors on the one hand and China on the other were perhaps best exemplified in late October to early November 2008 when Myanmar deployed ships used in hydrocarbon exploration in direct collaboration with South Korea and general cooperation with India and China, escorted by two naval vessels to stretches of the Bay of Bengal disputed with Bangladesh. Bangladesh responded by deploying first three and eventually four naval platforms demanding that exploratory work cease

¹ These were the dominant *motifs* of international security conferences such as the Global Security Review organised at the Intercontinental Hotel, Geneva, by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in September 2005.

and the Myanmar vessels leave what Dhaka claimed were Bangladeshi waters. When Myanmar refused to comply, Dhaka despatched a delegation led by its Foreign Secretary for talks while requesting China to mediate in the dispute. Myanmar then suspended its exploratory activities in disputed waters, presumably under Chinese advice.² How effective combinations of coercive diplomacy, strategic coercion, and behind-the-scenes mediation might eventually prove remains unclear, but the episode suggested that India and its regional neighbours share flashpoints with escalatory potential and these can provide China with an entry into regional affairs. How does that fit into South Asian sub-systemic geopolitics?

Conventional geopolitical frameworks, modified and refined after the Second World War, identified the two adversarial superpowers, the USA and the USSR, and their respective military coalitions, NATO and the Warsaw Pact Treaty Organisation, — given their economic and technological pre-eminence, and their shared ability to wreak destructive havoc not only on each other but also on the rest of the planet, as the ‘dominant system’ and the superpowers themselves as the ‘core’ of the international security system. Other parts of the world, depending on their internal cohesion and ability to influence events within and without their boundaries, were theoretically organised into subordinate systems. One of these, the Southern Asian subordinate system, stretched from the eastern shores of the Filipino and Indonesian archipelagos to the western boundaries of Afghanistan, although there were disagreements on the latter.³ The subordinate, system comprised three regional subsystems: South-East Asia, South Asia and West Asia. The eastern and western boundaries of the South Asian regional subsystem raised some debates among major powers.⁴

Why have regional subsystems? What roles do they perform beyond offering academic analysts themes for theoretical research in international relations? What practical purpose does South Asia serve? Regional subsystems, in contrast to their component states, are geopolitical constructs with no formal structures or roles. They are designed to ease comprehension of complex international security dynamics and help manage relations. By definition,

² Paul Tait, Nizam Ahmed and Masud Karim, *Bangladesh asks China for help in Myanmar sea row*, Dhaka, Reuters, 5 November 2008.

³ Some major powers, the USA most prominently, considered Afghanistan part of the southern Asian subordinate system; others did not.

⁴ Some considered Myanmar to lie within South Asia while others excluded it; there were similar disagreements over Afghanistan’s position. These differences were best expressed in the way major powers organised their Foreign Ministries and gave responsibilities of managing relations with these countries to their diplomats.

they combine two interactive elements — a geographical expanse with definable frontiers, and interrelationships of such intensity which sets them apart from neighbouring regions and indeed the remainder of the system. In this framework, for South Asia to be a meaningful subsystem, a consensus is needed on its geographical expanse and boundaries, and interactions among regional actors need to be more intensive than their relationship with extra sub-systemic players. Subsystems must be recognised as extant by both component actors themselves and their external interlocutors. Is that the case with South Asia? The record appears to be mixed.

As has been noted, the boundaries of a South Asian subsystem remain somewhat unclear. Latitudinally, the Himalayas in the north and the Indian Ocean, the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea in the South do provide helpful parameters. But geographical obstacles have lost some of their capacity to restrict linkages. Longitudinally, the expanse of the former British Empire, which erected political-economic edifices deepening colonial integration, strengthening the subcontinent's links to some neighbouring areas while barring those with others, provides one framework. This could include Myanmar which was, for a time, part of the British-Indian Empire but leave Afghanistan out, which was not. However, since the 1980s, South Asian states themselves have partly solved the problem by establishing the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), thereby formally defining sub-systemic frontiers. They have recently incorporated Afghanistan into their collectivity but have not explained why for so many years previous to that decision they refused to accept Kabul's bid to join the grouping. So, the basis appears to have been laid for building a regional subsystem in South Asia which might prove to be bigger than the sum of its parts, but so far, the record of SAARC's efficacy in offering a platform for joint security pursuits has been, to put it politely, modest. In fact, it is fair to suggest that in strategic decision-making terms, South Asia as an actor does not exist.

A critical element in the sub-systemic geopolitics is the overwhelming presence of India at the heart of the construct. Geographical, demographic, cultural, economic and military criteria set India apart from its neighbours. Line-crossing overlaps in these areas generate both attractions and suspicions. The asymmetry between India and its neighbours is the defining feature of a putative regional subsystem. A study of basic data demonstrates Indian preponderance in all counts of state potential.

India's geopolitical centrality and overwhelming preponderance interact to generate a complex combination of centripetal and centrifugal tendencies within the subsystem. Assertive efforts to erect an edifice reflective of the structural reality have often tended to create negative reactions among

Table 1 Power Potential Comparison among SAARC Countries⁵

Country	Area sq.km.	% of Total	Population	% of Total	2007 GDP	% of Total
Afghanistan	647500	12.58	32.73m	2.10	35.00	0.93
Bangladesh	144000	2.80	153.54m	9.35	208.30	5.57
Bhutan	14000	0.31	682321	0.04	3.35	0.10
India	3287590	63.32	1147.99m	73.54	2966.00	79.35
Maldives	300	0.005	385925	0.02	1.58	0.04
Nepal	147181	2.86	29.51m	1.89	29.29	0.78
Pakistan	803940	15.63	172.80m	11.08	411.90	11.02
Sri Lanka	65610	1.27	21.12m	1.35	82.02	0.03
Total	5143121		1558.75m		3.737.44	

neighbours, precipitating opportunities for intrusive systems to penetrate the subsystem. One notable exception occurred between 1977 and 1980, when the Janata Party-led coalition under Prime Minister Morarji Desai and Foreign Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, and their immediate successors, pursued an emollient and less muscular stance towards neighbours; relations dramatically improved. But the domestic consensus in India for such a posture soon collapsed and the elections in 1980 restored the status quo ante. More recently, bilateral interactions and multilateral undertakings under the SAARC rubric have eased tensions, but the structural discontinuities have not been addressed by any of the actors. Superficial temporising may have bought time but has not, indeed can not, bring mutual understanding and cooperation or form the basis of lasting amity.

What we have is a vague shadow, a glimmer in the eyes of visionary optimists among the region's elites, a minority challenge to the hard reality of policymaking in official circles. How does that relate to a South Asian response to the strategic consequences of the 'rise' of China? Well, Before South Asia can respond to anything, it needs to examine its own internal compulsions. And a brief review of the manifestations of the compulsions which the ruling elites in South Asian states have worked under since the states emerged as independent players would underscore the challenges facing any attempt to imagine, far less actually fashion, a regional response to even dramatic developments in South Asia's neighbourhood. Such a review follows.

⁵ CIA, *The World Factbook 2008*, Langley, 2008, at <http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print.bg.html> accessed on 5 November 2008. Population figures are July 2008 estimates; GDP figures are in billion US dollars calculated in purchasing power parity estimated in 2007; figures are rounded up but percentages are not, and, as a result, do not add up to 100.

V. THE WARS WITHIN

One key feature shared by regional actors individually and the subsystem collectively is the incoherence of political organisation. This is not unique to South Asia. However, given the profound discontinuity between expectations of a benign relationship between the elite and the masses, the state and the citizenry, the urban and the rural, the central and the peripheral, the rich and the poor, the majority and the minority, and several similar often overlapping categories, and the rather stark reality which has persisted for around six decades of independent statehood, regional actors remain 'soft' in political-economic terms.⁶ This means the ability of ruling elites to translate their visions — whatever these are — into action is constrained. Fragmentation rather than cohesion is often the more visible aspect of political life across the region. Sometimes the divisions are deep and apparently unbridgeable; other divides are more instrumentalist and motivated. However, perhaps except Maldives, no SAARC state has demonstrated sustained national consensus on the fundamentals of organisation, the purpose of statehood, the processes of decision-making or the allocation of resources.

All SAARC states have experienced domestic challenges to central authorities or to national integration. Both ruling elites and their regional, ethnic, religious, sectarian or linguistic rivals have engaged in the violent application of coercive instruments as tools in the pursuit of political objectives. Instruments of national defence and security, primarily designed for the defence of independence, have been deployed for prolonged periods in defence of sovereignty.⁷ Violent internal disputes, occasionally encouraged or abetted by external actors — but essentially internal in origin, have drained the substance of the actors' material, intellectual and moral capacities. Potential has thus been sacrificed in combating threats to the very fundamentals of statehood. Tactical and fire-fighting contingency operations by ruling elites have often bought temporary calm at some cost but not secured permanent peace. Consolidation of the state remains work in progress across the region while at the same time the regional and global contexts are in some flux. However, domestic political constraints are not the only challenges.

⁶ Political 'softness' has been examined in some detail in S. Mahmud Ali, *Nation-building and the nature of conflict in South Asia: A search for patterns in the use of force as a political instrument within and between the states of the region*, London, unpublished doctoral thesis, University of London, 1991, Chapter 1.

⁷ For case studies of such internal conflict in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, see S. Mahmud Ali, *The Fearful State: Power, People and Internal War in South Asia*, London, Zed Books, 1993.

The ruling elites in all states with representative superstructures have often deployed electoral rhetoric such as refrains of 'eliminate poverty' (*gharibi hatao*), and 'food, clothing and shelter for all' (*roti, kapda aur makan*). However, after decades of such semantics, the reality does not say much for their effectiveness in office. A small sample of quality of life indicators relating to infants and children, who not only comprise the most vulnerable segments of the population, but also carry the promise of the nation's future, offers a snapshot of the outcome of the elite's policy priorities and preferences.

Table 2 Basic Quality of Life Indicators in, South Asia⁸

	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Sri Lanka
Percentage of infants with low birth weight 1999-2006	30	19	22	22
Percentage of underweight (moderate-to-severe) children under five in 2006	43	38	48	29
Percentage of severely under weight children under five in 2006	16	16	13	-
Percentage of under fives suffering from moderate severe wasting in 2006	20	13	13	14
Percentage of under five suffering from moderate severe stunting in 2006	48	37	43	14
Infant (less than 1 year old) mortality rate per thousand live births in 2006	57	78	52	11
Under five mortality rate per thousand in 2006	76	97	69	13
Number of under five deaths in 2006	2067000	423000	277000	4000
Total number of children under five who died in 2006 in these states = 2771000				

It is difficult to see how states which permit this level of infant- and child mortality can claim that their operating systems, decision-making processes and resource allocation mechanisms are securing the primary interests of citizens whom they are sworn to serve. This of course is just a very small window to the world of South Asian governance, but it should offer insights into the state-citizen relationship across the region. The data above might partly be explained by the data below. All the regional states, classified as developing- or least-developed countries, feel compelled to devote large proportions of their fungible resources to protective activities rather than to productive ones. Despite the apparent failings of their public health systems they feel compelled to expand and modernise the state's capacity to coerce,

⁸ UNICEF, Basic Indicators, from <http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/southasia.html> accessed on 31 October 2008.

either for domestic control purposes or to secure deterrence against perceived external threats. And one worrying aspect of that calculus is that South Asian states have mainly focused on their regional neighbours as the key object of their military attentions. The figures speak for themselves.

Table 3 South Asian GDP Figures, and Defence Budgets/Expenditures in 2006-2007⁹

Country	2006 GDP	Def budget/exp 2006	2007 GDP	Def budget/exp 2007
India	US\$911bn	\$22.90bn	\$1070bn	\$28.50bn
Pakistan	US\$128bn	\$4.14bn	\$144bn	\$4.53bn
Bangladesh	US\$59.40bn	\$938m	\$68.00bn	\$999m
Sri Lanka	US\$27.50bn	\$686m	\$30.30bn	\$1230m

Compared to these sums, investment in public health, education, and welfare remains miniscule. So, where does elite priority lie? Domestic dissidence and regional rivalries have diverted attention, resources, and the power of the national imagination from targeting the dire poverty and debasement of citizens. They also have robbed societies of some of the capacity to advance themselves. The elite-masses divide has deepened, weakening states. However, not all has been lost. India's dramatic economic surge and the consequent rise in its global stature are an example of the potential for its neighbours.

It would be naive to suggest that reducing military expenditure would automatically reduce mutual insecurity and boost regional friendship, or expand allocations to health, education, welfare and productive sectors. But such reductions, or reordering of priorities could only help. After all, most South Asian military hardware is aimed at targets within the region. And there are several explanations for this. One of them is the fundamental contradiction in philosophical underpinnings rationalising the three major successor states — India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. All were created by dividing up a single — albeit diverse — political, economic and to a lesser extent cultural — unit established by centuries of integrative efforts by imperial powers following the Aryan invasion of South Asia around 1500BC. The dialectic succession of waves of integration and disintegration was not unique to South Asia, but

⁹ South Asian states are secretive with their defence expenditure details. Annual budget statements delivered in parliament as part of the national budgetary statements provide few details of sectoral allocations and indirect subsidies provided via non-MOD allocations such as funds granted to paramilitary organisations which operate under Interior Ministries but work closely with the military services. Civil construction and procurement agencies sometimes serve military programmes but are not included in defence allocations. Figures are from James Hackett, Editor, *The Military Balance 2008*, London, IISS, pp. 339, 341, 349, 351.

the establishment of the post-colonial successor states was. The critical aspect of this 'Partition' was that the successor states were built on the bases of two mutually exclusive founding principles. One insisted religious faith was the defining core of the polity's national identity around which a new state was to be erected; the other claimed confessional devotions had nothing to do with national identity, which was fashioned from historical association, cultural, convergences and shared collective memories.

The successor states were thus propelled into a competitive relationship from birth, each forced to demonstrate the validity of its own legitimacy by subverting that of the other. Substantial ethnic, religious and linguistic-cultural overlaps straddling contrived frontiers weakened the Partition's practical application, threatening newly-forged national identities, elites and interests. Animosity and insecurity were thus built into the structure of successor states. Imposing reason on what began as a non-rational and inconsistent application of organising principles and foundational mythologies proved to have been the biggest challenge for South Asian elites. The establishment of SAARC was the first step in meeting the challenge, but its faltering record underscores the depth of animus, fear and anxiety which have resulted from six decades of unhappy, even hostile, separation. The core of the subsystem is thus riven by divisions whose origins transcend reason and which challenge efforts at sub-systemic integration. Unless ruling elites in the 'heartland' states recognise, acknowledge and decide to address the consequences of this unhappy reality, changes to intra-South Asian circumstances are unlikely.

It seems reasonable to suggest that if South Asian states were able to reduce the political dissonance driving insecurity which is at the root of budgetary trends, they could not only transform themselves into a happier state of domestic harmony but also remove obstacles to regional collaboration. The two trends would be mutually reinforcing and the opportunity costs of not doing so are clearly visible. While South Asians have engaged in sanguinary internecine exercises, neighbours in the South-East Asian subsystem, starting from a comparable economic base have, over the past three decades, charted a trajectory to semi-developed status, lifting millions from poverty to reasonable affluence. Their success has largely been based on elite identification of common threats, collaborative decision-making and working together to address shared challenges. Instead of looking inwards, they have decided to remove mutual insecurity and act in unison in facing the external. ASEAN is far from complete or perfect, but its elites have managed to give the collective body greater bargaining power than member states could ever have exercised by themselves. Against this backdrop, SAARC states have

just begun a journey of regional collaboration while their strategic environs have been transformed into a dynamic and somewhat uncertain milieu. How will South Asians respond to China's rise?

VI. THE HISTORICAL CONTINUUM

To address that question, one has to look back and see how South Asians have related to China in the past. Since the late 1940s, when South Asian actors emerged and the Communist Party took control of China, the core of South Asia's encounter with China has been Sino-Indian interactions. And these charted a very mixed course. The Cold War, an intrusive force, cast its shadow on India's approach to China even before India became independent and China turned communist. On 5th July 1947, New Delhi; already under national leadership, signed an agreement with Washington to allow the temporary basing of US military aircraft, and their servicing, maintenance, repair and refuelling by Indian crew on payment of costs, 'at Maripur, Agra, Barrackpore and/or Kharagpore. US aircraft entering Indian airspace from the West would land at Maripur, those entering Indian airspace from the east would land at Barrackpore or Kharagpore. Agra would be used for intermediate staging in flights across India; in an emergency, US military aircraft would be able to land anywhere in India.'¹⁰ US aircraft hosted at Indian bases were engaged in combat against the Chinese Red Army.

The agreement was renewed on 3 May 1948, and 4 July 1949, expanded into a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement on 16 March 1951, renewed on 17 December 1958, and enlarged into another mutual defence assistance agreement on 14 November 1962. These accords crystallised into powerful bonds between Washington and New Delhi generally, and between their defence, security and intelligence services in particular. Collaboration was aimed at defending India from a perceived threat from Communist China. It later grew into a protracted covert operation using unhappy Tibetan militants who were recruited, trained, armed and infiltrated back into Chinese-occupied Tibet by the CIA and the Indian Intelligence Bureau in the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s.¹¹ The fact that India signed an agreement with China

¹⁰ Ambassador Henry F. Grady to the Indian Member of the Executive Council for External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, Jawaharlal Nehru, New Delhi, American Embassy, 1 July 1947; Nehru to Grady, New Delhi, 5 July 1947. Department of State, *United States Treaties and other International Agreements (USTIA)*—1951, Vol.2, Part 2, Washington, USGPO, 1952, pp.568-74.

¹¹ S. Mahmud Ali, *Cold War in the High Himalayas: The USA, China and South Asia in the 1950s*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1999, pp. 190-251.

in 1954 acknowledging Beijing's sovereignty over Tibet while conducting a proxy war against that sovereignty in collusion with the USA set the two neighbours on a collision course. The failed Tibetan uprising in 1959, the flight of the Dalai Lama and his compatriots to India, and the 1962 war followed. That war boosted US-Indian strategic collaboration, which was partly revealed in the Lok Sabha by Prime Minister Desai on 17 April 1978.¹² So, in terms of building Indo-US security collaboration against perceived Chinese threats, the past is prologue.

In the 1950s, Pakistan too signed a number of military agreements with the USA. Although Washington's goals were to help "build up Pakistan as a source of strength preventing the expansion of Soviet power into Western Asia, Pakistan's leaders drew the benefits of US aid in their perennial struggle against perceived threats from India. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, India and Pakistan covertly collaborated with the USA against Chinese authority in Tibet. Both worked to maintain the flow of *Khampa* and *Amdowa* guerrillas from eastern Tibet to training camps in Guam, Saipan, and Colorado from where they returned to fight Chinese forces on the Tibetan plateau.¹³ That unity of purpose was destroyed as Pakistan identified in China a potential foil for its existential fears emanating from India. Post-1962, Pakistan built collaborative relations with China as a counterpoise to India. The fundamental nature of Indo-Pakistani disputation, and their power-imbalance, contributed to grave national insecurity in Pakistan, strengthening China's intrusive capacity within the region. Despite dramatic shifts in 1965, 1971, 1979, 1989, 1998 and 2001, this broad pattern has persisted. So long as sub-systemic divisions fester and allow extra-regional forces a role, there will be no South Asian response to China's rise, or indeed, any other phenomenon; simply national ones.

VI. AN ERA OF CONVULSIONS

A brief explanation of the watersheds would be appropriate. In 1965, India and Pakistan went to war over Kashmir and the USA, increasingly involved in Vietnam and wider Indo-China, withdrew overt military support for both clients. However, covert collaboration with India against China continued — Pakistan had ended its role in that enterprise after its 1963 agreement with China. From this point on, with Washington leaving a vacuum of sorts behind,

¹² *Ibid*, pp. 1-3. For a detailed account of CIA-113 joint ventures in nuclear-powered covert surveillance of Chinese activities in Tibet, see M.S. Kohli, Kenneth Conboy, *Spies in the Himalayas: Secret Missions and Perilous Climbs*, New Delhi, HarperCollins, 2002.

¹³ *Ibid*, pp.78-88.

Soviet influence increased and was manifest in the Moscow-sponsored Tashkent peace accord which restored the status quo ante. The Soviet Union even provided a token volume of military aid to Pakistan but Delhi's protests put paid to that relationship.

In 1969, President Richard Nixon brought a new vision to great power relations. Keen to secure Chinese support to ending the Vietnam War and build up an anti-Soviet counter in the east, he pursued a clandestine China initiative, which required the termination of CIA-IB collaboration against Beijing's authority in Tibet. When France, Poland and Romania failed to deliver a credible link-up with Beijing and President Yahya Khan of Pakistan did, Islamabad became the conduit of a tectonic shift in the global security architecture.¹⁴ This explained the crystallisation of the Indo-Soviet alliance supporting Bangladesh's war of independence as the Sino-US alignment aided Pakistan, in a development that transformed South Asia, and established India as the dominant power in the region.¹⁵

The residual Pakistan became internally focused, seeking Arab, and wider Muslim support in recovering from the trauma of defeat and dismemberment. India consolidated its dominant role in the 1970s but did not win voluntary endorsement of its position from neighbours. Even the principal beneficiary of its costly intervention in 1971, Bangladesh, saw violent marginalisation of forces which had led the political campaign for independence with Delhi's support. Right-of-centre nationalist tendencies took control in Dhaka although a struggle for power did not cease until a military regime took charge in 1982. Nationalist forces, viewing India as a source of anxiety and a potential threat to autonomy, reorganised domestic political alignments and reversed external relations.

India itself underwent convulsions — its first nuclear test in 1974 confirmed Delhi's technical-strategic potential but aroused international anxiety and triggered a Pakistani response; a state of emergency was declared in 1975; a right-of-centre coalition, elected in 1977, extended a hand of friendship to neighbours including China; when consensus on the coalition's policies collapsed, it was replaced by an interim administration; elections in 1980 returned the Congress under Indira Gandhi to power, reviving an assertive regional stance. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan around the Christmas of 1979 dramatically altered South Asian dynamics as President Jimmy Carter

¹⁴ These dramatic developments are recorded in S. Mahmud Ali, *US-China Cold War Collaboration, 1971-1989*, New York, Routledge, 2005, pp. 17-79.

¹⁵ The crystallisation of these adversarial alignments is described in S. Mahmud Ali, *Bangladesh: An Introduction* (tentative title), London, C. Hurst and Company, forthcoming, Ch.2.

and then, President Ronald Reagan, incorporated Pakistan as the base of operations for a not-so-covert proxy war manned by Afghan, Pakistani, Arab and other Muslim fighters from around the world, armed and funded by a coalition led by the USA, Saudi Arabia, and China. A Soviet ally and unwilling to criticise Moscow's action, Delhi, despite its local pre-eminence, was marginalised in strategic decision-making in and about South Asia.

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, changes in eastern and central Europe, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the fission of the Soviet Union into fifteen republics and the end of the Cold War, coterminous with violent repression of democratic activists in China, transformed the international system. As bipolarity gave way to apparent unipolarity, South Asia returned to its systemic marginal stature. With Washington imposing strictures of the Pressler Amendment on Pakistan, Islamabad had few alternatives to refocusing attention on China and Gulf Arab states. The 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan brought about the next major shift in South Asia's strategic dynamic. Indian assertions that China was the object of its military nuclear enterprise¹⁶ and the fact that the following year, despite the presence of nuclear arms in both arsenals Pakistan mounted an operation to occupy the Kargil mountain ridges just across the 'line of control' dividing the disputed province between India and Pakistan, deeply disturbed Beijing.¹⁷ This led to a reappraisal by China of its security relationships vis-à-vis South Asian actors, especially India and Pakistan. A more nuanced if not balanced approach was decided on, with a view to 'normalising' relations with India while encouraging Pakistan to do so by strengthening Pakistan's confidence in its own productive, protective and regenerative capacities. Pakistan was more a supplicant and China a strategic asset.

The attacks by Al-Qaeda on Washington and New York on 11 September 2001 and the realignments which followed proved to be another watershed. With China's emergence as a perceived peer-rival, Beijing's protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, US officials and military planners began redeploying expeditionary forces to the Pacific theatre while building a network of alliances and partnerships which could take up the slack as American forces themselves were focused elsewhere. As Washington built or rebuilt security and defence ties to Japan, South Korea, Australia, ASEAN states and India,

¹⁶ Shortly before the tests, Defence Minister George Fernandes told a TV interviewer that China was India's 'enemy no.1'. Shortly after the tests, Prime Minister Vajpayee wrote to President Bill Clinton explaining China's pivotal role in driving India's strategic decision-making. Vajpayee to Clinton, New Delhi, PMO, 13 May 1998.

¹⁷ Informal exchanges with Chinese officials and analysts in London and Shanghai, January-April 2004.

there were some reactions from the object of this endeavour. China fashioned a rhetorical rebuttal of the 'China threat' theory in the slogans 'peaceful rise,' and 'peaceful development.' It devised new bilateral and multilateral economic-diplomatic initiatives, especially notable ones being the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and triangular associations with Russia and India. Small-scale military and naval exercises were begun partly as confidence-building measures while building economic and military muscle to expand Beijing's strategic space. Against this backdrop, Delhi and Beijing have insisted the world is big enough for both powers to grow simultaneously peacefully, and that neither had any hostile designs on the other. Indian officials in particular have carefully articulated Delhi's quest for strategic autonomy and refusal to allow any other power to use India as an instrument of its policy goals.¹⁸

VII. A FUTURE WITH CHINA

So what does the future hold? One way of assessing that is to review what eminent and influential strategic analysts in the region say about the impact of China's rise on their country and their region, and seek to discern patterns in such analyses. It is fair to say opinion is divided, but certain trends are discernible. One of the most influential strategic thinkers in India who has helped shape Delhi's national security perceptions, preferences and priorities for nearly four decades, views Chinese support for Pakistan in its strategic context: *Chinese support to Pakistan was originally, to some extent, anti-India and, to some extent, anti-US. It was anti-US in the sense that, Pakistan being a pro-American state, China wanted it not to lean too much towards the Americans. That is how the Chinese came to assist Pakistan.*¹⁹ In this perspective China and Pakistan emerge as negative forces while Indian and US interests converge. This contradiction in strategic interests, objectives and pursuits highlights the cleavages within South Asia with regard to China. Indian analysts have noted the post-Cold War balance of power paradigm in which India has expanded its reach by aligning with other powers. They see China's growing power as a source of instability across Asia.²⁰

¹⁸ India's National Security Adviser, M.K. Naryanan, spoke in this vein at the Global Security Review organized by the IISS in Geneva in September 2005. He and other Indian officials made the same point in their presentations in various European capitals in 2006 and 2007. For a detailed account of India's dynamic stance toward, China in the first decade of the 21st century, see S. Mahmud Ali, *US-China Relations in the "Asia-Pacific" Century*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, especially pp. 175-86; 208-9.

¹⁹ Serge Berthier, "Interview with K. Subrahmanyam: India's Nuclear Doctrine," *Asian Affairs*, at <http://www.asian-affairs.com/India/subrahmanvam.html> accessed on 18 September 2008.

²⁰ Brahma Chellaney, "China in 2030: The big challenge China poses," *Covert Magazine*, 1-15 November 2008.

It is in this context that Delhi's security links with Washington have been supplemented with similar ties to Tokyo, which itself forged strong bonds with both Washington and Canberra.²¹ The four powers, along with Singapore, have demonstrated their ability to mount concerted naval and air operations. The large-scale conventional combat capability displayed during Exercise Malabar-07-2 in September 2007 belies their insistence on an anti-piracy and counter-terrorism focus of collaboration. Chinese protests against the Quadrilateral Initiative suggest both sides understand the subliminal message being sent and received.²² While Canberra's new rulers may be less anxious about China's rise, Indo-Japanese concerns are a potent driver of security collaboration designed to secure an 'Asian power equilibrium' which translates into constraining the growth of China's capacity to impose its will.²³ This body of rational analyses is undergirded by a larger volume of more nationalistic views of the 'Chinese threat' promoted by associates and past members of India's security establishment. Their influence with policymakers is not clear, but their experience and expertise suggest a convergence with establishment thinking.²⁴ So, at great-power level, Sino-Indian competition is likely to remain a significant strand of the strategic dynamic shaping the regional security environment.

How does that tally with Chinese interactions with India's neighbours? And how do Indian security commentators view such interactions? A couple of examples will suffice. Last October, Pakistan's President, Asif Ali Zardari, visited Beijing, where he was received by President Hu Jintao and other leaders of the People's Republic. Although some in Pakistan and elsewhere considered the leader of Pakistan People's Party far more pro-US in his international inclinations than others, Zardari's reception by his Chinese hosts underscored the deepening of Sino-Pakistani 'all-weather friendship,' enhancing

²¹ Chellaney, "Japan, India sign landmark security agreement: Toward Asian power equilibrium," *The Hindu*, 1 November 2008.

²² As a guest of the US 7th Fleet, the author observed part of the exercise from aboard the USS Kitty Hawk and the INS Viraat. For an Indian perspective on the strategic implications of the Quad's defence collaboration, see Brahma Chellaney, "Building Asian power stability: Different playbooks aimed at balancing Asia's powers," *The Japan Times*, 3 November 2008.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ See, for instance, Bhaskar Roy, "China Unmasked — What Next?" SAAG Paper no.2840, Noida, South Asia Analysis Group, 12 September 2008; *Ibid.*, "Chinese Publication Dismisses Comparison with India," SAAG Paper no. 2870, 6 October 2008; D.S. Rajan, "China and Regional Security Architecture," SAAG Paper no. 2890, *Ibid.*, 23 October 2008. Such commentary is in stark contrast to sober, professional assessments conducted by others, an example being Brigadier Vinod Anand, "Modernisation of PLA Air Force," *Strategic Perspectives: A Commentary on Contemporary Issues*, New Delhi, USI, January-March 2007.

'all-round cooperation,' and pushing 'China-Pakistan Strategic Cooperative Partnership to a new level.²⁵ Speculation that Zardari would seek urgent financial help to avert an economic crisis had preceded the visit. Although Chinese aid in technological, energy, mining, agriculture, transport, environmental protection, communication satellites and infrastructural sectors proved substantial, no specific financial transactions were mentioned. However, Hu Jintao reassured Zardari of China's 'resolute support' for Pakistan's 'efforts to safeguard national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, to develop (its) economy and improve people's livelihood.²⁶ This reiteration suggested the defence of Pakistan's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity was an issue which merited China's 'resolute support.' This perceived existential insecurity afflicting the Pakistani elite irrespective of party-political affiliation explains China's presence in South Asian affairs. Until the roots of this insecurity are extirpated, Beijing's ability and willingness to support anxious South Asian actors will not change.

The other example is provided by Bangladesh which has, since late 1975, maintained almost equally warm relations with China. The head of its army-backed Caretaker Government, Fakhruddin Ahmed, visited China in mid-September 2008. In Beijing, he saw Hu Jintao, Vice President Xi Jinping and Premier Wen Jiabao. From Dhaka's perspective, the talks underscored 'time-tested' and 'all-weather' Sino-Bangladeshi relations and symbolised 'a comprehensive partnership for cooperation.²⁷ In short, the rhetorical warmth was almost as high as that between Islamabad and Beijing. China, which had built six 'friendship bridges' over Bangladesh's myriad rivers, would consider constructing two more; it also would examine Dhaka's request for help with building a nuclear power-plant, and offer advice on increasing agricultural productivity. Chinese officials also paid sympathetic attention to Bangladesh's proposal to link China's Yunnan province with Bangladesh's highway network via Myanmar, although given the state of Dhaka-Naypyitaw relations, this must bear further scrutiny. Although Ahmed's interim administration was

²⁵ Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China (FMPRC), *Hu Jintao Holds Talks with Pakistani President Zardari*, Beijing, State Council Information Office, 15 October 2008.

²⁶ Ibid. For an exposition of the agreements presided over by the two presidents in Beijing from a Pakistani perspective, see Air Marshal Ayaz A. Khan (Retd.), "President Zardari's China visit," *The Pakistan Observer*, 1 November 2008.

²⁷ Bangladesh's Foreign Adviser (Minister), Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury quoted in Xinhua, *Official: Sino-Bangladesh relations boosted through Bangladesh govt head's visit*, Dhaka, 20 September 2008; FMPRC, *Wen Jiabao Holds Talks with Fakhruddin Ahmed, Chief Advisor of Bangladeshi Caretaker Government*, Beijing, State Council Information Office, 16 September 2008; Ibid, *Xi Jinping Meets with Fakhruddin Ahmed, Chief Advisor of the Bangladeshi Caretaker Government*, Ibid.

on the verge of holding elections and transferring power to a successor government, its Foreign Minister expressed views which would likely persist long after its own demise. He said, 'China is important for us, as Bangladesh is for China. I have every confidence that all governments to follow will bear this in mind, and that close ties with China will be an eternal pillar of Bangladesh's foreign policy.'²⁸

Visits to China by a number of South Asian leaders — Zardari, Fakhruddin, Nepalese premier Prachanda, Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickremanayake, and Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Kayani — were commented upon by several Indian analysts. One observer noted that the US-Indian nuclear deal, the ouster of President Musharraf in Pakistan and the monarch in Nepal, and the 'gradual Indian access in Myanmar also threatened China's virtual control of the country's military supply, infrastructure sector, and oil and gas assets compounded (sic) China's strategic concerns.²⁹ The author says, 'India falls right into China's unstated hegemonistic designs in the region. Beijing is disturbed that Washington's strategy is aimed to enable India to envelop Pakistan in South Asia at the exclusion of China from the ombudsmanship of South Asia.³⁰ It was in this context, according to this analyst, that Beijing paid renewed attention to India's regional neighbours, evidenced by the warmth with which the above listed visitors were received in Beijing. This may be a reflection of the angst felt in semi-official circles in India but it does not provide a pathway to reconciling the divergent perspective on China seen from Delhi on the one hand, and from neighbouring capitals on the other. As South Asia's pre-eminent power, it probably is within India's diplomatic capacity to persuade its neighbours, but the record so far has been mixed.

VIII. EPILOGUE

A point about China's perspective may be apposite. In the spring of 2005, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao spent nearly a fortnight in South Asia, visiting Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, and capping the trip with four days in India. Although in each country he visited, Wen focused on bilateral relations and brought gifts in the form of technical and commercial assistance, he also spoke about South Asia as a unified actor working with China. Wen noted China's interest in developing both bilateral relations with South Asian states

²⁸ Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury quoted in Xinhua, *Ibid*, 20 September 2008.

²⁹ Bhaskar Roy, "South Asians at Beijing's Banquets," *SAAG Paper no. 2849*, Noida, South Asia Analysis Group, 19 September 2008.

³⁰ *Ibid*.

and ties with SAARC. He said Beijing hoped 'to cooperate with South Asia in promoting peace and stability in South Asia.' He also welcomed India's developing relations with the SCO and the 'Ten-plus-three' body which grouped ASEAN with China, Japan and South Korea. He also emphasised the convergence among China, India and Russia 'as influential countries in the world, (which) have similar views on promoting democratisation in international relations and safeguarding international security and stability.'³¹ Beijing noted simultaneous development of relations —

During Wen's visit, China and India agreed to establish a strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity between the two countries; China and Pakistan decided to enhance their strategic and cooperative partnership; China and Bangladesh agreed to establish a long-term and friendly partnership; China and Sri Lanka decided to build an all-out and cooperative partnership. China and the four South Asian nations spoke highly of the development of bilateral relations and expressed confidence in promoting the ties based on mutual benefit and cooperation.³²

Wen Jiabao and Manmohan Singh held extensive discussions following which the two sides signed a dozen agreements. These covered confidence-building measures along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and the nearly 3,400km-long ceasefire line along the Sino-Indian borders, boosting trade from the \$14bn level to \$30bn by 2010, and collaborating in the IT sector synergising India's software advantages with China's hardware abilities. Wen himself noted, 'China-India collaboration in the IT sector will herald a new "Asian Century" in IT.'³³ But perhaps the most notable outcome of the prime ministerial talks was the launch of a 'strategic partnership between the two Asian giants.'³⁴ The framework of this partnership was only outlined in broad strokes of expression of friendly intent but the details suggested both India and China were keen to leave their unhappy history behind and work towards a more collaborative, at least benign, future.

If the leaders were keen to build a new relationship, the prospects of their initiative remained uncertain. The scepticism of some knowledgeable Indian observers has been noted. But there are some indications that in Delhi, influential analysts are seeing in the dynamic changes in the global security architecture opportunities for paradigm-shifts. This may sound ambitious.

³¹ Xinhua, *Chinese premier on relations with South Asia, Russia, Japan*, New Delhi, 12 April 2005.

³² Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing quoted in Xinhua, *Chinese premier's South Asian tour meets desired targets: FM*, Beijing, 12 April 2005.

³³ Xinhua, *Two sleeping Asian giants awaken*, Beijing, 13 April 2005.

³⁴ Xinhua, *Wen ends "successful" India visit, leaves for home*, New Delhi, 12 April 2005.

One of India's foremost strategic thinkers and practitioners, Kumaraswamy Subrahmanyam, notes the division of elite opinion in India into two contradictory schools. One believes that the post-Cold War world has replaced bipolarity with a multipolar balance among the USA, the European Union, China, Japan, Russia and India, with a secondary tier of economic powers — China, India, Russia, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa and Mexico supplementing the trans-Atlantic core of OECD economic drivers. In this view, the USA, the EU, Russia and Japan are promoting faster growth in India to ensure a greater balance in Asia and the world. All the major powers are economically and technologically competing and cooperating while collaborating politically to maintain order. India is seen as a non-threatening power whose rise is universally welcomed. Given the semi-symbiotic nature of US-Chinese economic relations, enlisting India as an instrument of military containment of China 'is totally untenable.' India's current rulers belong to this school.³⁵

The other school believes the USA and China are potential adversaries and Washington, the hegemonic power, seeks to promote India as a 'balancer' by incorporating Delhi into America's 'strategic system.' According to Mr Subrahmanyam, this view reflects 'the lack of self-confidence to deal with the world at large economically, technologically, strategically and politically — presumably a colonial legacy.'³⁶ India is a strategic partner of the USA rather than a military ally — this means Delhi has as much capacity to shape the relationship as does Washington, and will not be the instrument of anyone else's policy objectives. Since China 'has no intention of confronting US, India, therefore, does not have to make a choice between the two powers for the next two or three decades to come.'³⁷ Subrahmanyam believes both India and China have identified poverty and underdevelopment as key challenges and seen opportunities for 'simultaneous fast growth.'³⁸ Subrahmanyam says not all problems have been resolved, though.

China is the only non-democratic nation among the major powers, but it has accepted the economics of the marketplace. Its communism is only a façade for a single-party dictatorship and has no doctrinal content in it. Consequently, a non-democratic China poses a challenge to other democratic major global powers. In today's world there is

³⁵ K. Subrahmanyam, "India's Nuclear Deal and Two Worldviews," *The Times of India*, 11 October 2008.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ K. Subrahmanyam, "Pragmatic China countervails US through India partnership," *India Interacts*, 17 January 2008.

³⁸ *Ibid.*; also see K. Subrahmanyam, "Partnership in a Balance of Power System," *Strategic Analysis*, Vol.29, no.4, October-December 2005, pp.549-60.

no alternative to dealing with China's challenge but for all major powers to engage it increasingly till such time that interaction will bring about democratic changes within China.³⁹

Words of wisdom no doubt, but will they be translated into India's strategic policy? Are voices like Subrahmanyam's crying in the wilderness of Delhi's strategic decision-making or are they becoming the mainstream of India's strategic thinking? The answer to this question will address the problematique at the beginning of this paper.

IX. POST-SCRIPT

At the end of 2008, K. Subrahmanyam was challenged with the question that having devoted nearly four decades of an active and influential professional career building India's national will to power, did he have any thoughts about the consequences of such a power-political rise for India's moral stature in the world. He wrote: "I believe in the 21st century, knowledge is going to be the currency of power, and not military power. But so long as the rest of the world believes in the utility of military power, one has to go along with it to influence the attitude of others to one's own benefit. I believe the world is bound to get increasingly globalised and integrated. In that integrated world, India's position will be increasingly like that of the European Union."⁴⁰

If he proves as prescient about India's future progression as he has been effective in shaping India's strategic development, there may be hope for the crystallisation of an operative South Asian regional sub-system and a South Asian relationship with a rising China, not just a response to it.

³⁹ Subrahmanyam, 17 January 2008.

⁴⁰ Subrahmanyam to author, private correspondence, 5 November 2008.

Is the Military Ready for the Information Age: The Challenge of Sharing and Security

*Dr. Paul T. Mitchell**

Everything has changed, except our way of thinking.

— Albert Einstein

The change from atoms to bits is irreversible and unstoppable.

— Nicholas Negroponte

The world is seized with the idea that we are at the doorstep of a new society. While Einstein wrote of the implications of a nuclear age, our thoughts today are guided by the vision of a future enabled by the power of digital technology. Negroponte's observation notes the inevitability of this shift, as have many others. Larry Ellison of Oracle has noted that all forms of knowledge will ultimately reside on the Internet: "It's collecting all the knowledge of mankind and making it available in digital fashion — reliably, securely and economically."¹ Howard Rheingold observed that the Internet is evolving into an "innovations commons and laboratory for collaboratively

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Dr Mitchell is continuing his research on the impact of networks on military operations, particularly with regard to coalition operations.

¹ Thomas Valovic, *Digital Mythologies: The Hidden Complexities of the Internet*, Piscataway NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2000, p. 15.

creating new technology.”² Don Tapscott and Anthony Williams make the case for a whole new approach to business and economics stemming from the technological changes taking place in early twenty-first century society.

Billions of connected individuals can now actively participate in innovation, wealth creation, and social development in ways we once only dreamed of. And when these masses of people collaborate they collectively can advance the arts, culture, science, education, government and the economy in surprising but ultimately profitable ways.³

The implications of these shifts for military forces are only beginning to be grasped, but there is much to suggest that despite the ravenous appetite for information technology, all is not well with how militaries will adapt to this new world. In truth, the same technology that is building new communities and enhancing people’s ability to cooperate, collaborate, and communicate on a global basis may perversely limit military interoperability and thus the prospect for more multilateral and cooperative international ventures aimed at restoring and enhancing international stability, protecting populations under threat, as well as traditional military ventures between alliances and coalition partners.

These enormous changes are expected to have significant impacts on our society. Vincent Moscoe, in a survey of the literature that has accompanied the development of the Internet, has observed that these typically fall into three related themes — the end of history, the end of geography, and the end of politics. History will come to an end both in the sense that all that has gone before will be irrelevant in this new age, but also in the sense that new forms of community will be possible in an age defined by linkages between people. The importance of geography will diminish as new communication linkages will enable people to carry out their lives no matter where they are located, themes that have been taken up by journalists such as Frances Cairncross in *The Death of Distance*⁴ and Thomas Friedman in *The World is Flat*.⁵ Finally, the end of politics is presaged by a new liberty for the powerless to direct their destinies in radically new ways, enabled by the ability to bypass the traditional sources of power in the large monolithic institutions of human society — the state, the family, religion, and corporations.

² Howard Rheingold, *SmartMobs: The Next Social Revolution*, New York: Basic Books, 2002, p. 48.

³ Don Tapscott, Anthony D. Williams, *Wikinomics: How Mass Collaboration Changes Everything*, New York: Penguin Group, 2006, p. 1.

⁴ Frances Cairncross, *The Death of Distance*, Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1997.

⁵ Thomas Friedman, *The World is Flat*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005.

While Moscoe points out that all these predictions have been made before in relation to other older forms of technology such as electrical grids, telegraph, radio and television,⁶ Manuel Castells notes that there seems to be a distinct difference in the case of information technology associated with the Internet. Indeed, he claims that rather the end of history, we may in fact be seeing the emergence of a new age:

History is just beginning, if by history we understand the moment when, after millenniums of prehistoric battle with nature, first to survive, then to conquer it, our species has reached the level of knowledge and social organization that will allow us to live in a predominantly social world.⁷

Indeed, even stripping away the superlatives that often accompany much of the information age literature, there are enough changes manifestly evident to even casual users of information technology (IT) to suggest that “something is afoot,” even if it is not the end of history.

Military interest in information technology predates that of contemporary society’s. Indeed, the military can lay claim for developing much of the foundation for these technologies. Modern computers emerged during the heights of World War Two in systems designed to assist with operations research in the fields of anti-submarine warfare and ballistics. Later, more famously, the development of the Internet itself was spawned by concern over the survivability of communications links carrying commands and orders to military forces fighting in the midst of a nuclear war. While the transistor and microchip were invented in commercial labs, the military invested heavily, in them and arguably speeded up their development, power, and widespread introduction into civil society.

Today, commercial interest in information technology ensures that civil technology is generally more advanced than military applications. Indeed, in developing modern communication systems, civilian technologies, such as cell phones, often lead military systems by several generations in their applications and ease of use. This often leads to developmental problems in the form of military users demanding at least the same level of performance that they can get using the commercially available systems they employ in their everyday life. Besides this technological gap, there is also a gap within the literature analyzing how these enormous social shifts in our culture will impact the

⁶ Vincent Moscoe, *The Digital Sublime: Myth, Power, and Cyberspace*, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2004.

⁷ Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, Second Ed., Malden MA: Blackwell, 2000, pp. 508-509.

military. While there are a significant number of publications that address the technological aspects of IT in the military, few consider the broader social implications that it will have on the military's role in the future.⁸

This is all the more surprising given the radical claims that accompany much of the "Information Age" literature. Each of the three categories of change advanced by Moscoe, each plays an overwhelming role in the use of military force. Power, and thus politics are, of course, at the heart of the use of force in any age. Geography is central to the fighting techniques of military forces. Divided into their respective air, land and sea branches, it is difficult to imagine the conduct of war fundamentally abstracted from the impact of geography. History plays such a dominant role in understanding the enduring aspects of warfare that modern commanders continue to study the battles of the ancients for understanding the challenges of the present. The curriculum of many war colleges, the Naval War College of the United States no less, use ancient texts such as Thucydides' *Peloponnesian War* as a foundational text in the study of the relationships between war and politics. If Castells is correct that we are at the beginning of a new age, then greater attention must be paid to these shifts.

These shifts, it is argued, are independent of any particular state or even region. While many have acknowledged the existence of a digital divide between those on the web and those with no access, others have pointed out that such divides do not obey traditional geographic categories of north and south, centre and periphery. The digitally dispossessed can easily be found in major urban centres of modern Western cities, and cell phone networks are transforming societies in Africa and Asia. It is the globalised phenomenon of technological transformation that is perhaps the most remarkable aspect of this phenomenon. Still, where most military observers have focused their speculation lies largely at the state level of analysis.⁹ Speculation has largely been restricted to the impact of high technology on militaries as monolithic entities, rather than internationally cooperative ones. Since the end of the Cold War, most developed militaries have been more active in internationally

⁸ Christopher Coker's work does begin to address some of the social implications that new forms of technology are raising for military forces. See Christopher Coker, *Waging Wars without Warriors: The Changing Culture of Military Conflict*, London: IISS, 2002 and *The Future of War: The Re-enchantment of War in the Twenty-first Century*, London: Blackwell Manifestos, 2004.

⁹ One example of a systems level approach is the body of research examining the use of networked entities to confront hierarchically organised foes. This includes John Robb's *Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the end of Globalization*, Hoboken NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2007, as well as a burgeoning literature on "swarms" and "fourth generation warfare."

cooperative ventures such as peacekeeping and humanitarian operations as well as more forceful “coalition operations.” In this new century, many militaries seem to have arrived at a strange period wherein they are as concerned with effectively operating with other partners as they are with mutual competition.

Furthermore, the present era of human history, whether it is on the verge of a new age or, in the inimitable words of Colin Gray, is simply Another Bloody Century, seems poised to demand increasing amounts of cooperation between military forces on a global scale. The challenges that are likely to confront all states in a period of global warming with all the transnational challenges such a shift portends, in a period where many of the global institutions, all developed in previous periods for different aims come under challenge from globalised forces not fully under their control, and in a period in which despite advances in communication technology and the advance of liberty, the concepts under which we govern ourselves seem increasingly contested. For all these reasons, as an executive arm of government, militaries will be important tools for delivering any proposed solutions or reactions to these globalised problems, and as globalised problems, cooperation and collaboration will be critical to implementation.

The technology that enables this globalised explosion of information sharing and digital collaboration, paradoxically, will inhibit the same in the military environment. Everyday, new platforms and applications appear to assist individuals across the globe link up and form new communities online; on the other hand, militaries seem stalled in achieving similar levels of interaction. Network Centric Warfare (NCW) would seem to be the military analogue of civilian collaborative IT, and it is true that collaborative networks have been growing slowly within the boundaries of many militaries. However, international networks between militaries are far more rudimentary. Nor does this seem to be simply a factor of the lag between civil and military use of technology discussed above. Indeed, in many regards, the limited advances that collaborative digital technology has permitted in terms of networking between international groups of military forces may have already been fully realized, save only in the most extraordinary of circumstances. The limited forms of interaction already evident between coalition and alliance partners may be as good as it gets.

In this regard, even if we accept the contentious point that technology is eliminating the role of history, geography, and politics for civil society, each of these factors remains firmly entrenched in the military sphere. While technology may be flattening hierarchies on a global basis, on the battlefield, such hierarchies are critical to survival, even on a “network centric”

battlefield.¹⁰ The current military predominance of the US may in fact be reflexively reinforced by the shift to networking technologies, establishing an enduring hierarchy of the US and those actors it is willing to digitally cooperate with.

I. THE INFORMATION AGE

As Castells points out, as important as technology is, especially in the military sphere, it is only one part of the factors that go into the establishment of any particular society. Other economic, political, and cultural factors are all critical, first to the development of any particular technology, and second, to how effectively that technology is used and propagates within that society. The shifts in global capitalist processes, the rise of social movements like feminism and environmentalism, and the origins of IT within the culture of American academe and then the liberal society of California are all as important a development in the shift to what he has called the "Network Society" as the emergence of the Internet itself.¹¹ Indeed, the Internet would not be what it is today without these developments: some societies, notably the Soviet Union, were unable to exploit such technology to the same degree as the United States and other Western nations.

Individuals across the planet are taking advantage of the opportunities provided by such technology so that a new social form, which Castells calls "informationalism," is replacing the structures, processes, and norms of industrialism. Informationalism provides the foundation to this new network society "based on the augmentation of the human capacity in information processing around the twin revolutions in microelectronics and genetic engineering." This network society has three essential features which distinguish it from how industrial and agricultural societies used information.

First, is the ever expanding information processing capacity of computer systems in terms of volume, complexity, and speed; factors all consistent with the so-called 'Moore's Law' of the processing power of semi-conductors. Second is the ability of digitized information to be recombined with itself and other information endlessly, permitting a similarly reflexive development of innovation and creativity. Last is the flexibility embodied in the nature of networks, permitting the widespread and uncontrolled spread of information generated by the first two factors.¹²

¹⁰ David Schmidtchen, *The Rise of the Strategic Private: Technology, Control and Change in a Network Enabled Military*, Duntroon ACT: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2006, pp. 27 & 43.

¹¹ This argument is developed most fully over Castells' three volume masterpiece *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, Malden MA: Blackwell, 1996.

¹² Manuel Castells, "The Network Society," in Pekka Himanen, *The Hacker Ethic*, New York: Random House, 2001, pp. 156-158.

Many analysts are careful not to whitewash the results of this development. Knowledge produced by the internet may be as imperfect as other forms of learning; more information does not really mean better information; further, the very abundance of information may undermine all pre-existing standards on which to judge the good, the noteworthy and the historical in exchange for the ephemeral.¹³

Nevertheless, as “amplifiers and extensions of the human mind,” new technology enables the creative and innovative powers of human thought as no other technology has in the past.¹⁴ The unleashing of innovation and creativity has enabled the development of new power loci outside of traditional social structures. Thus, industrial titans are humbled by new start up companies and states are stymied by amorphous social movements, just as militaries are challenged by insurgent movements.

Here we see a new stage in the evolution of the Internet, beyond a tool for communication towards one oriented around the creation of goods and services. The emergence of peer to peer networks and distributive computing is resulting in the movement of data and applications away from the desktop computer onto the web itself. The increasing interactivity of web sites on the Internet, referred to as Web 2.0, marks the difference from early web sites which users simply consumed information posted there, to active participation and community building applications like social networking sites.¹⁵ Web 2.0 sites encourage group forming behaviour by enabling human communication to modify the content contained on the web site, “jointly constructing value.”¹⁶ Thus, the web becomes a real collaborative space where content is created and developed by the users themselves. In this environment, it is suggested, new media companies such as Google, Yahoo, and YouTube unburdened as they are by historical legacies,¹⁷ all have advantages over traditional media companies. As Castells concludes —

Networks are appropriate instruments for a capitalist economy based on innovation, globalization, and decentralized concentration; for work, workers and firms based on flexibility and adaptability, for a

¹³ Stehr, “A World Made of Knowledge;” Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, p. 158; Valovic, *Digital Mythologies*, p. 23; Scott Lash, *Critique of Information*, London: Sage Publications, 2002, pp. 140-145; Nicholas Negroponte, *Being Digital*, New York: Vintage Books, 1995, p. 8.

¹⁴ Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, Second Ed., p. 31.

¹⁵ Don Tapscott, Anthony D. Williams, *Wikinomics: How Mass Collaboration Changes Everything*, New York: Penguin Group, 2006, p. 37. A good overview of this fast evolving space is found in ‘The Future of Web 2.0’, *Technology Review*, July/August 2008, pp. 34-69.

¹⁶ Howard Rheingold, *Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution*, New York: Basic Books, 2002, pp. 60-61.

¹⁷ Tapscott, Williams, *Wikinomics*, p. 271.

culture of endless deconstruction and reconstruction; for a polity geared towards the instant processing of new values and public moods; and for a social organization aiming at the suppression of space and the annihilation of time.¹⁸

Many of these themes are important for globalised and integrated military operations such as those characterized by the War on Terror. However, as will become apparent below, there are social impediments which will place frustrating barriers in the military's attempt to appropriate these technologies for its own ends.

II. FREEDOM, ANARCHY AND COLLABORATION

As he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.

— Thomas Jefferson

Information age literature expresses a common belief that the ability to harness the power of collaboration is a product of the system's openness. Information has been important to human societies in all times and places. Further, networks themselves have always existed within human cultures. What is distinctive about this period of time is how "new technology enhances the flexibility inherent in networks while solving the coordination and steering problems that impeded networks throughout history in their competition with hierarchical organizations."¹⁹ Networks distribute performance and share decision making; they are inherently flexible in their ability to add and subtract nodes without changing the fundamental organisation of their structure, permitting networks to maintain and enhance their value over time; finally, nodes enhance their relative importance by their ability to absorb and process information more efficiently. Technology linking nodes together in a seamless architecture, operating in an environment undisturbed by the clock routines of industrial organisations seems to offer a radical emancipation of human thought and creativity. "The growing accessibility of information technology puts the tools required to collaborate, create value, and cooperate at everyone's fingertips."²⁰

Indeed, the Internet has strong anarchical tendencies in many of its aspects. It is a "place" without a "space" and as such inherently resists control by territorial entities such as states. However, more fundamental seems to be

¹⁸ Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, pp. 501-502.

¹⁹ Castells, "The Network Society," pp. 166-167.

²⁰ Tapscott, Williams, *Wikinomics*, p.11.

the anarchical ideology that informs many such commentaries on the nature of the Internet. Classical anarchist philosopher Peter Kropotkin is cited by many as the basis for the theory of collaboration that powers the innovative aspect of the Internet. Both Rheingold and Eric Raymond of the Open Source Movement use Kropotkin's ideas on the ability of humans to cooperate without coercion in collective projects.²¹ Tapscott and Williams argue seemingly anarchic principles as the basis for the new business economy that is being created by IT. Openness in terms of corporate boundaries and the movement of labour characterize the emerging business market of the twenty-first century; peering in the form of meritocracy typifies business transactions from Google's page ranking features to eBay's trust measurement system between sellers and buyers. Finally, digital media's essential malleability enhances sharing between users allowing them to alter, remix, and repurpose content found on the Internet, thus creating new value from found objects. All of this enables the creation of truly global enterprises, building a "planetary ecosystem for designing, sourcing, assembling and distributing products ..."²²

Freedom, it is argued, gives networks their inherent power over hierarchical counterparts in this new technological structure. Companies developing open source software, such as Linux, Apache, or Firefox have inherent advantages in their ability to rapidly collaborate, develop, and fix software, outmaneuvering their counterparts stuck in traditional industrial organisations.²³ Stallman famously points out that "when I talk of free software, I am referring to freedom, not price. So think free speech, not free beer."²⁴ However, Chris Anderson of Wired argues that "free beer" is likely the destination of most products offered on the web, "everything the Web touches," he notes, "starts down the path to gratis." Because the marginal cost of digital information on the web is close to or actually at zero, "free becomes not just an option but the inevitable destination."²⁵

Many besides Anderson have taken up Stewart Brant's argument that "information wants to be free". Some argue that information is like a life form itself, seeking the opportunity to determine itself Information self

²¹ Howard Rheingold, *Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution*, New York: Basic Books, 2002, p. 39; Eric S. Raymond, 'The Cathedral and the Bazaar', <http://www.catb.org/~esr/writinas/cathedralbazaar/cathedral-bazaar/>, p. 22.

²² Tapscott, Williams, *Wikinomics*, pp. 20-30.

²³ Raymond, "The Cathedral and the Bazaar," p. 23.

²⁴ Richard Stallman, "Free Software: Freedom and Cooperation," May 29, 2001, <http://www.gnu.org/events/rnis-nyu-2001-transcript.html>.

²⁵ Chris Anderson, 'Free! Why \$0.00 is the Future of Business', *Wired*, February 25, 2008, www.wired.com/techbiz/it/magazine/16-03/ff_free.

reproduces, virus like, spreading and persisting between individuals; digital information seems especially hard wired to mutate: "digitized information has no final cut;" and depending on the context, is capable of perishing in its ability to degrade over time.²⁶ Clearly, the abundance of information that modern IT provides creates an environment where ideas compete against each other in terms of their perceived value to consumers. But this is also an environment in which consumers become "prosumers" in their ability to shape and alter the information they receive and share.

Networks create this condition of abundance in their ability to circulate information rather than simply accumulate it.²⁷ It is this free circulation of information that confers on new forms of collaboration their distinct power. "Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow," the so-called "Linus' Law" asserts that there is always somebody capable of solving every problem; the key is linking them up within a community.²⁸ While this example is typically used to argue for the superiority of open source software, it can be seen in other contexts as well such as the use of blogs to break news stories or challenge incorrect information.²⁹

The complex nature of information generates the power that results from the circulation of ideas. While information may be akin to a life form, it is also an "activity" as opposed to an actual "thing" that can be possessed. Information is "something that happens in the field of interaction between minds ... Information is an activity which occupies time rather than a state of being that occupies physical space, as is the case with hard goods." As such, information is experienced rather than possessed, propagated rather than distributed.³⁰ This notion challenges the belief that information can be owned in the same manner as capital. This forms the basis of the debate over "intellectual property" and the right to make copies of digital information like music, software, and movies.

²⁶ John Perry Barlow, "The Economy of Ideas," *Wired*, March 02, 1994, <http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/economy.ideas.html>.

²⁷ Lash, *Critique of Information*, p. 159.

²⁸ Raymond, "The Cathedral and the Bazaar," pp. 8-9.

²⁹ The revelation that the memo purporting to demonstrate that George W. Bush dodged the draft during the Vietnam war were quickly revealed to be forgeries through the collective analysis of the originals by bloggers watching the developing story. Careful observers noted clues in the font used on the memo which were unavailable at the time of its purported printing, and others familiar with such documents, found discrepancies in its style. James Kinniurgh, Dorothy Denning, "Blogs and Military Information Strategy," *Joint Special Operations University Report 06-5*, June 2006, pp. 1-2.

³⁰ Barlow, "The Economy of Ideas."

Irrespective of this struggle, clearly such notions concerning the free circulation of all information will be difficult to accept in military and intelligence circles. The Robb-Silberman Commission investigating the intelligence process that underlay the supposed existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq found that “the term information sharing suggests that the federal government entity that collects the information, ‘owns’ it and can decide whether to ‘share’ it with others. This concept is deeply embedded in the intelligence community’s culture.”³¹ The CIA developed “Intelink” in 1994 as a web based information portal for intelligence information, and more recently “Intellipedia” as a Wikipedia clone for the same purpose.³² Furthermore, the CIA has also created a social networking site, “ASpace” that mimics applications like MySpace and Facebook. Reportedly, Intelink was a relative failure as intelligence managers chose to withhold their most sensitive information, including operational details from the system. Intellipedia, reports suggest, is a relative success after the conduct of a “marketing” campaign although doubts persist within the intelligence community on its utility and its security.³³

Intelligence agencies and military organisations resist the anarchist ideology of the web for the simple reason that aside from its life-like and verb-like properties, information is ultimately also a relationship that exists within the mind. “We assign value to information based on its meaningfulness,” a relationship that can only be determined by an individual mind. In this relationship, scarcity and authority play critical roles. Because this is a human centric activity, the authority of the mind assigning the signification process altering data into information is important — some points of view are valued more than others. Second, some types of information are not abundant and thus have higher “marginal value”.³⁴ As such, secrets retain their currency. Even Anderson notes that “Information wants to be free, information wants to be expensive ... That tension will not go away.”³⁵

In the differing values assigned to discrete bits of information, walls are created restricting its free flow. Most famously, the walls between members

³¹ Derek S. Reveron, “Old Allies, New Friends: Intelligence Sharing in the War on Terror,” *Orbis*, Summer 2006, p. 453.

³² Clive Thompson, “Open Source Spying,” *New York Times Magazine*, 3 December 2006, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/03/magazine/03intelligence.html>; Calvin Andrus, “The Wiki and the Blog: Toward an Adaptive Intelligence Community” *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 49, no. 3, September 2005, available at <http://ssm.com/abstract=755904>.

³³ Scott Shane, “Logged in and Sharing Gossip, er, Intelligence,” *New York Times*, September 02, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/02/weekinreview/02shane.html>.

³⁴ Barlow, “The Economy of Ideas,” *Wired*.

³⁵ Anderson, “Free! Why \$0.00 is the Future of Business.”

of the US intelligence community have been blamed for the attacks of September 11 2001.³⁶ It is an assumption that harkens to Linus' law — with enough analysts aware of all the facts, one would have spotted the "bug". It reasonably assumes that without barriers to the free circulation of information, any given analyst would have been able to ferret out all the relevant bits of information and piece enough together to suggest the existence of a plot. Even assuming that such barriers can be lowered, a second issue concerns the ability of that analyst to compel others to listen to and believe the story thus crafted, and this is a question directly related to power.

The authority of a particular observer's point of view is a crucial determinant of the meaning assigned to any specific relationship between datum points in a narrative, the relative power of that observer as opposed to all others weighing the significance of his narrative is crucial. As Jaron Lanier points out, "The beauty of the Internet is that it connects people. The value is in the other people. If we start to believe that the Internet itself is an entity that has something to say, we're devaluing those people and making ourselves into idiots."³⁷ In other words, real people as opposed to a mythical collective exert the real power. Leaders in open source projects are often described as democratic individuals. But in practice, key developers tend to see their positions as a licence to make unilateral decisions. These leaders fought hard and often paid personal costs to achieve their status. Sharing that power with others runs directly against their own aims and ambitions.³⁸

The "walls" protecting sensitive information from hostile eyes as well as friendly ones on social networking sites arise as much because of the explicit value of the information as from the uncertainty about its final value. Indeed, as the significance of information depends on the meaning assigned to the datum and the arrangement of facts into a coherent narrative, the ultimate significance of any piece of information is essentially unknowable in advance. As such, agencies tend to over classify material in order to manage the risk of inappropriately revealing what may need to be kept secret. This issue is magnified by the inherently fluid and mutable nature of digital content.

Intelligence and military operators obviously desire to protect sources and techniques, just as law enforcement agencies seek to avoid compromising

³⁶ Richard Best, "Sharing Law Enforcement and Intelligence Information: The Congressional Role," *Congressional Research Service Paper RL33873*, February 13, 2007.

³⁷ Jaron Lanier, "Digital Maoism: The Hazards of New Online Collectivism," *Edge: the Third Culture*, 30 May 2006, available at http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/lanier06/lanier06_index.html.

³⁸ Nikolai Bezroukov, "A Second Look at the Cathedral and the Bazaar," *First Monday*, Vol. 4, No. 12, December 1999, <http://www.uic.edu/htbin/cp-iwrap/bin/qjs/index.php/fm/article/view/708/618>.

the jurisprudence of criminal cases under investigation. However, all need to cooperate in order to deal with the complex pan-jurisdictional nature of the global war on terror. A 2008 US government report discussing the possibility of developing an "information sharing environment" uniting disparate governmental communities develops one solution in the form of an "authorized use standard" based *not* on an application of legal and policy requirements currently in effect ... but rather on whether the official has the proper mission based or threat based permission to access that information.³⁹ Such permission would not be straightforward to determine, however. Considerations would have to be based on the legal authority of each agency involved, their specific missions, the sensitivity of the information and how it would be used, and that any sharing would be consistent with constitutional principles, statutes, presidential executive orders, regulations, the user's authorized mission and the mission of his/her agency. Such a determination would apply only to US persons and permanent residents and continue to require additional authorization where required by law.⁴⁰ It is a process that is complex, time consuming, and one which reinforces the relational aspects of information that create barriers to its dissemination in the first place. In no way does it create an environment which replicates or even mimics the anarchical distribution of information evident on the Internet.

One final criticism arrayed against the digital anarchism of the Open Source/Free Software movements is the ability of networks to exclude as well as to include. "The true value of the informal group of co-developers and users often is only revealed after a developer has abandoned his project. And the loss can be painful as the social and professional bonds that the developer acquired may not survive his or her 'defection.'"⁴¹ The risk of such exclusionary tactics is considerably greater in the sphere of military and intelligence information sharing. The case of New Zealand's stormy relationship with the United States is a case in point. Following the decision of the David Lange government in 1985 to ban port visits of nuclear powered/armed US Navy ships to New Zealand ports, the US suspended its obligations to the country under the ANZUS pact. This had a dramatic effect in terms of information sharing between the two countries, although Hager alleges that intelligence cooperation between New Zealand's Government Communications Security Bureau and the American National Security Agency was largely

³⁹ *Feasibility Report: Report for the Congress of the United States, March 2008*, prepared by the Program Manager, Information Sharing Environment, p. 14. Available at www.fas.org/irp/agency/ise/feasibility.pdf.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, p. 17.

⁴¹ Bezroukov, "A Second Look at the Cathedral and the Bazaar."

unaffected given the important value of the information it provided.⁴² Following decisions to abstain from cooperating with the US in the invasion of Iraq and, later, missile defence, the US briefly exercised similar policies against Canada.

III. CLASSIFICATION AND INFORMATION SHARING

As can be seen, information exchange between nations in the digital era has become progressively more complex. A whole series of instructions governing information exchange, especially involving information systems and networks has been released by a variety of government bodies since the early 1990s.⁴³ The depth of regulation controlling the storage, use, and dissemination of classified information illustrates best the clear differences in how information is formally treated within governmental bodies. In 2005, US Army Chief of Staff, General Peter Schoomaker drew explicit attention to the crossover between these two domains in concerns regarding the use of blogs by soldiers: "The enemy reads our open source and continues to exploit such information for use against our forces."⁴⁴ Such concerns have been raised repeatedly against the use of blogs, social networking sites like MySpace, and the posting of combat videos on video sharing sites like YouTube and LiveLeak by service members. While official policy is ostensibly to permit as much latitude as possible,⁴⁵ the impact on soldiers using blogs has been chilling.⁴⁶

Of particular interest is the treatment of unclassified information by some of this policy. For example, US Army regulations on operational security note:

(3) Critical information is information that is vital to a mission that if an adversary obtains it, correctly analyzes it, and acts upon it, the

⁴² Nicky Hager, *Secret Power: New Zealand's Role in the International Spy Network*, Nelson NZ: Craig Potton Publishing, 1996, pp. 23-24.

⁴³ For example: Our ability to share in a timely manner will determine our ability to leverage our unmatched capabilities. In order to accommodate new and rapidly changing demands to share information and to handle it in a secure electronic environment, information that has been determined releaseable through established foreign disclosure procedures to foreign networks ... shall be marked "Releaseable to USA with the applicable trigraph..." Steven Cambone, 'Memorandum: Security Classification Marking Instructions', 27 September 2004.

⁴⁴ James Kinniurgh, Dorothy Denning, "Blogs and Military Information Strategy," *Joint Special Operations University Report 06-5*, June 2006, p. 3.

⁴⁵ See, for example, SECNAV INSTRUCTION 5720.47B 'Department of the Navy Policy for Content on Publically Accessible World Wide Web Sites', 28 December 2005; Army Regulation 530-1 "Operations and Signal Security" 19 April 2007, para 2-1g; available at http://blog.wired.com/defense/files/amiy_reg_530_1_updated.pdf.

⁴⁶ See, for example, <http://destroyermen.blogspot.com/2008/04/please-stand-by.html> and the subsequent post <http://destroyermen.blogspot.com/2008/04/top-cover.html>.

compromise of this information could prevent or seriously degrade mission success.

(4) Critical information can *either* be classified or unclassified. Critical information that is classified requires OPSEC measures for additional protection because it can be revealed by unclassified indicators. Critical information that is unclassified *especially* requires OPSEC measures because it is not protected by the requirements provided to classified information. Critical information can also be an action that provides an indicator of value to an adversary and places a friendly activity or operation at risk.⁴⁷

As the instruction points out, unclassified information poses potentially as much a risk as classified material. Indeed, a whole series of new classifications for information have emerged to complement the classic Secret and Top Secret classifications including “For Official Use Only” (FOLIO), “Sensitive But Unclassified” (SBU), and “Controlled Unclassified Information” (CUI) which all control information that had previously been publicly available.⁴⁸

The baroque nature of information classification, however, further complicates its management. In his 2004 Congressional testimony, the DoD Director of Information Security Oversight admitted that “information that should not be classified is increasing, in violation of Executive Order 12958.”⁴⁹ A GAO report from 2006 on DoD’s management of classified information found that classification management training in the US military was insufficient at many levels, that they were not uniformly following established procedures for classifying data, that there was inconsistent treatment of similar types of information within the same documents and material marked as classified often did not meet the established criteria for doing so.⁵⁰

As information classification standards proliferate globally, the management of relations between intelligence and military organisations itself becomes more complex. Each agency manages a web of relationships with counterparts

⁴⁷ Emphasis added. Army Regulation 530-1 “Operations and Signal Security” 19 April 2007, p. 1.

⁴⁸ See Alice R. Buchalter, John Gibbs, Marieke Lewis, *Laws and Regulations Governing the Protection of Sensitive but Unclassified Information*, Washington DC: Library of Congress, September 2004. Available at www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/sbu.pdf.

⁴⁹ Executive Order 12958 governs the modes of classifying national security information: <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo12958.htm>. Davi M. D’Agostino, *Managing Sensitive Information: DoD Can More Effectively Reduce the Risk of Classification Errors*, Washington DC: Government Accounting Office, June 2006, p. 2.

⁵⁰ Davi M. D’Agostino, *Managing Sensitive Information: DoD Can More Effectively Reduce the Risk of Classification Errors*, Washington DC: Government Accounting Office, June 2006, pp. 4-5.

in other countries with differing degrees of openness.⁵¹ As each country has different needs and regulations determining what is collected and how it is stored, the standards on which information is classified between nations can vary widely. In a digital age, this can add considerable complexity to the process of sharing information. "Data models" specify the nature, organisation, and relationships between fields in information databases. These models can differ significantly in the diverse information products used by various military and intelligence services. In this, we see the conflict between the highly regulated digital environment of states and their security services as contrasted with the anarchic environment of the Internet.

Some argue that such digital anarchism may be an "early transient phenomenon," that a "more stable configuration" will ultimately emerge where worker and managerial autonomy is constrained within the digital environment.⁵² Several recent studies have argued for the possibility that the Internet may succumb to the control of states and corporations.⁵³ However, the transformations within our society discussed initially may be larger than the technology that presents these opportunities to reassert control.

What is characteristic of social movements and cultural projects built around identity in the Information Age is that they do not originate within the institutions of civil society. They introduce from the outset, an alternative social logic, distinct from the principles of performance around which the dominant institutions of society are built. ... The strength of identity based social movements is their autonomy vis-à-vis the institutions of the state, the logic of capitalism, and the seduction of technology.⁵⁴

In other words, the possibility of control may escape those forces best positioned to implement it. While this may be cause for celebration in some corridors, "digital culture cannot prize the anarchic and chaotic qualities of the Internet above all else and yet expect some kind of pluralistic cultural system or even model of governance to arise from those qualities."⁵⁵

⁵¹ Derek S. Reveron, "Old Allies, New Friends: Intelligence Sharing in the War on Terror," *Orbis*, Summer 2006, p. 459.

⁵² Gene I. Rochlin, *Trapped in the Net: the Unanticipated Consequences of Computerization*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997, p. 9.

⁵³ For example, Jonathon Zittrain, *The Future of the Internet: And How to Stop It*, New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2008; Ron Deibert, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohinsky, Jonathon Zittrain, *Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering*, Boston: Harvard University Press, 2008.

⁵⁴ Manuel Castells, *End of the Millenium*, Malden MA: Blackwell, 1998, p. 371.

⁵⁵ Valovic, *Digital Mythologies*, p. 21. The lack of civility in digital communication has been remarked on by many: Alan Jacobs, "Goodbye, Blog," <http://www.christianitytoday.com/global/printer.html?/be/2006/003/17.36.html>.

The digital environment may ultimately come to resemble the international environment in its worst anarchical qualities.

Ultimately, there is a fundamentally contradictory relationship between the organs of the state, the military in particular, and the emerging informational society. In his study of the relationship between the state and the Internet, Everard concluded that the state must continue to exist because of its connection to both the formation of social identity and its monopoly of violence,⁵⁶ however, both these roles are placed at risk by the rise of networks. But it is the relationship between the military and the informational society as it affects the sharing of information that concerns this study.

The importance of secrecy in protecting information places clear constraints on the ability of militaries to use technology to the same advantage as those groups which are rising on the Internet. This division is all the more intriguing given the origin of the Internet as a military project. Paul Baran, the Rand analyst who authored the first conceptual discussions of what would become the Internet, noted that the technology would assist as a means of keeping military secrets safe from foreign spies in peacetime as well as protecting communications during war.⁵⁷ Castells agrees with Everard that the state will survive the transformation in human society he foresees approaching, however, he disagrees that sovereignty will survive intact because of the impact on society of emerging forms of networked organisation. Although he does not consider the implications of this evolution for international relations in any great depth, he does advance two conclusions. First, that we might expect greater amounts of multilateralism in geopolitics. At the same time, he also expects that geopolitics will be “increasingly dominated by a fundamental contradiction between the multilateralism of decision making and the unilateralism of the military implementation of those decisions.”⁵⁸ Here again, we see the contradiction between the inherent impulse to work together that is emerging from shifts in culture, the economy, and technology with the need to wall off information, the release of which might damage national security. Just as the technology that enhances the ability of humans to cooperate together is emerging, we may expect to see the opposite trend within the military sphere — the growing difficulty of achieving the same.

⁵⁶ Jerry Everard, *Virtual States: The Internet and the Boundaries of the Nation-State*, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 44.

⁵⁷ The proposed network is a *universal high secrecy system* made up of a hierarchy of *less secure subsystems*. It is proposed that the network will treat all inputs as if they are classified in order to increase the intercept price to the enemy to a value so high that interception would not be worth his efforts. Emphasis in the original. Paul Baran, *On Distributed Communications: IX. Security, Secrecy, and Tamper Free Considerations*, Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1964, p. 7.

⁵⁸ Castells, *End of the Millennium*, pp. 376-377.

Asia at the Crossroads of History: A View from Southeast Asia

*Asad-ul Iqbal Latif**

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 unleashed the ideological equivalent of drunken celebrations that reached a crescendo among those who manned the gilded ramparts of Wall Street. Even intellectuals did not escape being swept into the mood of triumphalism. The Francis Fukuyama made history by penning his ode to the End of History.¹ Samuel Huntington, the Harvard scholar who had witnessed more of history than the youthful Fukuyama, responded with the warning that, far from history having ended, what had begun was a clash of civilisations.² The drunken celebrations continued, nevertheless, and led to drunken brawls, as they normally do, not least in the Balkans—the region that has given political geography the word “Balkanisation.” China was among the countries that refused to be caught up in the global celebrations. After its own experience of the Tiananmen protests of 1989, Beijing was circumspect, and the Great Wall kept its ancient place in China’s international relations.

Few triumphalists were around to celebrate the end of history in the first year of the 21st Century. The terrorist attacks of 11th September 2001 in the

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¹ Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” *The National Interest* 16 (Summer 1989), 3-18; and *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992).

² Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993), 22-47; and *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

United States of America inaugurated an era. In that era, many people around the world, no matter what they thought of this U.S. policy or that, found themselves on the same side of history as the American people. The counter-attack on Afghanistan was seen largely in that light. However, the invasion and occupation of Iraq initiated the second phase of the era. In this phase, the victims changed sides. The political failure of the occupation, and its human cost in what had been one of the most advanced societies of the Middle East, became obscenely visible. The third, and last, phase of the era was an economic meltdown originating in the United States that quickly drew fearful references to the Great Depression of the 1930s. An historical era was over. When I ran into an American official a few years ago, I asked whether the United States needed a new order at home. The simple reply was: "*Insha Allah.*" There was nothing surprising there, except that the official is a Catholic. It takes some effort to make a Catholic go Muslim, even if only metaphorically. America's neo-conservatives had pulled off that semantic miracle.

I. FROM WALL STREET TO THE GREAT WALL: A PERSONAL EXPERIENCE

How far the times have changed was reiterated when I visited Beijing in October 2008 for the annual conference of the Fulbright Association. It had chosen the venue both to recognise Beijing's hosting of the Olympic Games, and to mark the 30th anniversary of the normalisation of relations between China and the United States. A day before the formal opening of the conference, several Fulbrighters found themselves by chance on the same bus, headed for a private tour of the Great Wall at Badaling. On the way, we stopped at the Ming Tombs. As the tour guide provided vivid details of concubines, slaves and senior palace officials who had once been buried alive with departed emperors, a shudder ran through the assembled crowd. We had gathered in China in the spirit of Senator J. William Fulbright's liberal universalism and his quest for peace through international understanding. What was this China that we were encountering? A pacifist scientist from Egypt observed that even the Pharaohs had not been so cruel, for only replicas of what they had treasured in life had followed them to the pyramids in death. At this, an East Coast scholar from the United States opposed the Egyptian and declared that reinstating the ancient Chinese practice would do America a world of good — for what better way was there to pay homage to unpopular departed presidents than to bury senior members of their Administrations alive with them? Raucous laughter broke out at her words.

The good Senator would not have approved of that laughter but, then, he had lived in different times. The morbid mirth occasioned by the East Coast

radical's suggestion illustrated just how far the times had changed in the United States.

The Fulbright conference confirmed the extent of the change. I led a roundtable discussion on how other countries were responding to China's rise. In my roundtable proposal, I had structured the discussion along the usual lines of questioning: China is peaceful now because it needs peace to develop, but will it remain peaceful once it becomes strong? Will a Middle Kingdom mentality re-emerge in China, and will a redefined tributary system reappear with it in Asia? In response, the Chinese participants provided a friendly, if sometimes impassioned, defence of their country's peaceful intentions. It was hardly necessary since no one disagreed with them. Instead, an elderly American professor set the tone of the discussion by earnestly distancing his country's *raison d'être* from the unilateralist interventionism that had become synonymous with it since the beginning of the 21st Century. Rather than question China's intentions in some unknown future, he criticised America's all-too-well-known recent record.

At times, I felt that the Fulbrighters, progressive left-liberals generally, were being too apologetic, for Americans were not the first great power to make great mistakes, and they would not be the last. Even the neo-conservatives' intellectual origins had lain in socialism, and they had moved to the right only after having been mugged by reality. However, the sentiments of the Fulbrighters were unmistakable. All that was missing from the parley was a videoconference with Karl Marx in heaven.

Immediately after the Fulbright conference, I rushed off to attend a meeting of the Singapore-based Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF), which was being held in Beijing on the sidelines of the Asia-Europe Meeting's seventh summit. On my way to the ASEF meeting, I met several first-year History students from Beijing Normal University. They were drawn from across the length and breadth of China: from Anhui, Chongqing, Fujian, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Liaoning, Shaanxi and Shanghai. They had entered the university after having excelled in competitive examinations. Ten of them — six women and four men — accompanied me to the Temple of Heaven on a weekend.

Their idea of China's place in the world was interesting. I asked them: Had they had the choice of being born in an earlier era of Chinese history, which would it be? A student from Jilin chose the Qin dynasty that had unified China. Her body language made it amply clear that, if matters ever came to the issue of China's unity, even a horrendously cruel emperor like Qin Shihuang would be preferable to those who would take the country back to the Warring States era. The Tang dynasty received the most votes, of course, because it was then that a peaceful and prosperous China had risen to be the

world's most powerful civilisation. A student from Fujian cited the Republican period. That was because, during the War of Resistance against Japan, Chinese from the scholar to the peasant had left the pursuit of fame and wealth behind to rally to China's defence.

Listening to them, it occurred to me that one of the silliest things that foreigners could do in China was to think of its society in historically exclusive terms. It is a folly to look for a China that consists of a total rejection of one stretch of the past — be it Imperial or Republican or Communist — and an uncritical embrace of some other version of history. Instead, I sensed among my young interlocutors a layered identity that had emerged from a critical sensitivity to the fluctuations of Chinese history. And it was that nuanced sense of history that gave young Chinese the confidence to make a claim on an unknown future.

I looked around me. Once, emperors had prayed for abundant harvests at the Temple of Heaven. I asked my ten treasures of China what they wanted as a boon. The students, who are all members of the Chinese Communist Youth League, conferred briefly among themselves. "Peace," they declared spontaneously, and unanimously. "Cooperation" and "friendship" followed in swift succession. As I was about to make my way to an altar nearby to pray for the students, one of them asked meekly: "Could you pray for a bright future for us?" It appeared to me that, in putting collective ideals and goals ahead of their personal interests, these Chinese students embodied a Beijing Consensus shaping up in the wake of the Washington Consensus, whose market fundamentalists and other neo-liberal extremists had brought capitalism to the brink of existential disaster.

II. AMERICA AND THE ASIAN BALANCE

The redemptive nature of Senator Barack Hussein Obama's victory on 4 November 2008 was evident in the amazingly post-racial and, indeed, pan-religious character of the celebrations that broke out from Boston to Bangladesh. It was an international occasion of deliverance for those who had seen America destroy not only its enemies' ambitions but also its own ideals in the abyss of Abu Ghraib and the gulag of Guantanamo Bay. The outpouring of hope for change was not only epiphanic: It had a practical dimension as well. "Not since Suleiman the Magnificent in the 16th century, has anyone not 'white' possessed anything like the degree of trans-continental power that will soon be exercised by President Obama," Linda Colley, professor of history at Princeton University, wrote in *The Guardian* in the aftermath of that victory.³

³ Linda Colley, "Barbara Obama would not have stood a chance of election to the Oval office", *The Guardian*, 11th November 2008.

Obama's victory, whatever his record turns out to be eventually, signifies a fundamental virtue of America: its inherent ability to change political course peacefully when an existing state of affairs becomes intolerable. The same is true of its ability to recover from expensive economic mistakes. Writing off the United States would be a mistake almost as gigantic as the geopolitical mess that it has admittedly got itself — and the rest of the world — into. Speaking of a post-American world order is premature, to say the least.

However, some caveats are in order. Casting a look back at the Ottoman Empire that had produced Suleiman the Magnificent, the Harvard professor Niall Ferguson draws a very different conclusion from the one that Colley does. Ferguson warns that the world is living through a global shift in the balance of power very similar to that which occurred in the 1870s. This is the story of how an over-extended empire sought to cope with an external debt crisis by selling off revenue streams to foreign investors. The empire that suffered these setbacks in the 1870s was the Ottoman empire. Today it is the US.⁴

He traces the history of the aftermath of the Crimean war, when both Sultan in Constantinople and the Egyptian *khedive* began to run up large domestic and foreign debts. When a financial crisis struck European and American stock markets in 1873, a Middle Eastern debt crisis became inevitable and, in October 1875, the Ottoman government declared bankruptcy. "The critical point is that the debt crisis necessitated the sale or transfer of Middle Eastern revenue streams to Europeans." Although the US debt crisis today is different, the parallel with the 1870s lies in the fact that the crisis has resulted in the sale of assets and revenue streams to foreign creditors. As Middle Eastern and East Asian sovereign wealth funds invest in large American banks, "the resulting shift of power is from west to east." In the 1870s, the balance of financial power moved from the ancient Oriental empires of the Ottomans, the Persians and the Chinese to Western Europe. Today the shift is from America and other Western financial centres to the Middle East and East Asia.

It remains to be seen how quickly today's financial shift will be followed by a comparable geopolitical shift in favour of the new export and energy empires of the east. Suffice to say that the historical analogy does not bode well for America's quasi-imperial network of bases and allies across the Middle East and Asia.⁵

That is a sobering thought, although one that is probably overdrawn given America's military superiority — its defence expenditure is greater than that of the rest of the world's combined — and the tangible importance

⁴ Niall Ferguson, "An Ottoman Warning for America," *Financial Times*, 7th January 2008.

⁵ *Ibid.*

of its forward military deployment in Pacific Asia to the defence of the American homeland.

Looking in the other direction, the American role in Asian security cannot be overstated. The United States is the primary offshore balancer in East Asia. Although America is not a part of the region geographically, it has kept the balance of power in East Asia since the end of World War II primarily through its triangular relationship with Japan and China. One simple proof of the importance of the United States is that Japan's bilateral relationship with America is its most important one, as is China's bilateral relationship with America — and both these relationships are more powerful than Japanese-Chinese bilateral relations. There is no other power apart from the United States that can play this balancing role in East Asia, for the time being at least.

Southeast Asia is the region that lies south of China and east of India. This is the first time since the departure of colonialism that China and India are rising *simultaneously*. As they rise, they are engaging the region that lies between them — China with an economic charm offensive that is at the heart of its soft power, and India with its Look East policy. In the midst of these developments, America's balancing role in East Asia has a stabilising effect on Southeast Asia. True, India's Look East policy is drawing the Southeast Asian and South Asian security domains closer. Interestingly, however, America's growing strategic links with India are accompanying India's expanding involvement with Southeast Asia. Again, there is no way of denying America's continuing importance to Southeast Asia. Within what remains a largely US-centric security architecture in East Asia, the rise of China and India benefits Southeast Asia. China's "soft power" — its economic and cultural power — has grown tremendously in the region. India will have to keep pace in order to be a peer-power of China. A degree of healthy competition between the two Asian giants is good for Southeast Asia because Beijing and New Delhi will court ASEAN to keep Southeast Asia from falling into the other power's exclusive sphere of influence. This is good for Southeast Asia also because, observing China and India compete in this region, the United States will not want to be excluded from a region in which it has been strong traditionally, particularly since the end of the Cold War.

The problem is that, while the United States continues to loom large on Southeast Asia's radar, Southeast Asia does not loom as large as it should on the American radar. The United States' problems in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Middle East have diverted much of its attention away from the region. Washington does see Southeast Asia as part of the War on Terror; indeed, Southeast Asia can be regarded as the second front of the war, after the Middle East. However, Southeast Asia has both potential and problems that go

beyond the War on Terror. These do not seem to be registering in Washington, which appears to have adopted an issue-based approach to the region. There is little doubt that the War on Terror will continue to engage American minds. The question is how the Obama Administration will reformulate the war and what resources it will devote to its prosecution.

Should America decline to that point where it plays but a marginal role in regional affairs, more would be at stake than its forward military posture, important though it is. What could be threatened would be the very nature of the international political economy that developed after World War II and consolidated itself after the end of the Cold War. In East Asia and Southeast Asia, this political economy took the shape of access to Western investment, technology and markets that enlarged the sphere of the market economies. The benefits of this expansion spread, in flying-geese formation, from Japan to the four Asian Tigers—Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan—and to Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines; and then, in a world-changing move, to China; and thence to the countries of post-communist Indochina. Citing the importance of the open international economy to the security of states after World War II, Richard Rosecrance writes in *The Rise of the Trading State* that unless the plethora of small nations created by decolonisation could trade, “they could not live;” if tariffs and restrictions had circumscribed their trade, they would not have been able to function as independent units. Indeed, he goes on to make a larger point.⁶ “It seems safe to say that an international system composed of more than 160 states cannot continue to exist unless trade remains the primary vocation of most of its members,” he writes. “Were military and territorial orientations to dominate the scene, the trend to greater numbers of small states would be reversed, and larger states would conquer small and weak nations.”⁷

It is not a nice thought, particularly for small states.

III. TOWARDS A POSTMODERN ASIA⁸

Transition to a better world is possible. The Singapore scholar-diplomat Kishore Mahbubani sketches the contours of that world in *The New Asian Hemisphere*.

⁶ Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World* (New York: BasicBooks, 1986), 138.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 139.

⁸ This section is drawn from my papers presented at a conference on “Pan-Asian Convergences: Australia, India and East Asia”, organised by the Australian High Commission, New Delhi, and the Asian College of Journalism, Chennai, in Chennai on 15-16 September 2006; and at a panel discussion on “Strategic Issues in Asia-Europe Relations: Perspectives from the Media” held during the Fourth Asia-Europe Journalists’ Seminar organised by the Asia-Europe Foundation in Hamburg on 27 May 2007.

He argues that global power is shifting to the East. This is not because Asian societies are rediscovering the strength of Asian civilisations, but because they are building on Western wisdom, cultivated over the past two centuries, in the spheres of free-market economics; science and technology; meritocracy; pragmatism; a culture of peace that has existed among Western states since the end of World War II; the rule of law; and Western education. The author calls on the West to help Asia's modernisation and to share power with it. Mahbubani's suggestions on the creation of a new world order include the reform of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank; the institution of a single rule of law for all nations; the quest for social justice; and rejuvenated East-West partnerships. He warns that de-Westernisation will deepen if the West tries to continue its domination of world affairs.⁹

One part of Mahbubani's analysis that is especially pertinent to an Asia in transition is his support for the Western culture of peace. The British diplomat Robert Cooper's work on that culture takes off where Mahbubani's book ends. Cooper divides the world into three kinds of state. First are "premodern" states such as Somalia and Afghanistan where the state has failed and has unleashed a Hobbesian war of all against all. Second are the post-imperial, postmodern states of Europe, Canada and perhaps Japan that no longer think of security primarily in terms of conquest. Thirdly, there are "modern" states such as India, Pakistan and China that follow traditional principles of *raison d'état*. The US, too, would seem to fall in this category, although Cooper does not say so explicitly. Turning to regional organisations, a barometer of international postmodernity, he cites the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and other multilateral arrangements to argue that "what in Europe has become a reality is in many other parts of the world an aspiration." Nevertheless, Cooper believes, these organisations "suggest at least the desire for a postmodern environment."¹⁰

Now, it is questionable whether even the European Union (EU) is a genuinely postmodern organisation. While it is true that it has banished the national urge to resort to force *within* Europe, it has not done so for theatres *outside* Europe, witness the participation of European countries in the Afghan and Iraqi expeditions. True, the EU's member-states have moved beyond the balance-of-power principle among themselves, this principle being a key feature

⁹ Kishore Mahbubani, *The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East* (New York: Public Affairs, 2008).

¹⁰ Robert Cooper, "The new liberal imperialism," *The Observer*, 7 April 2002, <observer.guardian.co.uk/worldview/story/0,11581,680095,00.html> See also Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Grove Press, 2003).

of premodern and modern politics. However, it could be argued plausibly that this de-emphasis is but an attempt to secure a better balance-of-power position for the EU as a whole *vis-à-vis* the United States and other powers.

The most problematic aspect of Cooper's essay is its call for a new liberal imperialism to be embarked on by the global North to stabilise failing states in the global South. It is impossible to be enamoured of that idea, of course, because whatever liberal impulses drive or rationalise the imperial project do not stay liberal for long. Witness the ghastly mutation of the Enlightenment's civilising values into the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre of 1919 or the man-made Bengal Famine of 1943, an act of war that devoured more than three million innocent civilians, half the number of Jews who perished in the Holocaust.¹¹ Beneficiaries of the Asia that was born of the long gestation from the Dandi March through the Long March to Dien Bien Phu will have nothing to do with Cooper's imperial enterprise. Nor would any of the key actors in Asian history today, from China and Japan to Australia and India, which are drawing closer today in the long aftermath of colonialism and imperialism, and the Cold War that replaced the disappearing footprints of subjugation.

All this said, however, Cooper's analysis is interesting, not because of its call for a new liberal imperialism, but in spite of it. He draws attention to some of the institutions that underpin the European postmodern state system. The most salient of these institutions are, of course, the Treaty of Rome and the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, but there are also the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Ottawa Convention that bans anti-personnel mines, the treaty that established the International Criminal Court, the Strasbourg Court of Human Rights and the International Atomic Energy Agency, among others.

In this context, what are some of the impulses, initiatives, endeavours, mechanisms, processes or institutions centred in East Asia that can be expected to reflect the temper of the next half-century? There are the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum; the ASEAN Plus Three grouping; ASEAN's other Dialogue partners; the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO); the track-two Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP); proposals for JACIK, an economic community consisting of Japan, ASEAN, China, India and South Korea whose membership could be extended to other Asian countries; and others. Here, I shall concentrate on two of them: the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) process.

¹¹ For a convincing critique of Cooper's argument, see Michael A. Peters, "The Postmodern State, Security and World Order," *Globalism and its Challengers*, <globalization.icaap.org/content/v2.2/04_peters.html>.

Processes

Although ASEAN began life as a product of the attritional political economy of the Cold War, it set about revitalising itself when the Soviet Union's implosion in 1989 robbed it of a good part of its rationale. The ARF's creation in 1994 was a concrete step in establishing a multilateral security framework that reflected the shift in the regional distribution of power, with its inevitable impact on the evolving balance of power. Specifically, the ARF sought to incorporate the interests of the United States and China at a key moment of transition in international affairs. Washington and Beijing were not interested initially in joining a multilateral arrangement that might dilute their great-power advantage in dealing with smaller countries bilaterally and enmesh the great powers in the norms, practices and expectations of a multilateralism that was conducive to the interests of smaller countries. In the case of Washington, there was the additional consideration of the effect that the ARF — whose members represented half the world's population, nearly half the world's gross domestic product, and at least four more regional powers, China, Russia, Japan and India — would have on America's pre-eminent position in its regional bilateral alliances. But both the United States and China did join the ARF because its three objectives — the promotion of Confidence-Building Measures, the development of Preventive Diplomacy Mechanisms, and the development of Conflict Resolution Mechanisms — were sufficiently evolutionary to ensure that the Forum would move at the pace that its members were comfortable with, and any member could decide when to go slow. This approach, based on incrementalism and consensus, riles those who wish that the ARF would talk "hard security" — say, over Taiwan or Tibet — but if the cost of that approach is to make a key player walk away, the inclusive purpose of the exercise would be lost. Whether the ARF will help socialise China into international norms and standards of responsible behaviour — norms deemed important for the *status quo*, it should be added, by the existing superpower, the primary beneficiary of that *status quo*, and like-minded countries — or whether a rising China and its emerging partners will turn the ARF into a regional norms generator that reflects the political and strategic culture of Chinese ascendancy remains to be seen.

The latter scenario — in which China sets the pace, tone and the direction of East Asian multilateralism — is not an outlandish one. The scholarly literature exhibits serious references to a possible revival of the Chinese tributary system that existed in pre-colonial East Asia. Not long ago, a Singaporean scholar argued that Beijing's "charm offensive" in Southeast Asia was among its moves to "pacify" China's immediate region, "as in the old days of China's

imperial tributary system under the Ming and Qing Emperors."¹² Another observer noted that while it might be an exaggeration to view China's desire for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with ASEAN as a modern-day tributary system, it was apt historically to see in the FTA the economic statecraft of China's strategy of peaceful ascendancy.¹³

Indeed, the work of scholars such as David C. Kang makes a powerful case for treating pre-colonial Asia's Sinic past as a benign template when looking at the future. Kang argues that relations in East Asia, where a strong and stable China preserved hierarchical order, historically have been more peaceful and stable than international relations in the West. He commends the "considerable informal equality" that prevailed in that order till the intrusion of the Western powers in the 19th century. Those powers represent a Western tradition of international relations consisting of formal equality among nation-states but a tradition marked in practice by informal hierarchy and nearly constant conflict among states.¹⁴ Certainly, China itself does not ask officially for a return to East Asia's Sinic past, and it conducts its relations in the language and idiom of Westphalia. However, it is interesting to see sophisticated arguments being made against the Westphalian system in an era of China's rise.

It would not do to forget India's rise, either. Another Asian scenario is the revival, in an appropriately eclectic form, of the *mandala* system, which transmitted classical India's influence to Southeast Asia through the notion of demarcating the power of kings in terms of circles forming around them. The system never possessed a political centre back home — the *sine qua non* of imperialism — from which traders, scribes and warriors could carry Indic interests abroad. Rather, the Indian kingdoms that emerged in "Farther India" enjoyed only ties of tradition with Indian dynasties; there was no political dependence.¹⁵ Amitav Acharya makes a convincing case for treating the *mandala*

¹² Eric Teo Chu Cheow, "Rising Sino-US Rivalry — A case in Point following the Recent Sino-Singaporean Row over Taiwan," *Taiwan Perspective e-Paper*, published by the Institute for National Policy Research, Taipei, Issue No. 41, 30 September 2004.

¹³ Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, "The Logic of China-ASEAN FTA: Economic Statecraft of 'Peaceful Ascendancy,'" in Ho Khai Leong and Samuel C.Y. Ku, *China and Southeast Asia: Global Changes and Regional Challenges* (Singapore and Kaohsiung: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, National Sun Yat-sen University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan ROC, 2005), p.37.

¹⁴ David C. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks," *International Security* 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003): 66-7.

¹⁵ G. Coedes, *The Indianized States of Southeast Asia*, edited by Walter F. Vella and translated by Susan Brown Cowing (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1968), p.34.

system as one of the sources of contemporary Southeast Asia's regional state-system, two other sources being Stanley Tambiah's notion of "galactic polity" and Clifford Geertz's "theatre state" in Bali.¹⁶ "And just as the *mandala*, the galactic polity and the theatre state could be the basis of an imagined Southeast Asian community during the classical period, the 'ASEAN Way' has been at the core of efforts to build a Southeast Asian regional identity in the modern era," Acharya argues.¹⁷ The ASEAN Way relies on *musyawarah* (consultation) and *mufakat* (consensus) rather than formal, legalistic and adversarial mechanisms of decision-making.

To an extent, these values characterise the larger EAS process as well. The EAS, which was inaugurated in Malaysia in 2005, is very different from the original 1990 proposal for an East Asian Economic Caucus, a "legendary caucus without Caucasians." The United States, Japan, Australia and other countries countered it with a proposal for APEC.¹⁸ The EAS, with ASEAN in the driver's seat, includes the major powers that will determine East Asian outcomes in the coming decades: China, Japan, Australia and India.

The rationale of the EAS is interesting. In one view, Chinese perceptions of declining American power, caused by Washington being sucked into the War on Terror, made Beijing see an opportunity to "steer East Asian multilateralism" along the lines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, "to serve Beijing's strategic goals and further weaken US influence in East Asia." However, there are countries that "remain wary of becoming divided into Chinese and American blocs in East Asia" and their "alarm prompted a campaign to include India, Australia and New Zealand and to ensure that ASEAN remained central to any future East Asian Community."¹⁹ Chinese sources, though, are at pains to emphasize that Beijing is not practising a "Chinese Monroe Doctrine," with or without the "Roosevelt Corollary," of seeking absolute influence over East Asia.²⁰

In any case, although Washington is not a part of the grouping, it is not without influence in it. Five of the democracies in the EAS—Australia,

¹⁶ Amitav Acharya, *The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 20. Religion, trade, colonization and war are other factors, of course: *Ibid.*, pp. 26-37.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.29.

¹⁸ Dana Robert Dillon, "Watching the East Asia Summit," 18 August 2005, www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed081805a.cfm.

¹⁹ Mohan Malik, "The East Asia Summit: More Discord than Accord," *YaleGlobal*, 20 December 2005, <yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=6645>.

²⁰ P.S. Suryanarayana, "Political haze over East Asia vision", *The Hindu*, 20 December 2005.

Japan, South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines — are treaty allies of the United States; India and Singapore have strong defence relationships with Washington; and Canberra has declared that it will not sign on to anything that affects its defence relationship with Washington.²¹ The main objective is to ensure that, as the Kuala Lumpur Declaration puts it, the process will be an “open, inclusive, transparent and outward-looking” one and will strive to strengthen global norms and universally recognized values, “with ASEAN as the driving force working in partnership with the other participants.”²² Singapore Foreign Minister George Yeo places the EAS in the context of “ASEAN’s objective to make Southeast Asia a region which is open and friendly to all the great powers so that everyone has a vested interest in seeing us united and prosperous.” He notes that, because of ASEAN’s “unique position,” it has become a venue where the other powers can meet one another in a “neutral setting.” The EAS “must be outward-oriented and not seek to exclude the US, the EU or Russia.”²³

The Future

It is obvious that these processes are hardly postmodern in Cooper’s sense of the term. Asia is different from Europe. The Malaysian scholar Mohamed Jawhar notes that one difference is that Asia’s experience of war in the 20th century was not of the cataclysmic European variety; hence the absence of a “never again” stance on armed conflict in Asia. This is why the legacy of distrust created by the War continues to vitiate relations between key Asian countries; historical legacies have not been resolved in Asia to the extent that they have been in Europe. But, then, again, the Cold War in Asia never led to an “overarching and defining conflict” in the region involving essentially two protagonists, as it did in Europe. Instead, Asia is marked by the presence of primarily bilateral disputes, particularly disputes over territory that do not lend themselves to pan-regional mechanisms for resolution.²⁴ It is important to keep this difference in mind while speaking of European postmodernism as a model.

However, the difference is no reason for denying Europe’s role as a benchmark. If Asia is to move towards postmodernism in its international

²¹ Dillon, *op.cit.*

²² www.aseansec.org/18098.htm.

²³ Speech By George Yeo, Minister For Foreign Affairs, At the Harvard Project For Asian And International Relations 15th Annual Conference, Singapore, 18 August 2006, <app.mfa.gov.sg/internet/press/view_press_print.asp?post_id=1783>.

²⁴ Mohamed Jawhar, *The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Critical Appraisal*, www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/pacific2001/jawharpaper.htm.

relations, at least two conditions will have to be fulfilled. One is for Asian powers to recognise that their security interests are served best by economic integration. It was coal, steel and agriculture, after all, which paved the way for a currency union that underpins the amazing quest for a common European defence and foreign policy today. Asia is capable of playing in the league of integrating economies. For example, the 14 countries of JACIK have a population of three billion and a GNP of more than US\$7.2 trillion, comparable to that of EU in 2000. JACIK's exports would add up to US\$1.37 trillion, compared to US\$1.2 trillion for NAFTA.²⁵

The second condition is a determination to prevent Europe's past from becoming Asia's future. Europe's past — the wars of religion to the Hundred Years' War and the wars of ideology from Napoleon to Hitler and Stalin — does not have to be Asia's future. But Europe's present — the abolition of war as a viable option among states that had been at one another's throats half a century ago — must be a part of the vision of Asia's future in the next half century. For this to happen, there is a need to recognize that the security of regions is not only about the security of states. It is about the security of people, communities, the environment, ideas and belief — about human security. As an agenda for action, human security alerts us to a twin need: "Safety is the hallmark of freedom from fear, while well-being is the target of freedom from want. Human security and human development are thus two sides of the same coin, mutually reinforcing and leading to a conducive environment for each other."²⁶ Institutions, mechanisms and processes possess rules of membership by adhering to which countries create a common culture of trust and expectation that in turn sets the tone for their interaction.

The old narratives have had their day. It is time for a postmodern Asia.

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²⁵ See the New Asia Forum, an initiative of the New Delhi-based Research and Information System for Developing Countries, www.newasiaforum.org/NAF_Statistics_on_Benefits.htm

²⁶ www.humansecuritynetwork.org/menu-e.php

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The Changing International Security Landscape and the Challenges for National and Regional Security Policy

*Wilfried von Bredow**

One of the current controversies in international relations theory is centred on the conceptual change of the international system. Will it continue to be characterized by the interplay of sovereign states as dominant actors? Or do we observe the rise of quite a different international system that has emerged in the shadow of the traditional one, a system where new kinds of actors beside the states and their governments generate new forms and structures of international relations, and where perhaps even the process of politics beyond the borders of states is changing.¹

There are, of course, other political scientists who contest this hypothesis and point to the "classic" truths and laws of politics among nations.

One aspect of this controversy, not a very prominent one I should think, concerns the roles and goals of the armed forces. The organization and control of violence are generally regarded as prominent duties and privileges of the modern state. From a Hobbesian perspective, both functions are necessary in order to protect the citizens against other citizens (internal aspect), to protect the society against any potential aggressor, and to promote national interests in the political competition and conflicts with other societies (external aspect). According to this view, the modern state emerged by gaining the monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force which forms the nucleus of its sovereignty.

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¹ James N. Rosenau, "Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity", Princeton, N.J. (Princeton University Press) 1990; Mark W. Zacher, "The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple: Implications for International Order and Governance", In: James N. Rosenau, Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds.), *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge (Cambridge University Press) 1992, pp.58-101.

If the international system is really changing not only its structure but also its basic rules and if the state is deeply affected by internal and external developments which render it partly obsolete or at least emasculate it considerably, the claim of a monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force may also be threatened. This does not so much refer to domestic politics but mostly to foreign policies of states and to international relations. Since the end of World War I, the norms of international law began to deny states the use of physical force in their dealings with other states except in the case of defence against an aggressor. This did not yet prevent states from using their armed forces for all kinds of other political purposes. States without a democratic constitution and political culture (totalitarian and authoritarian states) were especially keen in militarizing their external relations.

The end of the East-West conflict generated a new dynamic in the process of change within international relations. Security experts differ on the consequences of the internationalization and perhaps even globalization of certain threats and military risks. Some regard this development as a transitional problem on the way to a post-military international society.² Others have predicted the dawning of a new era of violent inter-cultural conflicts and wars.³

Within the framework of the Westphalian system the legitimacy of the armed forces derived, in a process of consecutive amalgamation, from the concepts of state, nation, and democracy. This framework seems to crumble. The state seems to lose considerable parts of its former sovereignty. The nation seems to lose considerable parts of its capacity for integrating societies. And *democracy*? The optimism of those who wanted to interpret the fall of communism (and for that matter, of many authoritarian and military regimes in other parts of the world) into a worldwide "third wave" of democratization⁴ has always been futile. Most of it is now gone.

This leaves us with a question which I shall discuss on the following pages: How do the changes of the international system and the changing international security landscape in recent years affect the organization of the armed forces and the perspectives of national and regional security policies? This paper will only provide a preliminary answer to this question. Probably not even an answer, but rather an incentive to look deeper into the uncertainties of current security perspectives.

² Martin Shaw, *Post-Military Society, Militarism, Demilitarization and War at the End of the Twentieth Century*. Philadelphia, PA (Temple University Press) 1991, p. 186.

³ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*. New York, N.Y. (Simon & Schuster) 1996.

⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman, OK and London (University of Oklahoma Press) 1991.

I. THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT AND THE BIPOLAR NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION

East-West Conflict, Cold War, and Détente

The East-West conflict was certainly more comprehensive than the term Cold War suggests. The period of the Cold War between the USA and her allies on the one side and the USSR and her satellites on the other was predominantly, but not exclusively shaped by the perceptions of mutual threats. The bipolar international order of the decades following World War II was, at any rate, substantially sustained by the nuclear potentials of the adversaries. In this respect, we can take the nuclear strategic constellation of MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) (partly a doctrine, partly a condition) as representative for the ambivalent stability of the international order at the time. It was certainly not a really peaceful order. But because of the delicate "balance of terror" the antagonists were forced to a (slowly growing) minimum of co-operation. This was at least the lesson of the Cuban missile crisis of autumn 1962. MAD was a constellation which made nuclear war an irrational option, insofar it was all but mad. Moreover, it was strong enough to impede conventional wars between actors over which the so called superpowers had a certain control. Sure enough, sometimes conventional wars were waged; but they were always contained — even wars with American or Soviet participation.

One of the most effective incentives for the partial co-operation between the "super-powers" was their suspicion that other states would do anything in order to become a "member of the nuclear club." Therefore they began building a non-proliferation regime which was one of the decisive steps towards East-West detente, various arms-control agreements, the CSCE process and eventually the breakdown of the "communist camp."

Before that happened, the security landscape of the second half of the 20th century was, indeed, dominated by the bipolar nuclear confrontation. A nuclear war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact was considered as the devastating "worst case." Nuclear strategies were therefore primarily conceived of as deterrence strategies. Proxy wars with conventional and sub-conventional means were, however, possible as long as they did not threaten the superpower-balance. Regional conflicts in the trans-Atlantic region but also on other continents were carefully supervised by the leading powers. They often intervened in these conflicts, directly or indirectly, in order to impede an increase of the geostrategic potential of "the other bloc."

The emergence of a "third world" (following the conference at Bandung in 1955) and the rift between the USSR and China in the late 1950s and early 1960s modified the bipolar structure of the international system, but did not create a new security landscape.

The lengthy and mostly violent process of decolonialization in Asia and Africa emphasized, however, the restricted usefulness of weapons and strategic wisdom for nuclear and conventional warfare. The anti-colonial guerrilla wars since the 1950s exhibited already many features of the so-called New Wars after 1990.

The United Nations functioned during the East-West conflict (both in the Cold War and the subsequent detente era) as a kind of global forum and sometimes as a mediator for regional conflicts (peacekeeping). But because of the ideological and power-political split between the capitalist and the communist world the UN was unable to become a really powerful promoter of peace, human rights and human development.

The End of the East-West Conflict

The end of the East-West conflict was a moment of euphoric melancholy. The ruling elites in the USSR and other Soviet-socialist countries had long-since ceased to foster revolutionary concepts for themselves and the rest of the world. The great majority of the people living under their un-sophisticated and decaying totalitarian regime were only too excited to shed the burden of Soviet-socialism.

The "winning side" of the East-West conflict war primarily surprised by the suddenness of the Eastern breakdown. There were no concepts prepared how to deal with the new situations.⁵ The euphoric moment in the West was rather short, perhaps best summarized in the pictures of happy people climbing on the Berlin wall and celebrating the unification of a formerly divided city. The often quoted "end of history"⁶ did not come with the end of the East-West conflict. For the years that followed the "unipolar moment" made it clear that the victory of the West did not imply universal peace or the universal expansion of the model of liberal democracy. Likewise, there was no real chance to build a "new world order" based on peace, justice, and solidarity.

II. THE EMERGENCE OF NEW THREATS, RISKS, AND DANGERS

Changes in the International System After 1990

Key notions for the transformation of the international system after the end of the East-West conflict are: globalization; regionalization and trans-regionalization;

⁵ Michael J. Hogan (ed.), *The End of the Cold War. Its Meaning and Implications*. Cambridge (Cambridge University Press) 1992.

⁶ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York, N.Y. (The Free Press) 1992.

growth of the number of international actors; new nationalisms; political theologies; state failure.

Globalization

All kinds of political, economic, and cultural actions are more and more linked together in a global context. Networks of mostly asymmetric interdependencies develop: many of them as a reaction to problems which have also grown into global scale. A huge demand for coordination and co-operation between individuals and groups creates more and more inter/transnational agencies, conferences, institutions, organizations, committees, and regimes to deal with these problems. The awareness of globalization is decidedly enhanced by modern mass media.

Regionalization and Trans-Regionalization

Regions with a centre and a periphery are well-known phenomena in history. What seems to be new is the fact that regions today are often defined by different criteria (economic, geopolitical, cultural, religious, military etc.) which allows an overlapping of regions. This has considerable consequences for international relations because it is becoming more and more difficult to paint a hierarchical picture of regions. A region may be "strong" in matters of economy and "weak" in military matters. Regions have no borders like nation states. They may expand or shrink. Because of the impact of globalization on communication, transport and production, regions can not be separated from each other. The new requirement for coordination and co-operation between regions and actors in different regions is called trans-regionalism.

Growth of the Number of International Actors

In fact, not only the number of actors in the international system, but also the variety of actors is increasing immensely. The "state-centric world" (James N. Rosenau) has to learn to coexist with an equally powerful, though decentralized world of non-state actors. The scale of actors in international relations ranges from private persons and "ordinary" citizens to transnational organizations, transnational corporations, movements, all kinds of subgroups and, of course, states. Communication between them is quick, dense, and borderless.

New Nationalisms

Ethnic groups and multi-ethnic states, ethnic minorities in nation states, sometimes also majorities in nation states develop a more militant, more exclusive

identity and demand either autonomy, or more autonomy, or the removal of other groups from "their" territory. The reasons for this development represent a broad range of discontent: lack of participation and collective self-determination, repression, lack of orientation.

Political Theologies

The decline of secular ideologies like communism and the wide-spread suspicion of American or Western dominance in world affairs have generated the rise of a new kind of politics which is inspired by and tensely bound to religious norms, values, and attitudes. We can also find this development in some Western countries, especially the United States where the considerable impact of religious groups on the political system stems from other motives. The de-secularization of politics is often accompanied by militancy and violence.⁷

State Failure

State failure originates from various reasons. It is endemic in regions where state-centric structures were only superficially superposed by foreign powers. The first generation of rulers in states which had emerged from the anti-colonial wars of liberation were mostly educated either in Western countries or in the USSR. They tried to import and modify either the Western or the socialist model of organizing a modern state. This succeeded neither in comparatively rich states nor in poor states. The East-West conflict structure kept many of these weak states superficially functional, but after the end of the East-West conflict the condition of many weak states worsened dramatically. In some cases they fell apart (Somalia) or became engulfed in permanent internal violence (Algeria) or civil wars (Congo), in others they are struggling hard to overcome the devastating consequences of the implosion of a multinational state design (former Yugoslavia).

A European Threat Perception

These changes have remarkable consequences for the threat perceptions and the security doctrines of states. Their governments and their armed forces are to meet new and unprecedented challenges for their security policies or strategies. Current security strategies emphasize a whole range of phenomena which are not directly military threats. The lines between internal and external security and between civil and military aspects of security have been blurred.

⁷ Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God. The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. Berkeley (University of California Press) 2001.

What critics of current security policies denounce as a process of (voluntary and sometimes populist) securitization⁸ seems mostly to be the result of changes which are generated by the above mentioned developments.

A good example for the adaptation of the security strategy to new challenges is the European Security Strategy of 2003.

On 12th December 2003, the Heads of State and Government of the European Union adopted the *European Security Strategy (ESS)*. A common European security policy has not yet been created. The slowly emergent patterns of this policy are in fact new patterns. It is therefore easier for the EU than for many states (including the EU member states) to focus its security strategy on current and anticipated threats.

The *European Security Strategy* defines the following global challenges and key threats to Europe: Global challenges are the indissoluble linkage of internal and external aspects of security, the considerable dependence on an interconnected global infrastructure, poverty and disease in developing countries, competition for natural resources, and energy dependence. The list of key threats comprises terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and their impacts on European interests, state failure, and organised crime. The European strategic objectives are, according to ESS:

- to fight terrorism both on the civil and on the military level in cooperation with other countries, notably the U.S.A;
- to strengthen the international control of WMD non-proliferation;
- to intervene in regional conflicts in order to help restoring and building peace;
- to build security in Europe's neighbourhood, notably the Balkans, the Near East, and the Mediterranean area;
- to develop an international order based on effective multilateralism with stronger international organizations and regimes.

The policy implications for Europe are:

- to become more active in pursuing these strategic objectives;
- to become more capable in terms of military forces without duplications; and
- to develop more coherent policies for crises and post-crisis situations.

⁸ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, *Security. A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, CO (Lynne enner Publ.) 1998.

III. NEW WARS AND ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

New Wars and Their Precursors

In his historic overview on the development of war in modern times, Kalevi Holsti distinguishes three kinds of war. *Institutionalized war* occurred in the 18th century between the states of the expanding European international system and was a rather domesticated, highly professional form of war. Then, with the French Revolution, the flush of victory of nationalism as the most forceful mobilizing ideology for modernizing societies began. One of the consequences of this development was the formation of mass armed forces. Wars between mass armed forces developed the tendency to become *total wars*, a term already used by Clausewitz, albeit with a quite different meaning. The first half of the 20th century witnessed two world wars, which represent the terrible climax of this development. The second half of this century is characterized by the rise of yet another form of war, called "peoples war" or "*wars of a third kind*." These wars are also total wars in a certain sense, but on a restricted level. The indigenous people fought the liberation wars of the decolonisation era in order to create a political community against the colonial power.

The purpose of such wars is often to politicise the masses, to turn them into good revolutionaries and/or nationalists. Civilians not only become major targets of operations, but their transformation into a new type of individual becomes a major purpose of war. Since the distinction between combatant and civilian is blurred or indistinct, it is not surprising that the brunt of casualties are suffered by the inhabitants of villages, towns, and cities.⁹

This typology is certainly helpful, not so much because it offers clear distinctions, but because it makes us aware of the hidden continuities between these forms of war. We ought not to forget, for example, that not only the decolonisation era saw many wars of the third kind as described by Holsti. Some centuries before, the colonial wars of the European powers in the Americas, Africa, and Asia displayed similar features (and similar cruelties).

In an attempt to give an overview of the various names and concepts of the military conflicts that fall into this "third kind," Roger Beaumont lists among others: *dirty war*, *guerrilla war*, *insurgency/counterinsurgency*, *limited war*, *proxy war*, *surrogate war*, and *low-intensity operations*.¹⁰ These wars are, to a large degree, intrastate conflicts between comparatively weak governments and comparatively strong opponents, and they are, indeed, predominantly

⁹ K.J. Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War*. Cambridge (Cambridge University Press) 1996, p.39.

¹⁰ Roger Beaumont, "Small Wars: Definitions and Dimensions", In, *The Annals*, N° 541/1995, pp.20-35.

small wars. They may, however, easily escalate into major threats for third parties, in either the neighbourhood or elsewhere.

Small wars are usually local wars. Territorial control plays an important role in these wars, but mainly on the level of official war aims and the motivation to fight. The fighting itself can be transferred into other regions, e.g. into the urbanized parts of the world. There are enough examples, which illustrate this horizontal escalation such as the struggle between radical Kurds and Turks in Germany and acts of terrorism in Western Europe in the 1970s etc.

The literature on guerrilla warfare of the past few decades provides a vast array of empirical material to study their tactics and strategy. They combine primitive warfare and cruelty with high-tech sophistication and hyper-modern propaganda. Their intensity ranges from sporadic terrorism to secretly prepared genocide.

The current discussion about war in the post East-West conflict era is structured around the notion of "new wars."¹¹ Some features of the new military missions, like fighting insurgents (stability operations), have a tradition of their own. They formed a less visible but always present part of conventional modern warfare. There are, indeed, many similarities between guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare in the decolonisation era of the 20th century and today's "new wars." However, the different political framework and the so-called "revolution in military affairs" are demanding quite new military doctrines and organizations.

A different political framework is of salient importance for the shaping of the "new wars." This is important to note in order to remain sensitive to the impact of political factors on the outbreak, the waging, and eventually the de-escalation of those violent conflicts that fall into the category of "new wars." They originate in zones with weak or failing states. Holsti argues that they will continue into the future because in many parts of the world states are not strong enough to successfully monopolize the means of organised physical violence. The conflicts in question do not become militarized because of the strength of a state, but because of its instability and weakness. When a state is unable to integrate the interests of different groups, when it lacks the ability to contain internal tensions and to sustain law and order, the consequence may well be the outbreak of internal clashes and civil wars.

¹¹ Mary Kaldor, *Neue und alte Kriege. Organisierte Gewalt im Zeitalter der Globalisierung*. Frankfurt/M. (Suhrkamp) 2000; Herfried MÖnkler, *The Wars of the 21st Century*. In, *International Review of the Red Cross*, vol. 85/2003, N° 849, 7-22.; Andreas Herberg-Rothe, *Der Krieg. Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Frankfurt/M. (Campus) 2003.

Mary Kaldor insists on the category of "new wars" because wars like those in former Yugoslavia or in many parts of Africa are distinctively different from "old wars" with regard to their goals, the usage of violence, and their financing. Ideological and geopolitical confrontations are less important than the clash of collective identities. This implies a fight against every single member of the other ethnic, religious or otherwise defined group. Forced migration, mass violation, ethnic cleansing, and genocide belong to the methods of violence in such new wars. Financial resources for the participants of such wars come from different sources — a considerable part through a symbiosis of the war fighting groups with organized crimes (drug trafficking, smuggling, kidnapping, prostitution).¹²

Herfried Münkler regards asymmetry as one of the salient features of the new wars. It should be noted, however, that asymmetric warfare is not a completely new phenomenon. "In a sense, all warfare is asymmetrical as there are never identical belligerents."¹³ In today's world, the differences between belligerents are more dramatic than ever before. The U.S.A. disposes of a high tech military which can be rapidly deployed all over the planet. In recent wars in Africa and on other continents, the decisive factor was not high tech weapons, but second-hand small arms. Acts of terrorism have become an integral part of asymmetric warfare. As Münkler states, greater material resources and a more advanced technological development alone will not automatically tip the scale between victory and defeat. The militaries of the rich Western countries may be the winner in an open battle (like the U.S.A. which won the Gulf war in 2003 without much resistance from the Iraqi troops). The fundamental aim of asymmetric warfare is to find a way round the adversary's military strength by discovering and exploiting, in the extreme, its weaknesses (Pfanner).

The main weakness of complex societies is their infrastructure. Striking against non-military targets often causes spectacular damage. The "new wars" at the fringes of the Western world are comparatively cheap for those who wage them.

Most of these wars are not fought by well-equipped armies but by the hastily recruited militias of tribal chiefs or heads of clans, plus the armed followers of warlords and the like. Above all, the weapons used in the new wars are cheap — small arms, automatic rifles, anti-personnel mines and machine guns mounted on pick-up trucks. Heavy weapons are only rarely used and, when they are, consist

¹² Mary Kaldor, *Global Civil Society. An Answer to War*. Cambridge (Polity Press) 2003, p.119.

¹³ T. Pfanner, "Asymmetric Warfare from the Perspective of Humanitarian Law and Humanitarian Action." In, *International Review of the Red Cross*, vol. 87/2005, N° 857, p.151.

mostly of remnants from the stockpiles of the Cold War. That wars of this type can be fought — and even fought successfully — is mainly due to the fact that they are not decided on the battlefield between two armies but drag on interminably in violence directed against the civilian population.¹⁴

A second salient feature of new wars is their partial privatisation.¹⁵ The emergence of warlords and their privately recruited militaries (often including child soldiers) in zones with failing or failed states is no surprise but a logic consequence. The war economies in these zones are able to tap into the flows of capital and goods in the world market. Apart from oil and strategic raw materials such as ores and minerals, gold and diamonds, the warlords use above all illegal or fraudulently certified goods to finance their wars and frequently to accumulate enormous fortunes.

Revolution in Security Affairs

It is quite normal today, to use the terms "revolution" and "revolutionary" with regard to current changes in warfare. We should be aware that these terms have two different (although not mutually excluding) meanings. Generally, they characterize the enormous technological developments in military technology, like in "revolution in military affairs" (RMD). However, they also refer to strategic, operational and tactic innovations in two quite different political frameworks: first, the anti-colonial wars of the mid-20th century within the East-West conflict¹⁶ and secondly in the turbulent post-East-West conflict era.

Until 1990, the threat perceptions of Western countries had been dominated for more than four decades by the anticipation of a nuclear and/or a non-nuclear (conventional) aggression from the Soviet Union and its allies. Even the decolonisation wars in Africa and Asia were always connected with the main threat of a Soviet or communist inspired aggression. Within this political framework, a first revolution in security affairs occurred. The rapid development of nuclear weapons and carrier systems with a global reach brought about a kind of strategic stalemate. After the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the nuclear "superpowers" U.S.A. and Soviet Union built their defence against each other on the concept of mutually assured destruction. Nuclear peace was an uneasy phenomenon, but it seems to have worked. The main task of the protagonists of the East-West conflict's armed forces was to demonstrate

¹⁴ H. Münkler, *op.cit.*, p.15.

¹⁵ Thomas Jäger, Gerhard Kimmel (eds.), *Private Military and Security Companies. Chances, Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects*, Wiesbaden (VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften) 2007.

¹⁶ Among other, André Beaufre: *La guerre révolutionnaire*. Paris (Librairie Arthème Fayard) 1972.

a credible deterrence. In the case of deterrence failing, NATO troops in Western Europe had the mission to defend the territory against the aggressor. The capacity to do so, however, was necessary in order to make deterrence more credible. The virtualisation of war in Europe and between the "superpowers" was a first and rather dramatic revolution in security matters for it guided the adversaries towards a kind of antagonistic co-operation — as expressed in a whole range of arms control agreements from the 1960s to 1990.

In this period, the armed forces of the Western countries became more of a bureaucratised organization, and military leadership implied more managerial skills than in the past. Before the East-West conflict was about to enter its last phase, Gwyn Harries-Jenkins and Charles Moskos stated bluntly: "In short, the military profession as a whole has become similar to large bureaucratic, non-military institutions. It has, in effect, become civilianised."¹⁷ In the same year, Michel Martin described the development of the French military establishment since 1945 as a passage from "warriors to managers."¹⁸

This trend was sustained by technological change, as well as by the intricate nuclear strategic "balance of terror." Underneath the nuclear level, the armed forces of many Western countries (although not all of them — the German Bundeswehr being the most prominent exception) were engaged in wars. Most of these wars were a mixture of guerrilla war and conventional war. For these wars, the armed forces needed warriors more urgently than managers.

At the same time, the international community started to regard the containment of violence in local or regional conflicts as a high-priority goal — not in all cases, but in those where violence appeared to be especially dangerous for the neighbouring countries or especially evil. In the 1950s, the United Nations developed the instrument of international peacekeeping.

A *peacekeeping force* consists of military components from various nations, operating under the command of an impartial world body and committed to the absolute minimum use of force, which seek to reduce or prevent armed hostilities. The more generic term *peacekeeping operations* includes not only peacekeeping military forces but also such diverse and usually smaller peacekeeping enterprises as observer groups, truce commissions, investigatory missions, and the like. The *peace soldier* is, therefore, one who serves in a military capacity under a command authorized by an internationally accepted mandate and who adheres to impartiality while subscribing to the

¹⁷ Gwyn Harries-Jenkins and Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "Armed Forces and Society." In, *Current Sociology*, vol. 29/1981, p.11.

¹⁸ Michel Martin, *Warriors to Managers: The French Military Establishment since 1945*. Chapel Hill (The University of North Carolina Press) 1981.

strictest standards of absolute minimal force functionally related to self-defense.¹⁹

These are definitions of the traditional kind of peacekeeping. During the East-West conflict, the Security Council of the United Nations initiated a whole range of what we now call traditional peacekeeping operations. Moskos who had looked more closely into UNFICYP peacekeeping operations in Cyprus contended the necessity of special training for peacekeeping soldiers. "Contemporary standards of military professionalism must undergo fundamental redefinition to meet the requirements of the peacekeeping role."²⁰

This role implied a neutral and status quo oriented stand by the military. The interposition of UN forces came only after the belligerents had separated of their own accord.

A famous saying, attributed to Dag Hammarskjöld and to Charles Moskos, stated that peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it. The peacekeeping role combined the traditional image of the soldier as warrior with the non-traditional image of the soldier as a constable. Under the auspices of the East-West conflict, peacekeeping was mainly a business for smaller and middle powers, neutral and non-aligned countries or countries (like Canada, for instance) which developed a generally acclaimed political preference for mediation and brokerage in international politics.

After the end of the East-West conflict, the nuclear balance of terror ceased to be a point of reference for the maintenance of armed forces. In addition, grand scale conventional warfare between big powers or alliances became quite an unlikely scenario. Instead, small wars with different degrees of asymmetry and of different intensity, peacekeeping, and a whole range of military missions other than war fighting seemed to occupy the fantasy of the military planners. The enormous pace of the military technological development in some countries, mainly of course, the United States, generated a revolution in military affairs. The increasing demand for military intervention in nasty fringe wars (from Somalia to Bosnia, from Rwanda to Chechnya, from East Timor to Haiti and Darfur) and the unprecedented growth of international terrorism generated a revolution in the perception of security.

Both processes had and continue to have a remarkable impact on strategic, operational, and even tactic thinking in the military.

¹⁹ Charles C. Moskos, Jr., *Peace Soldiers: The Sociology of a United Nations Military Force*. Chicago, IL (The University of Chicago Press) 1976, p.4.

²⁰ Charles C. Moskos, Jr., *Peace Soldiers*, *op.cit.*, p.10.

IV. GLOBAL SECURITY LANDSCAPE

Local and Global Aspects of Security

If the concept of a global security landscape captures some of the recent developments in international security, we have to reconsider some of the traditional political wisdom based on the existence of a functioning international system of states (Westphalian system). The violation of local or regional peace can always escalate into threatening international security and order. Such escalations produce terror, misery, destruction, and death. Therefore they are also a permanent dark challenge to the human dignity. The moral aspect and the imperatives of a truly global political consciousness go hand in hand. Unfortunately, we have to reckon with a broad gap between this principle and the reality of international politics. This gap is sometimes bridged but often only pushed out of our political horizon.

This is mainly due to the way the current international system is built. Globalization and the development of a global structure outside the state-centric world²¹ have, until now, produced a whole range of concepts and perceptions about politics which do not fit together. In some fields of action (like ecology, international banking etc) we tend to think and to act more and more in global terms. In other fields (like culture, immigration etc) we tend to do exactly the opposite.

Security in the broader sense of the term has both a local and a global character. This is also true for those aspects of security where the military is involved. The organization of armed forces is comparatively expensive (not only in terms of money and finance). This may be one of the reasons, why rulers and governments were mostly concentrating on local and regional aspects of security and neglected its global aspects. Even in the times of European imperialism and colonialism — and also when these times came to an end — the dominant ideas about security and security landscapes were mostly defined in terms of territorial national interests.

The advent of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction changed this perception, but only in parts. A nuclear war between East and West would have had devastating worldwide consequences.²² The potential global threat posed by nuclear and (to a lesser degree) also by biological and

²¹ James Rosenau calls this structure “multi-centric world.” Quoted in N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics. op.cit.*, p.14.

²² One of the most threatening scenarios was the prediction of a “nuclear winter” which would follow the explosion of nuclear devices in an East-West war. Even if some scientists criticized the premises of this scenario it functioned as a strong vehicle for the globalization of our definitions of security.

chemical weapons has survived the East-West conflict and is, albeit with a restricted urgency, still with us.

The new wars developed in the shadow of the nuclear confrontation. Mostly confined to a specific local context or region they became slowly more and more “international” because of the role of television and because of the corresponding wish of the local actors to attract the world media’s attention. This development started at the end of the 1950s. It was accompanied by a permanently growing tendency where local wars broke out of their confined geography (e.g. by projecting acts of terrorism into the metropolitan areas on other continents and by collecting money and recruits wherever a group of partisans of the common cause was to be found).

After the end of the East-West conflict, this development became even more powerful. The considerably high number of local wars and infra-state wars as compared with the number of traditional (“Westphalian”) inter-state wars after 1990 taught the optimistic observers of the post-East-West conflict world that this was not the yet the moment of peace in our times. On the contrary, the numbers of violent conflicts, the number of direct victims, and the direct and indirect repercussions for the international order have to be regarded as an intense challenge for those actors (states, international organizations, and non-state actors alike) which have a strong interest in a non-violent and reliable international order.

This is the international aspect of the current debate about the possibilities and limits of military intervention. Globalization may breed spill-over crises, and it is certainly reasonable (in a realist perspective) for the leading states of the international system to think about a military intervention in the name of maintaining international order. The United Nations Organization appears to be the most suitable institution for debating and possibly preparing such interventions in the name of international peace and security.²³

This aspect is, however, not very prominent in these debates, mostly because the history of the 20th century provides abundantly cases where this kind of collective action did not work, did not take off in time, or did not take off at all.

A second aspect of the current debate is of *a moral* nature. Globalization and the information power of the globalized media which report on atrocities against human beings in certain far places, breed a fragile, flouting, and often highly emotional determination of the public in the leading states. The public there often tries to press their governments and/or the somewhat euphe-

²³ According to the rules and regulations in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

mistically called “international community” to intervene against the perpetrators and mass murderers, the torturers, and war criminals — if necessary also with military means. Nongovernmental organizations with humanitarian goals (interests) are often busy to stabilize this futile public morality and transform it into governmental action. It is only fair to add that many NGOs are also working directly in those conflict areas, providing relief and often enough cooperating with the peacekeepers provided by the community of states.

Sometimes political and moral reasons converge and sometimes they don't. The second case is an embarrassment everybody tends to forget as quickly as possible.

Inevitability and Limits of International Intervention

The leading actors of the international (state-) system tend to regard only those conflicts and wars as a genuine threat which appears to cross the course of their (objective or subjective) national interest. Only then do they consider investing diplomatic and perhaps also military energies in any attempt to de-escalate the conflict or to restore and re-build peace.

Governments usually try to define other conflicts and wars as local or regional affairs where any substantial intervention is too expensive and too dangerous. This attitude by governments, often enforced by the media and public opinion in the countries concerned (or un-concerned), is certainly understandable and makes sense up to a certain degree. It may, though, also have un-welcome consequences.

For some of this local turmoil may develop into full-fledged wars and thus threaten to spill over to the neighbouring territories and potentially also beyond the region. The early containment of a small conflict by the leading powers of the international system may thus be far less expensive than an intervention at a later stage.

There are, of course, no recipes to recognize the regional or global threat potential of a local conflict. Early military intervention in every single conflict of this kind everywhere on the planet is unfeasible and would cause an immediate break-down of the international order. The problem has at least four dimensions:

- identification the really dangerous conflicts as early as possible (preventive stage);
- designing a mix of civil and military resources and measures to de-escalate the conflict (planning stage);

- organization of an intervention with enough multinational legitimacy (implementation);
- reconstruction of a viable social, economic environment and of political stability (post-conflict stage).

The literature authored by experts in the field of military interventions to keep or restore peace generally comes to rather skeptical conclusions about the success of such missions. The consequences of the interventions were at best ambivalent.

During the last decade, political scientists, international lawyers, and politicians have again started to discuss the possibility of providing a catalogue with humanitarian criteria for military interventions, in order to close the gap between political and moral perceptions of the necessity to intervene. One proposal demands that the international community of states should introduce a duty of states to intervene in cases where these criteria are fulfilled.²⁴ Two obstacles seem to be insurmountable when it comes to any institutionalized mechanism concerning military interventions:

- It is utopian to think of a global pattern for the perception of political reality. It is therefore extremely difficult to find criteria which are immune against controversial interpretation.
- The proclamation of a legal duty to intervene whenever and wherever certain humanitarian values are violated would probably not only overburden the leading powers of the international system but would also throw the whole system into a deadly crisis.

The result of these considerations is not very satisfying. Organized violence on a local or regional scale may, because of the mechanisms of globalization, quickly grow into confrontations which threaten regional or even world peace. They might develop into such a murderous intensity that to stand by and just observe the atrocities strikes our consciousness. Such conflicts have to be monitored by the international community of states which must be prepared, under certain conditions, to intervene with armed forces in order to keep or restore peace or, at least, to protect the work of humanitarian organizations.

Even if many people in societies like North America or Western Europe consider their countries as “warless societies”²⁵ they will have to keep efficiently armed, trained, and organized military forces.

²⁴ Dieter Senghaas, *Weltinnenpolitik – Ansätze für ein Konzept*. *Europa Archiv*, vol. 47/1992, N°. 22, pp.643-652.

²⁵ Charles C. Moskos, *Streitkräfte in einer kriegsfreien Gesellschaft*. *Sicherheit und Frieden*, vol. 8, N° 2, 1990, pp.110-112.

V. MULTINATIONAL CRISIS REACTION

New Missions

The changes in the ways to wage war and the enlargement of the concept of security have led to new security strategies with a new canon of security threats and risks. The response to these new threats and risks is partly a military one, partly a civil one. In order to prevent and contain the horizontal escalation of conflicts and crises, the international community introduced *crisis response operations (CRO)*.

This kind of military human intervention has had many different names in the past decade. It is part of an international crisis management, which is mainly, but not only organized in the framework of the United Nations. NATO uses now the term *crisis response operations* instead of the older term *peace support operations (PSO)*.

There are many slightly different definitions of PSO. A representative example is the 1997 definition by the Swedish armed forces:

PSO is the military term used to cover both peacekeeping (PK) and peace enforcement (PE) operations. PSO differ from war in that they are complex operations that do not have a designated enemy but are designed as part of a composite approach involving diplomatic and generally humanitarian agencies to achieve a long-term peace settlement. Military activities in PSO will be, without exception, part of a wider strategy in support of political goals.²⁶

A 1999 definition in the British Joint Warfare Publication 3-50 is a little broader:

PSO was a term first used by the military to cover peacekeeping (PK) and peace enforcement (PE) operations, but is now used more widely to embrace not only PK and PE but also those other peace related operations, for example, conflict prevention, peace making, peace building, and humanitarian operations, which are principally the preserve of civilian agencies.

PSO are increasingly in response to complex intra-state conflicts involving widespread human rights violations as opposed to more traditional PK, which was generally conducted in the aftermath of an inter-state conflict or war.²⁷

²⁶ K. Schmidseider, *Internationale Interventionen und Crisis Response Operations: Charakteristika, Bedingungen und Konsequenzen für das Internationale und Nationale Krisenmanagement*. Frankfurt/M. (Peter Lang), 2003, p.26.

²⁷ Schmidseider, *op.cit.*, p.27.

Instead of PSO, the United States used in their manuals and directives the term *military operations other than war (MOOTW)*.

NATO differentiates between six kinds of PSO or CRO:

- conflict prevention (CP): preventive deployment, early warning, surveillance, sanctions and embargoes, non-combatant evacuation operations;
- peacemaking (PM); mainly diplomatic activities like good offices, mediation, conciliation, diplomatic pressures;
- peacekeeping (PK): observation, interposition force, transition assistance, arms control;
- peace enforcement (PE): enforcing sanctions and embargoes, protection of humanitarian operations, establishment and enforcing of no-fly-zones, establishing and protecting safe areas or exclusion zones;
- peace-building (PB): military aid to civil authorities, assistance to refugees or displaced persons;
- humanitarian operations (HUMOPS): humanitarian aid, disaster relief, protection of human rights.

These operations are not always, but mostly 'operations other than war'. However, even when they include fighting, they are categorically different from traditional war fighting operations. This is the reason why these new missions demand a new profile and a renewed professional self-understanding of the soldier.

Civil-Military Complexities

In his most stimulating book on the utility of force in current and future conflicts, the former British General Rupert Smith points at six trends which characterize the new missions of armed forces:

- The ends for which we fight are changing from the hard objectives that decide a political outcome to those of establishing conditions in which the outcome may be decided.
- We fight amongst the people, not on the battlefield.
- Our conflicts tend to be timeless, even unending.
- We fight so as to preserve the force rather than risking all to gain the objective.
- On each occasion new uses are found for old weapons and organizations which are the products of industrial war.

- The sides are mostly non-states, comprising some form of multinational grouping against some non-state party or parties.²⁸

These six trends must be complemented by another one: The new missions demand a close and trustful civil-military co-operation. Civil-military co-operation (CIMIC) comprises all aspects of the relationship between military forces, the national authorities and civilian population in an area where the military forces are employed. NATO document MC 411/1 (January 2002) defines civil-military co-operation as “The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national populations and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.”²⁹ It is important to note that this kind of operations does not imply military control of civilian organizations or the reverse.

A functioning civil-military co-operation is meanwhile one of the most important prerequisites of a successful multinational crisis reaction. This was always the case with respect to disaster relief operations. But today, no intervention by the international community in local trouble spots can be conceived of without the combination of civil and military goals, the former being, in the long run, decisive for the success of the intervention.

The Case of Afghanistan

In view of the history of the country, Afghanistan is a rather unlikely candidate for a successful political and military rescue operation. Democracy, civil society, and participation of the citizens in political affairs have no tradition. The violent decade after the Soviet invasion in 1979/80 generated a multi-faceted war between various ethnic groups and warlords, furthermore, it created the political atmosphere for the surge of the militant and very authoritarian Islamism of the Taliban. After 9/11, the Taliban regime demonstratively expressed practical solidarity with Al Qaeda terrorists. Therefore the removal of the Taliban became one of the first and salient goals of the international coalition against terrorism which was also, albeit half-heartedly, supported by the Pakistani government.

The Taliban regime quickly collapsed. Some of the leaders of the Taliban government and of Al Qaeda escaped, however. At the end of 2001, it was evident that the reconstruction of Afghanistan would have to be comprehensive

²⁸ Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force. The Art of War in the Modern World*. New York (Alfred A. Knopf) 2007, p.271.

²⁹ <http://www.nato.int/docu/mc411-I-e.htm> (Jan 6, 2008).

and would need enormous amounts of material and non-material resources in order to reach the take-off phase.

The consolidation and stabilization of Afghanistan turned out to be the most difficult and most demanding challenge for the international community. This became even more evident in the light of the ill-fated attempt of the America-led *Coalition of the Willing*, after the removal of the dictatorship by Saddam Hussein, to democratize Iraq according to American concepts. Together with other European and non-European countries, Germany played an important role in the process of stabilizing Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban. At the end of December 2001, Security Council Resolution 1386 called for an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Since then, German armed forces join the armed forces of about 40 other states in assisting the (weak) Afghan government to create some sort of security around the capital Kabul and later also in other provinces of the country.³⁰

Germany's presence in Afghanistan is the consequence of the decision of a broad majority of the Parliament and of two consecutive governments to respond to the threats and dangers which would grow out of a failed state in that part of the world.

In order to do so effectively, a mix of military and civilian goals has to be attained. This is emphasized in the 2007 Afghanistan Concept of the German government.

The tasks facing the international peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan are both military and civilian in nature. In the future, they will be integrated more and more into a comprehensive strategy. The development of the police force and the legal system, the disarming of illegal militias, as well as the extension of government rule to all provinces are interdependent.

Sustainable crisis prevention can only be achieved in the framework of a broader strategy. This includes military security activities, civilian reconstruction efforts, and the implementation of development projects.³¹

Civil-military co-operation is not only the expression of a division of labour between military protection and civil reconstruction. On the contrary, the provincial reconstruction teams and many other common civil-military

³⁰ One of the difficulties of ISAF stems from the delicate co-existence with another military operation, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) which is part of the ongoing and at least in Afghanistan not really successful war on terrorism.

³¹ Stabilizing Afghanistan by military and civilian means, <http://bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Article/2006/10/2006-10-31-afghanistan-mit-militaerischen-und-politischen-mitteln-stabilisieren.html>.

activities in Afghanistan underscore the necessity of a new civil dimension of the military profession.

One of the main goals of international interventions like that in Afghanistan is to strengthen the political and administrative self-reliance of the damaged societies. A often used term for this goal is good governance. Any attempt to arrive at good governance in a weak or failing state has to rely on the sound co-operation between civil and military, local and regional, national and international actors.

Security Sector Transformation

The above mentioned European Security Strategy reflects not only the structural change in the international system. It is based on a more comprehensive approach to security and security policy. One of its implications is the necessity to redefine the functions and structure of the security sector and especially the armed forces. This necessity is, with a different emphasis, also present in the often-quoted September 2002 National Security Strategy of the U.S.A.

The term “security sector” is comparatively new in the security discourse. Experts in security sector reform use it either in a broader or in a more limited sense. The latter definition comprises armed organizations like the regular armed forces, paramilitary forces, police forces, and the intelligence agencies. The broader definition widens the scope and integrates private security firms, other non-governmental actors with certain interests in security matters, and even the judiciary in the security sector.

Security sector reform refers mostly to post-communist countries and those of the former Third world, which undergo a transition process and want to democratise. A well functioning democracy is hardly thinkable without successful democratic control of the armed forces and other security agencies. The complex transition process should be based on a comprehensive security approach. The necessity of a comprehensive approach does not only stem from political factors. The impact of economic and cultural globalisation, the re-emergence of ethnic and religious militancy, international terrorism, in short the very nature of the new threats and risks demand a thorough security sector reform not only in new democracies, but also in the well-established Western democratic societies.

For the Americans, the Somali intervention in the early 1990s, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the 2003 Gulf war against the dictatorial regime of Saddam, Hussein are painful examples for the problems the stronger military party will meet without a well-adapted security sector.

In the Information Age, it's not just smart weapons that win wars. It's the total package — the total information picture that is important.

Even with long-range precision weapons, you still need a network that gets you inside your opponent's decision cycle. Aidid beat the Army in Mogadishu and Al Qaeda beat the Navy in Yemen because, in both cases, they had better information about us than we had about them — exactly the same situation that existed on September 11, 2001.³²

These are also telling examples for the necessity to adopt a comprehensive approach to the political, economic, social, religious, and security aspects of the country, where the intervention takes place in the name of human rights, democratization and disarmament. In the future, the armed forces of the many countries will often be engaged in new missions. They will have to create peace between civil war parties. They will control truces in traditional peacekeeping missions, but they will also have to protect the population against attacks by insurgents in robust or strategic peacekeeping missions. They will have to fight the troops of ruthless warlords in the name of the international community.

These new missions in violent conflicts and new wars demand, with special pressure, a cautious redefinition of the functions, mental and physical condition, range of capacities, and, last but not least, of the professional self-perception of the soldiers serving in the armed forces. The catchword for this process is transformation. Transformation of the security sector is complex and far from approaching its end.

VI. CONCLUSION: A NEW MILITARY

Around the turn of the century, military sociologists debated what some of them called (to the chagrin of their colleagues) the *postmodern military*.

The Postmodern military is characterized by five major organizational changes. One is the increasing interpenetrability of civilian and military spheres, both structurally and culturally. The second is the diminution of differences within the armed services based on branch of service, rank, and combat versus support roles. The third is the change in the military purpose from fighting wars to missions that would not be considered military in the traditional sense. The fourth change is that the military forces are used more in international missions authorized (or at least legitimated) by entities beyond the nation state. A final change is the internationalisation of military forces themselves.³³

³² B. Berkowitz, *The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century*, (The Free Press), New York 2003, p.117.

³³ Moskos, Charles C., J.A. Williams, D.R. Segal (eds.), *The Postmodern Military. Armed Forces After the Cold War*. Oxford (Oxford University Press) 2000, p.2.

Postmodernity and/or postmodern features of current history were widely discussed in the 1990s. Today, this quasi-ironic perspective on the time we live in has somehow lost much of its aggressive freshness. In spite of this, the diagnoses of the authors Moskos, Williams and Segal which were collected in order to depict the changes in the organisation of the armed forces in such different countries as Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and, of course, the United States, converged. The political environment of the armed forces generated new challenges for them, and they had to respond by adapting their structures and skills to meet the new requirements.

The Swiss military writer and former general, Gustav Dtiniker³⁴ was one of the first to paint the outline of the new soldier of the 21st century. He did not shy away from occasional idealism, but this made his essay provocative in the most positive sense of the word. Here are (with some alterations and additions) some of his propositions for the future (or futuristic?) soldier in Western armed forces:

- The armed forces will have to fulfil mainly functions of prevention, intervention, and restoration of order. Deterrence and traditional combat will not disappear. They will, however, become of secondary importance.
- Military intervention by third parties in a local conflict is the first step towards a reconciliation process. The ‘enemy’ is not to be defeated and destroyed, but his actions have to be stopped in order to prepare him for a kind of re-education.
- The motivation, and the moral and political basis of the soldier’s professionalism is no longer or not solely his or her allegiance to the nation state, but a kind of cosmopolitan perception of the necessity to defend human rights, prevent genocide and other atrocities, and to keep or enforce peace. To balance a strong military patriotism and a more cosmopolitan perspective is not always easy.
- As crisis response operations (CRO) are in nearly all cases a reaction of the international community, military units will have to get used to serve more and more in multinational frameworks.³⁵
- The military will no longer seek military victory. Instead, the soldiers will have to create and protect suitable conditions for comprehensive and stable peace settlements, which integrate former enemies.

³⁴ Gustav D. Aniker, *Wende Golfkrieg. Vom Weser and Gebrauch ktinftiger Streitkrifte*. Frankfurt/M. (Report Verlag) 1992.

³⁵ W.E. Kretchik, “Multinational Staff Effectiveness in UN Peace Operations: The Case of the U. S. Army and UNMIH.” In: *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 29/2003, N° 3, pp.393-413.

- War criminals will have to be caught by the armed forces which will act as a police force. These individuals will be brought before an international criminal court and will be held personally responsible for their violations of the law.
- The soldiers are not allowed to think and behave according to purely military norms and rules. At least among the officer corps, a genuine ability to think in political and diplomatic terms will become part of their education and training.
- Flexibility and multi-functionality are becoming as important on the battlefield as fire and mobility.
- The armed forces will have to build up Special Forces against especially dangerous threats like terrorism by extremist groups and their backers. Soldiers in these kinds of forces are, indeed, warriors. They will have to fight both on the level of sheer physical violence with 'primitive' weapons and on the level of a highly advanced network-centric warfare model.³⁶
- Military activities within CRO often overlap with paramilitary police activities. A certain constabularization of the military is probable.
- It is important to keep in mind that these elements of the armed forces' functions do, not *replace* their traditional missions (deterrence and defence) but *complement* them.
- The role of the classic "mud soldier"³⁷ tends to be underestimated in the military establishment. In some militaries, a certain gap may develop between a spirit of strong commitment to the warrior aspects of the soldier's role among the rank and file and younger officers on the one side and more positive attitudes toward crisis response operations among the military establishment on the other.

Do these elements form a coherent picture of the new military? Probably not. In military circles, there is no consensus about the weight of the different elements in the future role of the soldier. But with a changed international security landscape and quite different sorts of missions for the armed forces it is only logical to think of the military profession as a profession in transition.

³⁶ B. Berkowitz, *The New Face of War*, *op.cit.*, p.113.

³⁷ G.C. Wilson, *Mud Soldiers: Life Inside the New American Army*. New York (Charles Scribner's Sons) 1998.

Book Review

**Armed Groups: Studies in National Security,
Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency[†]**

*Reviewed by Nusrat Zahan**

Terrorism has long been recognized as a threat for global security and after the September 11th terrorist incidents in the USA, global community employed a range of protective measures through diplomatic cooperation to combat international terrorism and ensure global peace and security. In this context, Jeffrey H. Norwitz has ventured into a commendable job of editing the book entitled *ARMED GROUPS Studies in National Security, Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency* to analyze the significant aspects of the global security threat. The book contains 5 parts with a good number of research papers and thinking of diverse eclectic groups on contemporary global war on terrorism, strategies for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. The book has been published by U.S. Naval War College several months ago and the research findings are highly valuable for understanding the emerging pattern of armed groups and security threats.

The book contains five parts:

- Part 1: History and Armed Groups
- Part 2: Present Context and Environment
- Part 3: Religion as Inspiration

[†] Edited by Jeffrey H. Norwitz, Foreword by Admiral Stansfield Turner, US Navy (ret) and former Director of Central Intelligence, published by US Naval War College (Newport, Rhode Island), USA, 2008.

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- Part 4: Thinking Differently About Armed Groups
- Part 5: The Shape of Things to Come

The first part of the book presents research papers with case studies on the Italian Red Brigades, armed conflict in Cambodia, East Timor's FRETILIN Guerrillas and Irish Republican Army. This part basically explains the evolution of armed groups, courses of developing their strategy, tactics of war against armed groups and pseudo operation.

To analyze the evolutionary behavior of armed groups, it defines armed groups and three basic categories falling along a spectrum 'ranging from poorly organized, disjointed, and motivated by greed, to highly organized, coordinated, and motivated by ideology' (Peter T. Underwood, p.3). It critically reviews weak governments as 'providing opportunities for armed groups originating from a desire for profit' (Underwood, p.11). The book narrates the reality of poverty, its link to terrorism and states, 'At the leadership levels, the poverty link to terrorism is tenuous at best. Leaders within the Red Brigades or Al Qaeda have been, for the most part, relatively well educated and, presumably, economically prosperous (or at least they had access to the means to achieve prosperity). However, at the lower *worker* levels ... poverty arguably has played a more significant role in fueling despair and thus facilitating recruitment' (Paul J. Smith, p.23). Smith's logic can be rightly placed in Asia since terrorist groups are running their academy in poverty-ridden and environmentally disaster prone areas of this continent. In South Asia, many students of religious education institutions are coming from poor economic background with low level of social consciousness and they can be easily motivated to take part in terrorist activity as a holy religious duty. Smith therefore, rightly quotes, '... bin Laden and many of his lieutenants and agents have not been victims of poverty or deprivation, tens of millions of people in the region have been.' (quoted, Smith, p.23) and '... Diaspora Muslims residing in Western Europe face much higher unemployment rates — typically double those of the native population — which provides a convenient pool of potential terrorist recruits.' (quoted, Smith, p.23-24). Hence, it should be noted, factors favorable for terrorist recruitment are not necessarily related to the issue of poverty only, it relates to the mind set up towards radicalization as well. According to the CSIS study (2006-7/07, p.2-3), 'Radicalization is a very individual process — there are no easy profiles. The factors and influences responsible for one person's transformation may differ significantly from those of another ... these individuals take the violent defense of Islam as a personal goal and religious obligation ... Parents who share their radical ideologies with their children can also be a factor in radicalization ... Overseas

experiences can also help expose young radicals to older, more experienced Jihadists and possibly training opportunities.'

By clarifying 'some of the driving factors that animate the challenges of armed groups today' (xvii), the book also presents research analysis in the context of maritime domain, globalization and arms proliferation applicable to domestic and international arena. To analyze the threats of maritime domain by terrorist groups, Rohan Gunaratna explores their operational abilities, explains the intensity of threat to onshore and offshore maritime infrastructure from all levels of attack — sea, land and air. He observes most guerrillas and terrorists as 'landlubbers' by nature and justifies the actual threat to maritime assets as medium to low for two reasons:

- 'First, very few terrorist groups have the capabilities to attack maritime targets.
- Second, very few attractive maritime targets could be attacked without expending many resources.' (Rohan Gunaratna, p.83).

His suggestions to the law enforcement and intelligence services for an effective strategy are:

- 'a. creating dedicated maritime counterterrorist commands to target terrorist groups with land-based maritime assets;
- b. securing waterways used by ships operating in areas where terrorist and criminal groups are active;
- c. protecting cruise liners, oil tankers, liquefied natural gas and liquefied propane gas carriers, and other vessels transporting strategic cargo operating in areas where terrorist and criminal groups are known to be active' (Gunaratna, p.83-84).

However, although Rohan's arguments to justify the actual threat of terrorist's attack to maritime assets as 'medium to low' — sound rational, the threat can be assessed as 'high' from the geo strategic perspective of global energy security. Statistics on maritime security reflect the fact that frequency of maritime piracy has increased in recent decades and nexus of maritime piracy and terrorism can have a devastating impact on global energy security. The strategic waterways of Strait of Hormuz (located between the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf, represents 40% of the world's seaborne oil shipments), Bab el Mandeb (located between Yemen and Djibouti, connecting the Red Sea), the Bosphorus (connecting the Black Sea with the Sea of Marmara and useful for international navigation), coastal areas of Western Africa and most importantly, the Strait of Malacca (located between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, regulating the trade relations of major

regional powers in Asia — India, China, Japan and South Korea) are strategically very much vulnerable to terrorist's threat. Maritime pirates and terrorists groups belong to common organized crime syndicates in these belts and geographic features of these sea passages force sea vessels, oil tankers to pass through these areas on a regular basis. So, any disruption of naval security of these sea routes can affect the balance of global trade management seriously.

Sea and land access of developing countries, on the other hand, are also providing good aspects of networking terrorist organizations in a micro level which also can create threat for security of small states. In this context, arms trafficking and arms proliferation in Bangladesh can be considered as an example. Sea coast areas of the southern part i.e., *Akyab* in Myanmar, *Naikhongchori* in Teknaf, *Moheshkhali* in Cox's Bazaar, *Bashkhali* and *Sitakunda* in Chittagong are strategically very much vulnerable to cross border arms trafficking of South and South-east Asia. Since Bangladesh's geographic location is at the heart of Golden Triangle (the eastern part of Myanmar's *Shan* state, areas of Northern Thailand and northern Laos, bordering southwest China) in the east, Golden Crescent (the northeastern and southern Afghanistan, NWFP of Pakistan and *Shistan Baluchistan* of Iran) in the west and Golden Wedge (the northern India including *Himachal Pradesh*, *Uttar Pradesh* and *Arunachal Pradesh*, parts of Nepal and Bhutan) in the north, international arms-drug traffickers and terrorist groups may use the route as a corridor.

Moreover, the Golden Crescent arms and drug trades are intimately related to the terrorist's activities of Asia as well. It produces three quarters of world's opium, representing millions of dollars of earnings to drug and terrorist' syndicates. During Afghanistan's fight between 1982 and 1992, more than 100,000 foreign fighters were directly influenced by the Afghan war. They had been imparted with very sophisticated types of training and the funding was significantly generated from Golden Crescent drug trade. Prior to the 70's decade, opium production in this region was directed to small regional markets but over the subsequent decades, new surge in opium production unfolded in this region and powerful armed and terrorist syndicates allied with organized crime are now competing for strategic control over these heroin routes.

To provide a comprehensive foundation about the legal principles for dealing with armed groups, Allen (Craig H. Allen, p.88) therefore, rightly noted three legal issues for reader's attention:

- i. 'to what extent should members of armed groups be killed by armed forces of a state without prior due process?'
- ii. 'what are the standards applicable to their capture, interrogation, treatment and release?'

- iii. 'what is their criminal liability under the law of war or criminal laws typically applied in peace time?' (p.xviii)

To explain religious factors as inspiration of future form of conflict, the book critically presents an in depth analysis of the power of religion, myths-motivations of violence and Islamist ideology. Otis, in his paper, *Armed with the Power of Religion: Not Just a War of Ideas*, proposes four sources of religious power i.e., Resources, Interpersonal Power, Communication and Expertise. He states, 'Religion, when viewed as ideology with a God factor, is assumed to be the single most important determining factor in international conflict.' (Pauletta Otis, p.216). To analyze different aspects of Islamist ideologies, Mehrdad Mozayyan on the other hand quotes, 'Many of the references to jihad in the *Qur'an* were aimed at encouraging those who were reluctant to fight, reminding them that God is fighting along their side, and of the fantastic rewards to be given to those who fight. There is considerable body of literature dealing with the rewards and the high status reserved for martyrs' (quoted, Mehrdad Mozayyan, p.241). Hence, it can be noted that the word 'Islam' means peace and it encourages peaceful coexistence. Islam conveys the messages like- 'You have been created as a moderate nation to be a witness for truth for mankind' and 'there is no compulsion or coercion in religion. Your religion is yours and my religion is mine'. Majority of Muslims of the world are peace loving. They practice moderate version of life and religious tolerance. Since Islamist terrorist groups are violating the rights of mankind and moved by wrong interpretation of Islamic values, it is therefore urgent to raise global consciousness about peaceful tenet of Islam.

To think differently about armed groups, the book effectively presents empirical and predictive analysis about tribal system, state cohesiveness and the role of information technology in global terrorist activity. It explains anthropology as a field to study armed groups and explores how ordinary people can act in violent way, through the lens of 'cognitive' anthropology. However, authors in this part, could discuss detail about the culture of tribal groups of Durand Line areas since these tribal areas are dominated by local tribal groups. Their traditional way of political culture made this area difficult to the path of modernization and their tribal customs, traditions, war fighting abilities reflect the fact that anthropological insight in studying armed groups is imperative for developing an effective global counterterrorism strategy.

With a critical view of traditional security approaches and the role of transnational actors, the book also explains the issue of financing armed groups and identifies the level of collusion between terrorists — arms traffickers to understand the most complex and vexing aspects of terrorism. Hence, the

undeniable fact is, Islamist terrorist groups have spiritual inspiration on extreme religious views and Taliban of Afghanistan. There are many Afghan veterans who are running their training camps in the remotest areas of South Asia to share their experiences about fire arms and war tactics. They are connected with international terrorist network and providing arms and training assistance to create a new generation of good militant workers. As a part of strategy, threats of armed and terrorist groups therefore, have to be combated on different fronts. We need to choke off the financial sources of global terrorist network on a priority basis. Mass awareness in developing countries about the threat of terrorism and building partnership between developed and developing world need to be established urgently. Since terrorists are not born, they are made and terror feeds on poverty, reducing rich-poor gap of global economic and trade management between the North and South may also reduce the number of terrorist recruitment in Asia and Africa. Law enforcement agencies of domestic and international institutions should play an effective role in drawing up list of terrorists, armed groups, their associates and their internal-external sources of funding. The time is now to identify all sources of power of global terrorist network. Otherwise, it will be the strongest driving force to reshape the geopolitical map of Asia.

Finally, the research papers by the authors of this book are pioneering efforts in the field of security strategy, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. The Editor deserves a big applause and welcome, and I am hopeful that, US Naval War College will undertake more substantive works in this area of study in future to ensure sustainable peace and security of our common world.